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Allies are unwilling to meet 2% burdens---it’s not realistic

Techau 15 [Jan Techau; director of Carnegie Europe, a part of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 9/2/15; THE POLITICS OF 2 PERCENT; https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf]

If 2 percent has become the gold standard for defense spending in the debate on NATO’s future, then how realistic is it that the goal will ever be reached? Pessimism prevails on this issue. “The guideline . . . if taken literally, would create an impossible situation for some allies,” writes Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. A country like Germany would have to absorb €74 billion ($82 billion) of defense spending instead of its current €37 billion ($41 billion), something it would be unable (and unwilling) to do and that would in turn lead to “inefficiency and waste, rather than an increase in useful capability.”20 Germany is also the focus of another argument that aims at making 2 percent look unrealistic. The enormous increase in absolute defense spending in Germany, with its large economy, that would result from 2 percent could also lead to a degree of nervousness among some of the country’s allies. As Karl-Heinz Kamp of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy argues, “If Germany spent 2 percent of its huge GDP, it would produce a defense budget overshadowing those of France and the UK, arguably causing more concern than reassurance among its neighbors.”21 This is a weak argument, as it essentially questions the political reliability of a key NATO partner that is most under pressure to spend more The strength of the 2 percent metric is its triumph of simplicity over complexity. 12 | The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe on defense. For the most part, it is a self-serving defensive argument against higher defense spending that has been used primarily by Germans themselves, not so much by other NATO allies. But the lack of capacity among member states to absorb significantly increased defense budgets is not the only factor that leads to doubt about hitting the 2 percent target. The biggest concern comes from the fact that many NATO countries agreed to the 2 percent pledge in Wales but have no real intention to make good on the promise. “The problem is not that most NATO allies will fail to reach the 2 percent bar. The trouble comes with those that don’t even try,” as Kamp puts it.22 Initial budget decisions made around or after the Wales summit and even public announcements by many member states seem to indicate that the political will to really reach 2 percent is indeed underdeveloped across NATO. Overriding economic concerns are also reasons for skepticism that the 2 percent pledge can be fulfilled. “As long as austerity remains the eurozone’s economic mantra, it is unlikely that European allies will meet the target,” one researcher argues.23 Under the prevailing economic circumstances, it is often claimed that a reversal of the downward trend in defense spending would already be a success, but that an increase to 2 percent would be too much to realistically expect. The Wales summit declaration itself makes 2 percent dependent on positive economic development, stipulating that allies “aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows.”24 This conditionality is meant to generate more defense spending from the moment economic recovery sets in. The volume of growth that would be needed to increase defense spending is not specified, nor is a time reference for growth given. Should spending be measured against absolute GDP growth on an annual basis, or should the growth rate be the metric? Or should GDP growth be measured against a fixed point in time—for instance, GDP before the financial crisis?

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