Alliances aren’t honored mindlessly
– Quantitative analysis of every single alliance invocation
Berkemeier, M., & Fuhrmann, M. (2018). [Ph.D. Political Science, Texas A&M University M.A. Non-Proliferation & International Security B.A. Political Science, University of Chicago, 2012 “Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance commitments in war.” Research & Politics, 5(2), 205316801877969. doi:10.1177/2053168018779697]//EZAY
Table 1 lists the opportunities to fulfill alliance commitments from 1945 to 2003. This information offers some possible explanations for the sharp decrease in promise fulfillment after World War II. One thing that stands out is that offense pacts and neutrality agreements, which are honored at higher rates than defense pacts and nonaggression pacts, are less common in the modern era. Only 20% of alliance performance opportunities from 1945 to 2003 included offensive or neutrality-based commitments, compared with more than 70% from 1816 to 1944. Changes in the types of alliance commitments that are invoked in war over time might partially account for the puzzling trend that we identify. Yet we still see sizable variation in compliance within the same commitment type in the two eras. Defense pacts, for instance, were honored 61.02% of the time from 1816 to 1944 and only 13.95% of the time post-World War II. What else, then, could explain the changing patterns over time?
The invention of nuclear weapons offers one potential answer. In the post-World War II era, the world’s most powerful states possessed nuclear arsenals. Given the destructive power of these weapons, alliance commitments from nuclear powers – especially defense pacts – have rarely been challenged in war (Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). As a result, major powers appear just a few times in Table 1 and relatively weak states account for a sizable percentage of all “alliance performance opportunities” from 1945 to 2003. This is relevant because state power may affect alliance treaty fulfillment. Countries should be most likely to intervene in war when their participation might change the outcome (Morrow, 1994; Smith, 1995). Relatively weak states, according to this line of thinking, are less likely to fulfill their alliance promises because they lack the material capacity to sway a conflict’s outcome.7 Israel probably would have prevailed in the Six Day War, for instance, even if Saudi Arabia had joined its allies in the fight. From Riyadh’s perspective, this may have made it easier to largely remain on the sidelines. This is, however, merely a preliminary conjecture. Conclusion This study presented an updated assessment of the reliability of military alliances. Our analysis, which extended earlier work to include the post-World War II era and utilized updated war data, yields three main conclusions. First, the overall rate of alliance fulfillment in war is lower than previously reported. Second, defense pacts and nonaggression pacts are honored much less frequently than neutrality agreements and offensive alliances. Third, there is a large disparity in the rate of alliance fulfillment before and after World War II. This offers a lesson for researchers that extends beyond the realm of alliance politics: trends that apply in one period may not extend to other eras. It is important to consider whether relationships of interest vary over time – particularly when there are structural shocks, like World War II. What implications does the lower compliance rate carry for our understanding of alliance treaty reliability? Our analysis does not imply that military alliances are ineffective, nor does it challenge the evidence that defense pacts promote peace through extended deterrence (Leeds, 2003b; Johnson and Leeds, 2011; Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). The most effective threat is one that never has to be implemented (Schelling, 1966). NATO does not appear in our dataset, for example, precisely because potential adversaries perceive it as effective. However, when alliance commitments are invoked in war, allies uphold their promises less often than the conventional wisdom suggests. This implies that leaders are less restrained by treaty commitments than prior research would expect, a conclusion that carries implications for our understanding of international institutions (for a review of relevant literature, see Simmons, 2010). Our analysis opens up avenues for future research. Scholars could use our updated dataset to revisit enduring debates about alliance politics, such as whether democracies make more (or less) reliable allies (c.f., Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, 2003a). The disparity in compliance rates over time also represents a puzzle worthy of examination in scholarship. Something may have changed after 1944 that fundamentally altered the nature of alliance politics. We have speculated about the sources of this variation, but further analysis is necessary in order to achieve more definitive answers. The disparity in compliance across commitment types is worthy of further investigation in scholarship as well. Dedicated studies on why offense pacts are so much more reliable than defense pacts would be especially welcome. More generally, future research might consider the implications of our findings for extended deterrence, war-fighting, and the efficacy of international institutions.