Freeriding enables strategic blackmail, which ensures entrapment
Ashford ’17 [Emma M.; Jul 6; Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal “Hegemonic blackmail: entrapment in civil war intervention,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2017.1341843#2b85d6ca-6520-4a3d-8e4a-aa9f2ee3f33d-357c6cfb-53ba-4fa0-8e6b-e69fc2b8ce9f]
Entrapment occurs largely when no national security interest is at stake; indeed, this is the key distinction between entrapment and the classic notion of “chain-ganging” (Christensen and Snyder 1990). The mechanisms by which entrapment can occur include: (1) a state’s choice to defend its ally for reasons of credibility; (2) socialization, which encourages the adoption of an ally’s interests (so-called “self-entrapment”); (3) provocation, as alliance formation creates a security spiral; (4) an alliance emboldens a small state to attack a competitor; or (5) a state, fearful of abandonment, initiates conflict in a last-ditch attempt to preserve the alliance (Snyder 1984, Betts 2011, Findley et al. 2012). Of these, both credibility and socialization pressures are plausible drivers of involvement in civil conflict.
In effect, each can be understood as a strategic interaction between State A (the potential intervener) and State B (A’s ally) over an intervention in a third-party state (State C). In the case of credibility, State A may fear that its refusal to back B’s intervention in C’s civil war may undermine its commitments to other allies. Alternately, the process of alliance socialization, with frequent meetings and joint military exercises over time, may encourage State A to absorb B’s interests, including those it is pursuing in its intervention. In both cases, alliance dynamics push A toward support of B’s ongoing intervention. In addition to these “natural” forms of civil war entanglement – i.e., pressures that are an inevitable result of strong security ties – it is also possible for State B to increase the odds of an intervention by State A. Indeed, B sometimes has a strong incentive to do so, particularly when A has substantially higher military capacity.
Put more simply, small states can benefit substantially from the intervention of a major power ally, particularly if they lack the capacity or manpower to carry out an effective campaign alone. African Union peacekeeping forces, for example, typically lack military assets required for their missions; training, logistical support and equipment are often provided by the United States to overcome this deficiency (Williams 2011). Such pressure is far less likely if A and B both have high military capacity, or if A is weaker, as State B wouldn’t need external support to achieve its objectives in these cases. Likewise, if both A and B have low military capacity, then A’s support is unlikely to be of help. In these three scenarios, there is also a high potential for free riding, particularly in cases of humanitarian crisis (Gent 2007). Thus, pressure from allies to join an intervention is likely to be highest when A is larger (i.e., relatively more capable in military terms) than B, and has the potential to tip the balance toward B’s intervention objectives. There are two ways in which State B can seek to entangle A in its ongoing intervention. First, it can seek to manipulate public and policymaker opinion, purposefully using diplomatic pressure, as well as lobbying and media manipulation to shift public opinion on intervention. Prior studies show that media coverage is often a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for intervention, particularly in humanitarian crises (Jakobsen 1996, Gilboa 2005). Second, State B can seek to alter the strategic balance inside C’s civil war in ways that alter A’s incentives. Indeed, actors within a civil war can deter third-party intervention using methods like salami tactics to reduce threat perceptions (Werner 2000); State B can use similar tactics, seeking to empower rebel forces and increase the level of threat State A feels from the conflict. B can also take steps which increase the odds of victory or shorten the projected time horizon of the intervention. These two approaches form a rough type of strategic “blackmail,” allowing State B to entangle A in its ongoing intervention.