The 2% standard is not an accurate representation of contribution--- destabilizes the alliance by calling out competent countries.
Kivimaki, 19 [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/power-contribution-and-dependence-in-nato-burden-sharing /alundy]
The national GDP share of defence spending is often used as an easy, parsimonious, quantitative measure of contribution in some of the formative studies in the field and in most studies that aim at complete mathematical models of burden sharing in military alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser , Boyer , Oneal , Sandler and Hartley ). The use of national defence spending is justified by the fact that much of NATO’s operations and activities are funded by national defence spending, while only some funding is channelled through the NATO budget. Thus, the idea of measuring contribution to NATO by considering GDP shares of national military spending makes some sense, but it is neither an accurate, nor a necessarily useful, indicator of contributions (Zyla , Techau , Kunertova ).
US military spending in 2017 was at a level of 610 billion USD, thus representing not only a majority of NATO spending, but 35% of the military spending of the entire globe; 9.2 times that of Russia and 2.7 times that of China (These calculations are based on data by SIPRI ). Thus, if we use the GDP share of national military expenditure as an indicator, it seems clear that the US, with about a 45% share of the NATO GDP , (GDP data is calculated from “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d.) has a too high a national expenditure, as it add up to more than 50% of the sum of national defence expenditures of all NATO countries.
If we look at the funding of NATO itself and of such functions and operations that are under the direct control of the alliance rather than member countries, the picture changes dramatically. If security is a public good and there is an agreement on how best to protect it, one could assume that NATO countries should have no difficulties in channelling their military spending through a common, rather than a national, decision-making structure. The fact that this is not the case already challenges the credibility of seeing security as a public good for NATO countries.
Direct NATO funding is proportional to each member country’s GDP, with the exception of the US, which is compensated in its NATO shares for its superior national spending. According to NATO statistics on defence spending (NATO 2018) from 2016 and the CIA World Factbook (“The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d., NATO ) data on GDPs, all NATO countries contribute more to NATO’s budget than their GDP share (the GDP share equals the GDP of the country divided by the GDP sum of all NATO countries), excepting Luxembourg and the United States. While NATO’s budget share from Luxembourg is likely to be a result of fluctuation in GDPs and a specific year’s (2016) contribution, and while the share of Luxembourg’s contribution to the NATO budget is still very close to its share of GDP, the case of the US is different. US funding for NATO is systematically lower than its GDP share, less than half of it. Obviously, this relates to US superior national military spending, but again, it highlights problems with the assumption that the security needs of NATO countries are identical. If the US actually contributes 22% of the NATO budget while its GDP share would be 45%, then we either have to believe that US national defence spending serves NATO’s security needs or relinquish the conclusion that the US is such a disproportionate contributor to NATO. However, the question of burden sharing is much more complicated than the debate on defence expenditures may suggest.