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No impact---defense spending is irrelevant.

Mira Rapp-Hooper 20, Political Science PhD at Columbia University, Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center, Senior Fellow at Yale's Paul Tsai China Center., “Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances,” Harvard University Press//Wompus =)

But it is also reasonable to argue that these spending gaps are of little consequence. The important question is whether it is cheaper to have a foreign policy that relies on sustained cooperation with allies afflicted by moral hazard than to have a unilateral policy with no burden-sharing at all. On this view, as long as US defense spending does not exceed national means, it is hardly tragic if allies spend a bit less as a proportion of GDP. There is no evidence that American defense spending hampers growth or makes the country less competitive. And while the defense budget makes up a sizable chunk of federal spending, a relatively small portion of that money goes to forward basing. To those who bemoan burden-sharing gaps, a reasonable rejoinder is that Washington should ensure that its own budget commitments are sound in national terms, rather than preoccupy itself with false equivalence abroad.7

Finally, when we think about the costs of alliances, we should be mindful that alliance agreements themselves impose no financial burdens on the US Treasury. What costs money—and potentially lives—is the associated force posture. Proposals for cutting US alliance spending are usually suggestions about curtailing overseas defense presence. This is not a semantic difference. It points to an important reality that many miss when they refer to alliances as extravagant: in order to generate substantial savings in its own defense budget—that is, to close the gap between its “allied contribution” ratio and those of its thriftier partners—the United States would have to close overseas bases and return the personnel and materiel to the continental United States. Simply consolidating bases and relying more on rotational deployments would not generate substantial cost savings.8 Leading scholars have argued for just this kind of move—ending alliances and shuttering related bases to curb commitments and spending. Such dramatic changes would require not just a transformed alliance policy but a completely different grand strategy— one that does not seek to secure the balance of power in Eurasia through forward defense, deterrence, and allied assurance and control.

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