Timing entrapment creates multiple scenarios for war – Russia proves
David Edelstein 18 — (David Edelstein; Vice Dean of Faculty in Georgetown College and a professor in the Department of Government, Published: December 2018; "Entrapment Revisited: Strategic and Structural Dynamics"; Accessed: 7-5-2022; https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/66008/files/2018/12/Entrapment-Revisited-Strategic-and-Structural-Dynamics-1xpycy1.pdf)//Pen-SY
Timing entrapment occurs when members of an alliance disagree over the optimal moment at which to confront an opponent. Weaker members of an alliance, for example, may feel proportionally more threatened by an adversary at an earlier date than proportionally stronger members of an alliance, and so be more inclined to adopt hardline policies that increase the likelihood of war before the alliance’s stronger members reach that point. 30 Likewise, unsettled domestic politics may give some members of an alliance incentive to go to war sooner than its allies prefer if a ruling coalition seeks to resolve an external threat but fears being turned out of office before its allies are prepared for joint action.31 Under these circumstances, even if Ally A might eventually be willing to assertively confront or fight alongside Ally B against a common opponent, B may initiate a confrontation at a time that State A finds unattractive, yet A feel compelled to back B for fear of later having to stand alone later (when it would prefer to fight). Put differently, Ally A left to its own devices might prefer to address an external threat without resorting to behaviors that increase the risk of conflict, feeling it has the capacity to wait or hoping that war can avoided through deterrence or a negotiated settlement; nevertheless, Ally B may behave in ways that makes war more likely in the short-term for fear that time is no longer on its side. In theory, states seeking to entrap partners at times its partners would rather avoid can do so in a number of ways. Some states, for instance, may spoil negotiations with an opponent designed to settle outstanding disputes so that a diplomatic standoff festers or escalates.32 Alternatively, states may engage in provocative behavior over disputed issues designed to trigger an aggressive stance by an opponent that merits an allied response. And, in extremis, states can simply begin hostilities despite allied opposition, thereby daring its partners not to back it up. In all these situations, Ally A is faced with the choice of either being drawn into an escalating crisis or war, or abandoning B. When A chooses to support, entrapment occurs. To not act, despite the ill-advised timing of B’s provocations, would potentially leave B weakened and vulnerable to a defeat in the face of a seemingly pressing threat that, in the end, may be far worse for State A. Russia’s involvement in World War I on behalf of Serbia presents an example of timing entrapment. Few would deny that Russia believed it had a strategic interest in defending Serbia and bolstering the pan-Slav identity. As Jack Levy and William Mulligan argue, however, the timing of this support poses a puzzle. If Russia was perceived by Germany as a rising power and a potential threat, then it would have been sensible for Russia to lay low and avoid provoking Germany into a wider war. Yet in the dangerous summer of 1914, St. Petersburg stood by its Serbian allies even as they issued an ultimatum to Austria-Hungary that made war considerably more likely. As Levy and Mulligan note, “1914 was not Russia’s favored year for war.” But the Russians were also fearful of the diplomatic consequences of an unfavorable outcome to the Austro-Serbian crisis.” And, “Although Habsburg control of Serbia did not present an immediate threat to Russian territorial integrity, a more prominent consideration was Russian credibility. In the context of Balkan politics, Russian inaction in the face of Austro-Hungarian aggression could have had severe consequences.”33 To reiterate, our contention is not that Russia supported Serbia despite strategic interests wholly to the contrary. Rather, our claim is that entrapment occured in a more subtle yet very consequential manner: rather than waiting for a more opportune moment for war, Russia was pulled in on behalf of its ally, Serbia, at a time more of Serbia, than Russia’s, choosing.34