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Entrapment is a process, not an event. Critics of the thesis miscount case studies and underestimate the risk.

Edelstein and Shifrinson 18, *David M. Edelstein, Professor of Foreign Studies at Georgetown, and *Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Boston University, (“Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics”, https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)

Recent efforts to examine entrapment, however, define the issue differently. In a widely cited study, for example, Tongfi Kim argues that Snyder’s definition, is “too broad” because it encompasses both military and non-military behaviors that may or may not be desirable from the perspective of the state in question. Instead, Kim argues that Snyder’s original definition should more properly be understood as “entanglement” – “the process whereby a state is compelled to aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance” – while “entrapment” more narrowly refers to “undesirable entanglement in which the entangling states adopts a risky or offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement [emphasis added].”14 Beckley embraces Kim’s approach, arguing that entrapment occurs “only when an ally instigates a conflict with a third party in order to drag its alliance partners into the dispute.” Entanglement, by contrast, “occurs when a state is dragged into a military conflict by one, or more, of its alliances” – a definition very close to Snyder’s original – with “alliances” themselves requiring states to be bound by a formal treaty.15 Meanwhile, Lanoszka’s rigorous examination of mechanisms that might undergird entrapment relies on a similar distinction. As he writes, “Entrapment is a type of entanglement” that “occurs because of risky or offensive actions taken outside the parameters of the original alliance treaty.”16 And, just as Kim notes that entrapment is “undesirable entanglement,” Lanoszka argues that “entrapment by definition cannot take place if the defender wishes to fight in order to protect an ally that it sees as vital for the goods that it provides.”17 In short, recent redefinitions relabel Snyder’s original concept as “entanglement,” narrow entrapment to only include going to war for an ally in overt contravention of one’s interests, and narrow its applicability to formal alliances.

In this paper, we adopt a revised form of Snyder’s original conception because of conceptual and empirical limits in the revised definitions advanced in recent studies. Before offering our definition, it is first worthwhile noting the problems posed by the revised definitions. On one level, defining entrapment solely as an issue of formal alliances sidesteps the reality that many real world debates concern worries of entrapment via informal alliances. Critics of American backing for Ukraine, for instance, worry that informal-but-real American security engagement with Ukraine may end up pulling the United States into a conflict with Moscow for the sake of Kiev.18 Likewise, as U.S.-Indian ties strengthen as the U.S. seeks partners to confront China, it is reasonable to question whether the United States will end up courting an increased risk of conflict with China as Indian-Chinese relations themselves deteriorate for issues separate from those the United States has with the PRC.19

Not coincidentally, treating entrapment as only an issue of formal alliances also highlights questionable solutions to the problem, namely, crafting loop-holes and escape clauses into alliance treaties. In reality, even formal treaties with notionally clear obligations among its members are often the subject of significant intra-alliance haggling, and debates surrounding the credibility of states willingness to follow through on the terms of the agreements. After all, if alliance provisions (loopholes and all) were sacrosanct and a panacea for real political debates, there would be no questions of the scope and credibility of alliances at any point in international politics.20 That this is not the case – that states in practice bargain hard with their partners over even formalized alliance terms – suggests that linking entrapment to formal alliances creates erroneously adopts an essentially legal approach to thinking through a fundamentally political and strategic problem, in addition to narrowing the scope of analysis. 21

At the same time, narrowing the definition of entrapment solely to cover “undesirable” instances of military escalation for a partner virtually defines away the problem entrapment seeks to explain. To have Beckley, Kim, and others tell it, entrapment can only occur if states knowingly throw caution to the wind and roll the iron dice for a partner for uncertain or avowedly irrelevant ends. Setting entrapment at such a bar, however, ignores that Snyder’s original formulation heavily focused on the risks states run in the course of forming and adjusting alliances over time. Put differently, the new definition ignores the process by which policy and strategy evolve over time and, in doing so, may cause entrapment.

At a basic level, the decision to go to war is rarely a dichotomous or discrete event.22 Most international conflict is preceded by extensive diplomatic deliberations with both opponents and allies as states try to obtain their objectives through means short of war while preparing for conflict on the most advantageous political and military terms possible.23 Even fast-moving crises involve such diplomatic engagement and coordination: the run-up and immediate outbreak of World War One, for example, saw extensive negotiations across the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, diplomatic consultations within the alliances and domestic efforts within various states to prepare the policymaking apparatus and public for conflict. The net result is that dissenting voices on the necessity of a particular course of action (here, conflict) tend to be minimized; 24 by the same measure, policymaking elites may come to hold particular and debatable understandings of the national interest [d]riven by psychological, domestic, or decision-making biases.25 Hence, even an ally that – in Snyder’s terms – shares interests “only partially” with a partner may end up concluding that conflict on behalf of the ally is viable: the process of forming and managing the alliance in a competitive international system can alter how states perceive their interests. Not only does this make it problematic to treat entrapment as undesired conflict, but it makes it difficult – as scholars such as Kim and Beckley attempt – to assess the frequency of entrapment by evaluating states’ perceptions and decision-making deliberations in the run up to war.

Finally, missing from all treatments of entrapment is recognition that entrapment is not solely a problem of pre-war deliberations – entrapment can be a wartime issue as well. After all, even if Allies A and B agree on the necessity of confrontation and conflict against Adversary C, A and B may hold different preferences over how, where, and when to engage in this confrontation.26 This again reflects the reality that allies may share interests “only partially”: partners can disagree on what the form and substance of a confrontation with a common adversary should entail. In turn, as states try to keep an alliance together for the sake of prosecuting a conflict while still pursuing the conflict in ways that best serve their interests, states may end up entrapping (or being entrapped by) their partners by pursuing policies and accepting risks that they would not otherwise.

Recognizing these shortcomings, we adopt a modified version of Snyder’s original definition. For our purposes, entrapment constitutes a process whereby states seeking security progressively take on greater risks of being dragooned into a partner’s political or military endeavors by virtue of having an alliance, even if the state in question shares few interests besides the continuation of the alliance itself in the partner’s moves and even if the alliance is never formalized. There are several elements to this definition. First, and in keeping with Snyder’s original formula, entrapment can occur in stages, as states take on sequentially greater risks on behalf of partners in the hopes of creating security for themselves. This may or may not be seen as “desirable” in the moment – the key for this concept is that states can be seen to accept real risks of confrontation or conflict that they would not otherwise if not for the existence of the alliance. Second, this conceptualization is agnostic as to the degree of formality in the alliance – entrapment can manifest in informal as well formal alliances. Third, entrapment is not limited to pre-war behaviors: entrapment during wartime is also a logical possibility. Finally, entrapment is fundamentally a byproduct of the politics of alliance management: states may take on progressively greater risks on entrapment owing to the existence of the alliance and its partners moves both therein and vis-à-vis an adversary.

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