Article 5 itself doesn’t assure allies and if it’s invoked no impact
Joshua Alley 2020[Postdoctoral Research Associate (Politics) UVirginia Ph.D. Political Science (Department of Political Science) Texas AM B.A. International Affairs/Political Science Gettysburg college) Alliance Participation and Military Spending. Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University. Available electronically from https://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/189551.] pg.76-78//EZAY
I focus this brief case study on NATO treaty design for two reasons. First, information from NATO applies to multiple alliances, as other US treaties have similar designs. Most US alliances have conditional promises of military support and understanding why is important. Second, NATO is also the most important alliance in international politics, so understanding how the treaty formed is worthwhile. After the end of World War II, the US sought a way to protect Europe from the USSR. Despite acute security concerns, fear of entrapment in unwanted conflicts led to limits on military support. First, as Poast (2019a) details, NATO members disagreed over how to define the North Atlantic area, which was a key condition on military support. The US and other states argued about whether France’s Algerian colony and Italy should be protected by the alliance. Second, active military support from NATO members depends on domestic political processes.18 Isolationists in the US Senate feared that an alliance would force America to intervene automatically if partners were attacked, bypassing the power of Congress to declare war and engaging the US in unwanted conflicts (Acheson, 1969, pg. 280-1). Therefore Article V of the NATO treaty states that if one member is attacked the others “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary (emphasis mine).” Military support was and is not guaranteed. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated as much in a March 1949 press release defending NATO to the US public, where he said that Article V “does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one of the nations covered by the Pact is subject to armed attack” (Acheson, 1949). This claim and the emphases of the press release shows that promises of military support were highly salient to the US public. Military support from Article V did not assuage European fears that if the Soviets invaded, the United States would not fight. To increase the credibility of NATO, the United States took other measures. A 1951 presentation by Dean Acheson to Dwight Eisenhower argued European allies “fear the inconstancy of United States purpose in Europe. ... These European fears and apprehensions can only be overcome if we move forward with determination and if we make the necessary full and active contribution in terms of both military forces and economic aid” (Acheson, 1951, pg. 3). The first part of reassurance was the creation of the Atlantic Council, which is an international organization and the main source of depth in the NATO treaty itself. The United States used the Atlantic Council to coordinate collective defense and increase the perceived reliability of the alliance. By investing in the Atlantic Council and related joint military planning, the US addressed European fears of abandonment. For example, US officials thought that the British Foreign Minister viewed US provision of a supreme commander in Europe as “a stimulus to European action” in NATO (Acheson, 1950). Many Senators also opposed military aid to Europe (Acheson, 1969, pg 285), which limited efforts to add further treaty depth. These legislative constraints on the executive branch reduced the formal depth of NATO relative to what many ambassadors preferred (Acheson, 1969, pg 277). Bilateral agreements on troop deployments then became another instrument of reassurance. In 1950 the Germans formally requested clarification on whether an attack on US forces in Germany would be treated as an armed attack on the US- which the US said it would (Acheson, 1969, pg. 395). These bilateral arrangements and basing rights are not covered in the NATO treaty, but they added substantial depth.19 NATO negotiations reveal the tendency of democracies to use treaty depth to reassure their allies, rather than unconditional military support. Fear of foreign entanglement led the United States to offer conditional military support, but did not inhibit deep military cooperation, which helped reassure European allies. Limits on the promises of military support were an important public justification for the NATO treaty, while the Atlantic Council was less discussed. Still, the power of treaty ratification in the Senate limited formal NATO depth to the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council and associated bureaucratic machinery are the formal core of substantial defense cooperation. Altogether though Article V is limited, the US used treaty depth to increase the credibility of NATO.