Arctic securitization spills over and causes tit-for-tat hostilities that spiral into military escalation, even if nobody intended it.
Wilhelmsen ’20 [Julie.; Sep 30; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Journal of Global Security Studies, “Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization ,” https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/6/3/ogaa044/5916402; Vol. 6, 2021, pp. 1–19]
Focusing on the changing relations between Norway and Russia, I show how rising tension spread from the 2014 crises in Ukraine to the North.1 Initially, both parties declared that they neither wanted nor believed that the new strategic tension between Russia and the West would spread to or define relations in this region. This was not surprising. Norway and Russia had managed to build a close and practical partnership in the North following the end of the Cold War. Relations in the region had been characterized as pervaded by a spirit of cooperation and a “culture of compromise” (Hønneland and Jensen 2015). However, by October 2018, NATO was conducting “Trident Juncture,” the largest military exercise since the Cold War on Norwegian territory, with twenty-nine NATO countries participating, as well as Finland and Sweden, involving 50,000 troops in all.2 While this exercise was underway, Russia unexpectedly announced that it would conduct missile tests in the Norwegian Sea simultaneously.3 Few could deny that the new Russia–West tensions had spread to the North. Although the Norwegian authorities were reluctant to identify Russia as a “threat” for an entire year after the annexation of Crimea, today they openly speak of and prepare for hostilities. Russia, for its part, recently claimed that Norway has become “the frontier of deterrence of Russia” in the policy plans of the United States and NATO.4
This development will be explained with reference to changing Russian and Norwegian representations of each other: toward construing the other part more as a threat than a partner in one issue-area, the rippling outward of this representation to other issue-areas, the policy changes effectuated in line with these shifting representations, and how these changes have been (re-)acted upon by the other side. Within such a process of mutual and multifaceted securitization, attention to domestic audiences, quests for internal unity, and coherent identity articulation in volatile times send signals of offense and non-recognition across the border to the foreign state audience—playing into a mutual blame game, shaping interaction, and further escalating tensions to the point where the threat of hostilities seems imminent. As long acknowledged by security-dilemma theorists, both the classical realist and newer constructivist proponents, interaction has a dynamics of its own (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978; Mitzen 2006; Booth and Wheeler 2008). I argue that the emerging and mutual pattern of representing the other as a threat, not only in the military sphere, but also across issue-areas, has become an “autonomous” driver of conflict—regardless of whether either side (Norway/NATO/West, and Russia) might originally have had offensive designs on the other.5
By invoking the new Cold War in this article, I do not intend to measure the level of threat and distribution of power between the parties or suggest that these are the same as in the old Cold War. This article does not speak to the recent discussion on the similarities and differences between the old and the new Cold Wars (Legvold 2016; Lieven 2018). Rather, I put the spotlight on the mutual and evolving social identification processes between political entities that can help to push a relation to the point where an outbreak of hostilities seems imminent. Just as during the Cold War, the parties today hold increasingly and mutually incompatible descriptions of self and other (Ringmar 2002) and focus on blaming each other (Legvold 2016). I believe the totalizing “blame game” now underway and the mutual and intensifying descriptions of the other, metastasizing to a level where the other stands out as an “existential threat” at every encounter, are central to understanding the unlikely return of high military tension in the North.
Drawing on a detailed study of Russian and Norwegian official texts in the years following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and applying a discourse-theoretical approach to securitization theory, this article offers two theoretical contributions to second-generation securitization theory post-Copenhagen School (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008; Salter 2008; Floyd 2010; Hagmann 2015; Wilhelmsen 2017; Stengel 2019, building on Wæver 1994 and 1996; Buzan et al. 1998). First, I propose that securitization processes should be understood and studied in dyads because the shift to more radical representations of the other—i.e., a higher degree of securitization—often unfolds in a mutual pattern of identification and interaction between political entities. Second, an issue-specific securitization—say, representing the other part as an existential threat in the military domain—may spread to other dimensions of the relationship, making the other part appear as different and dangerous at every encounter. Such multifaceted securitization can intensify a negative spiral, ultimately blocking the chances for positive mutual representation and recognition. Military means then become a logical and legitimate way of relating to the other: contact and collaboration in other issue-areas are precluded. With this approach, I seek to expand on and integrate a discourse-theoretical version of securitization theory into the study of how and why relations escalate to the brink of war.
Although the post-positivist foundation of this study complicates direct communication and compatibility with much of the classical literature on the security dilemma and spirals, it does speak to the central question of how collective actors, such as states, become unsure of whether the other has defensive or offensive intentions and why they come to see and act toward each other as aggressive, regardless of the “true intentions” of the other (see e.g., Jervis 2001; Mitzen and Schweller 2011). The positivist literature on the security dilemma and spirals usually theorizes such pathways to conflict as an encounter between actors reasoning through preference structures in rational games, or a set of games (Jervis 1978; Fearon 1995; Mearsheimer 2001; Glaser 2010; Copeland 2011; Mitzen and Schweller 2011). In contrast, my approach, building on the fundamental insight that political entities are socially constituted and that the identity of self and other is subject to change through linguistic practices, theorizes such pathways to conflict as emerging through many encounters and gradually changing relations where identity dynamics serve as the causal engine.
This article proceeds as follows: I first lay out the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the argument, building on second-generation securitization theory and the concept of ontological security. Then, after a short presentation of the historical background of Russia–Norway relations in the North, I turn to changing Russian and Norwegian mutual representations in 2014–2018, and the shapes taken by the securitizing narratives on both sides. Investigating the Norwegian side in depth, I show how the image of Russia as a threat has solidified over time, spilling over into non-security issue-areas, and made a string of initiatives that reject Russia’ logical and legitimate policies in a new Norwegian approach. I examine how Norwegian official securitization of Russia has been driven by the quest for unity and continuity in representations of the self in a time of uncertainty and disruption. The fifth section concerns this driver and the unintended consequences of skewed attention to internal cohesion and domestic audiences at the expense of Russia. I point out how Russia has interpreted and (re-)acted to Norway's securitizing moves and policies, showing how mutual and multifaceted securitization unfolds in practice—and results in escalation.