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Say no and the cp collapses NATO

Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Wohlforth%20-%20The%20Right%20Choice%20for%20NATO.pdf)

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42

Options 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that the international system generates strong pressures for European states to do one or all of three very costly things: ramp up spending on defense; reform entrenched domestic defense practices and institutions; and set aside national prerogatives to generate genuine supranational military defense and decision making at the EU level. Take away Uncle Sam’s “welfare for the rich” and the logic of anarchy will somehow force this outcome. It cannot be ruled out that there is something special about Europe that would cause it to act in this collectively martial way without the US umbrella. But that expectation is inconsistent with most of what we know about international politics and with the lived experience of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments just don’t do extremely expensive and politically costly things without a major prod of some sort. The problem is that there is neither a compelling external security incentive nor a European hegemon to help solve the collective action problem. Germany may play this role in economics, but it is not going to do so in security.43 The likelihood that a US revocation of Article 5 would spur France and Britain to set aside national feeling and unite defense efforts—and that middle powers from Poland to Turkey would acquiesce—is exceedingly low. Indeed, the downward trend in European defense spending has continued despite the continuing decline in American military forces in Europe and despite increasingly loud calls for retrenchment.

Three consequences follow from this analysis. First, doubling down is unlikely—because Americans won’t pay for it—and neither form of retrenchment will work—because Europeans won’t pay the political or economic costs even if the United States steps aside. Second, major changes to the current benign macro-security environment are likely to occur only after substantial strategic warning, and therefore projected low costs and risks for US security provision will likely remain adequate. And third, there is no net security benefit to the United States (p.261) of administering a shock to NATO via even more dramatic reductions in presence or commitment. Indeed, there are serious expected costs in terms of lost security cooperation and even less capable and interoperable allies. With militarily capable allies like NATO and the Republic of Korea, a major benefit of presence is security cooperation (joint training, planning, etc.) that is difficult or impossible to replicate with rotational deployments. According to a recent comprehensive RAND study, the US presence in NATO is getting near the floor of deployed personnel needed to sustain security cooperation at current level.44

Now let’s consider how this vision of NATO aligns with American grand strategy. The US grand strategy of deep engagement is essentially about three objectives: managing the external environment to reduce near- and long-term threats to US national security; promoting a liberal economic order to expand the global economy and maximize domestic prosperity; and creating, sustaining, and revising the global institutional order to secure necessary interstate cooperation on terms favorable to US interests.45

NATO’s declining capability for large-scale optional expeditionary operations to address conjectural security threats or humanitarian ideals does little to impede this grand strategy. The Obama administration’s policy pronouncements and military deployments do not in any way represent a change away from deep engagement. They reflect a refocus on the strategy’s core. For that core, NATO retains value as an institutional framework for:

• Coordinating transatlantic security cooperation;

• Maintaining key infrastructure and lines of communications to sustain a US-led containment strategy in the greater Middle East;

• Reducing inefficient duplication of defense efforts among allies, preventing full renationalization of security;

• Hedging against the emergence of a more threatening Russia or the appearance of a new, serious security threat.

The retrenchment options (One and Two) put these benefits at risk. Full retrenchment does so because it is obviously inconsistent with deep engagement. “NATO-friendly” retrenchment does so because it confuses secondary aims with the grand strategy’s core aims. It is willing to trade US leadership of the alliance for ephemeral and likely unattainable gains in indigenous European capability. Doubling down on NATO makes the same mistake of viewing optional capacities as essential, and magnifies it by ultimately imposing its costs on the US taxpayer, as it has no answer to the “free rider” problem aside from exhortation.

If the United States engineers a dramatic shift in its grand strategy to a strong version of restraint that devalues the capacity to mount light footprint military operations around Eurasia as well as the incipient “coalition in waiting” represented (p.262) by NATO, then the alliance would cease to make sense. But if, as is likely, it pares the deep engagement strategy to its core objectives, then muddling though, with no new grand bargains, no grand “rebooting” of the alliance, no sudden new infusion of defense dollars and euros, and no “post-American” NATO emerges as the optimal choice. In other words, the transatlantic bargain should contain three parts: NATO should continue to guarantee territorial defense; external operations in Europe’s neighborhood where the United States has no interest should fall under the EU or individual European allies (e.g., France in Mali, Central African Republic); and NATO should only engage beyond Europe’s borders when the United States wishes to be involved.

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