Scientific consensus proves bioweapons are a threat.
Cummings '21 [Christopher L., Kaitlin M. Volk, Anna A. Ulanova, Do Thuy Uyen Ha Lam & Pei Rou Ng, “Emerging Biosecurity Threats and Responses: A Review of Published and Gray Literature” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology, pp 13–36]
Bioweapons were the second most frequently mentioned threat, appearing in 28% of the articles analyzed. Franconi et al. (2018) define bioweapons as “deadly pathogens – bacteria or viruses – or toxins that can be deliberately released in order to cause harm to people or animals and plants.” Generally, when a bioweapon is used by a state sponsored entity it is considered an act of biowarfare, while the use of a bioweapon by a non-state sponsored entity or individual is considered an act of bioterrorism (Jamil 2015), the latter of which was mentioned in 17% of articles. Unaltered organisms can and have been used as bioweapons in the past, such as in the 2001 anthrax attacks. Biotechnology opens the door to creating enhanced or novel pathogens and new avenues for toxin production. Cross (2018) identifies three ways in which biotechnology can be used to create bioweapons: (1) “recreating pathogenic viruses such as Ebola, SARS, or smallpox,” (2) “engineering bacteria to make them more dangerous, which could be easily accomplished by inserting genes to confer antibiotic resistance,” and (3) “engineering microbes to produce and release toxic biochemicals.” Researchers have already demonstrated capabilities in all three of these avenues. Horsepox, a close relative of smallpox, has been synthesized from mail-ordered DNA (Noyce et al. 2018), avian influenza has been engineered to allow for airborne transmission between mammals (Linster et al. 2014), and botulinum toxin has been produced using yeast cells (Fonfria et al. 2018). These three cases are also prime examples of dual use research, as they were carried out for beneficial purposes (vaccine development, study of transmission, and enhanced therapeutics, respectively) but also provide a clear avenue towards weaponization.
Bioweapons and bioterrorism are mainly concerned with the deliberate release of an engineered pathogen or toxin with the purpose of causing harm, but the literature also identified accidental releases of modified organisms as a threat. Accidental releases are often cited as a concern for biosafety and not biosecurity. Pastorino et al. (2017) delineates the two terms in a laboratory setting as follows:
“Laboratory biosafety” is the term used to describe the containment principles, technologies, and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins or their accidental release. “Laboratory biosecurity” refers to institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of pathogens and toxins.”