Unconditional security cooperation with Norway antagonizes and draws the US into conflict with Russia
Wegge ’22 [Njrod.; Mar; Norwegian Defence University College, Norway; Arctic Review on Law and Politics, “The Strategic Role of Land Power on NATO’s Northern Flank,” https://arcticreview.no/index.php/arctic/article/view/3428/6330; Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 94–113]
The defence of Norway, including its arctic islands, must be seen in the context of the NATO alliance. Experiencing the failed policy of neutrality in 1940, followed by five years of German occupation, Norway has, since the foundation of NATO in 1949, looked westward for her security. After deciding to join NATO, Norway sought to improve the likelihood of receiving support in crises and war through several means, including the active policy of inviting foreign troops to exercises in Norway, and increased military coordination and integration with other western powers, especially the USA. To adapt the Norwegian force structure, including its operational concepts, to conform with her key NATO partners, particularly the USA, and to some degree the UK, has, since 1949, been given high priority, influencing both ways and means. In this perspective, working to ensure both American willingness as well as ability, to assist Norway on NATO’s northern flank has been crucial in Norway’s effort to deter potential Soviet aggression. From this perspective, the massive nuclear capabilities of the Northern Fleet represent not only a Norwegian problem, but also a challenge for the USA and its NATO allies. Norway has both overlapping interests with NATO, as well as its own unique national interests. As a state directly bordering Russia, Norway has a particular need to combine the deterrence policy of invitation and integration of allied forces, with certain screening measures and self-imposed restrictions. These restrictions are most notably, disallowing the siting of foreign bases with regular combat units during peacetime, restrictions forbidding nuclear weapons in Norway, and restrictions on how far east allied exercises and training in Norway can take place. Norway’s policy-line, influencing both ideas about military objectives, concepts and resources, captures the country’s dual approach, and can be summed up in the phrase “integration and screening”.
Norway has been of particular interest to the US given the country’s proximity to the Kola Peninsula and the Russian Northern military district. This location was, and remains, an unusually well-placed location for the collection of military intelligence in addition to potential force projection. In addition, Norway’s closeness to the North Atlantic and the crucial transit route for Russian submarines seeking to enter central areas of the Atlantic Ocean and posing a threat to trans-Atlantic communication, has been another vital aspect of US military interest in Norway.
In the post-Crimea (2014–) international environment, familiar dilemmas from the Cold War can be seen. In welcoming a larger number of US Marines to cold weather training in central and Northern Norway, the government continues to emphasize military integration with the USA, while still avoiding the construction of any permanent bases. The move to invite more US Marines has spurred external complaints from Russia as well as opposition from certain sections of the political spectrum in Norway today. The “Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement”, signed 16 April 2021 between Norway and the USA, represents the latest development in this area.