Libya proves NATO entrapment is certain and impossible to deescalate if we give them unconditional security cooperation
Ashford ’17 [Emma M.; Jul 6; Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal “Hegemonic blackmail: entrapment in civil war intervention,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2017.1341843#2b85d6ca-6520-4a3d-8e4a-aa9f2ee3f33d-357c6cfb-53ba-4fa0-8e6b-e69fc2b8ce9f]
In order to better understand these dynamics, this article offers a preliminary analysis of two recent cases where the United States has faced substantial pressure to intervene in civil wars: Syria and Libya. In both cases, American allies have taken active military and covert actions, and have sought to induce the United States to join them. These case studies do not aim to test a specific hypothesis – or to prove that alliance pressure is the only factor which influences intervention decision-making – but rather aim to further explore and illustrate the process of civil war entrapment. The two cases are distinct: the United States chose to join a major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya, but has been more reticent to intervene directly against the Assad regime in Syria.
Alliance dynamics in Libya
During 2011, substantial pressure was placed on American policymakers by France and the United Kingdom, both of whom strongly supported a pro-rebel intervention in Libya. This intervention has sometimes been portrayed as a choice by the Obama administration, a policy infamously described as “leading from behind.” Yet the timing of pressure implies strongly that American allies instead actively lobbied to obtain necessary American military support. Indeed, as then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in his memoirs, “Asked if the situation in Libya involved our ‘vital national interests,’ I honestly said I did not think so – but our closest allies felt that it affected their vital interests and therefore we had an obligation to help them” (Gates 2014, p. 521). For France’s Nicholas Sarkozy, an intervention in Libya offered substantial domestic political benefits, while historical British animosity toward Gaddafi was enhanced by concerns about the growing humanitarian costs of the Arab Spring uprisings. Yet both Britain and France would have struggled to conduct an intervention alone; as British Defense Secretary Liam Fox later admitted, “NATO could not have done it without the US” (quoted in Wintour and Watt 2011).
Protests against the government of Muammar Gaddafi began as early as February 2011, but it was not until Gaddafi launched a military counteroffensive against rebel groups that international pressure began to grow for an intervention to protect civilians. Even then, as Chivvis (2012, p. 67) notes, “when the conflict in Libya began, another US military intervention in the Middle East seemed a distant possibility at best.” Instead, France and the United Kingdom took the lead, building momentum for intervention on humanitarian grounds through an aggressive public relations (PR) campaign (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).
Though the United States only agreed to join the intervention two days before the key vote on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, American military capacity was instrumental (Barry 2011). Indeed, though the United States tried to step back from the air campaign after the initial 10 days, it came under consistent pressure to commit more resources. European states found it difficult to maintain a high-intensity air campaign without American support, and were only able to manage 150 of 300 planned daily strikes inside Libya. The United States provided 80 per cent of all air-to-air refueling (Barry 2011), and “surged” hundreds of staff to the Combined Air Ops Centre in Italy in order to handle European intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) shortfalls (Chivvis 2012). Despite this reliance, America’s allies sought to expand the campaign. Indeed, even as France and the United Kingdom were publicly calling on the United States to join them in creating a no-fly zone, they privately recognized the National Transitional Council as Libya’s government, and began to covertly assist rebel groups (Kuperman 2013).
Allied pressure was most apparent in the run-up to the intervention, as concerted diplomatic and public relations efforts focused on obtaining American support. Both Sarkozy and Cameron strongly favored intervention, a marked contrast to the skepticism and debate in the White House (Chivvis 2012). During a later parliamentary enquiry, British policymakers were clear that they felt it was their influence that tipped the balance in internal American debates. As Liam Fox, British Secretary of Defence, later noted, “It is no secret that the US were quite reticent about getting involved militarily … in a Libyan campaign.” William Hague, Foreign Secretary, concurred: “I think in the UK and France we did influence the United States on this subject where there were divisions” (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2016).
It was under this pressure that President Obama sent his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to meet with Libyan opposition leader Mahmoud Jibril in Paris; her advocacy on Jibril’s behalf would later prove influential in the American choice to join the intervention (Becker and Shane 2016). As Obama himself later admitted: “this is not so at the core of US interests that it makes sense for us to unilaterally strike against the Gaddafi regime. At that point, you’ve got Europe and a number of Gulf countries … who are calling for action” (quoted in Mason 2016).12 Defense Secretary Robert Gates ultimately concluded in his memoir that “Qaddafi’s bloodthirsty rhetoric … the action of the Arab League, and strong British and French pressure for NATO to act, I think, persuaded the president” (Gates 2014, p. 518).
French and British leaders took a two-pronged approach to achieve this influence, relying on private diplomatic channels and the media to build public support. At the United Nations, British diplomats handled the drafting of several Security Council resolutions, building momentum for Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of military force. In order to bolster the case that the intervention was a widely accepted humanitarian mission, diplomats procured an Arab state amenable to the intervention (Lebanon) and a defector (Ibrahim Dabbashi) (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). French policymakers, including French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, spoke openly of their unhappiness with Washington’s “slowness” on the issue (cited in Erlanger 2011). Both states sought to be the main source of information on the unfolding crisis, highlighting their joint narrative even when embassies in Tripoli presented contrary reports (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).
In parallel, both governments pursued an aggressive media strategy, seeking to build popular support and making a concerted effort to keep Libya in the headlines, even as other Arab Spring crises and Europe’s financial meltdown threatened to knock it off the front pages. The implication that the United States was a bad ally for refusing to back the intervention was a key component of this strategy; one only has to look at the treatment Germany received for its choice to abstain on Resolution 1973 to see how effective this strategy was (Brockmeier 2013). Germany’s abstention “provoked speculation that Germany wanted to shed its supporting role in the US-led Western alliance,” highlighting the credibility pressure that allies can face (Bremmer and Leonard 2012).
Despite this, the primary focus of PR efforts in London and Paris was in using the “framing power of the media” to portray intervention as a humanitarian necessity, using Gaddafi’s own inflammatory rhetoric to build a case that mass casualties were imminent (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). In fact, as later studies would demonstrate, much of this evidence was found to be substantially exaggerated by Libyan expatriate groups (Kuperman 2013). Nonetheless, France and Britain were able to use it to build public support, helping proponents inside the United States government to gain the upper hand in ongoing debates (Chivvis 2012). While other factors certainly affected the American decision to engage in intervention in Libya, it is undeniable that this pressure from America’s NATO allies played a key, potentially decisive role.