Bans solve neither advantage and drive the tech underground.
Trump '21 – PhD, a research social scientist for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and served as a Strategic Planner and public health subject-matter expert for FEMA Region 1’s Data Analytics Task Force [Benjamin D, Marie-Valentie Florin, Edward Perkins, and Igor Linkov," Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance” in Emerging Threats of Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology]
Synthetic biology is a transformative technology with the possibility to change the world to the same extent as – if not more than – the digital revolution. As is the case with previous scientific breakthroughs, the potential for its dual-use and misuse represents a global problem, and necessitates that the highest levels of policy makers pay it close attention. Although targeted countermeasures can go some way toward providing protection, preventative actions are likely to be more effective given the heightened uncertainty of the field’s future (Trump et al. 2020a). It is necessary that biosecurity policies and practices be updated to take into account both the unprecedented challenges associated with synthetic biology and the globalized, diffuse, and varied nature of its threat space.
Effective global biosecurity will not happen quickly, nor will it be enthusiastically adopted by all national governments and non-governmental organizations. Incentives to misuse synthetic biology with harmful consequences remain high for certain negligent actors, as are the incentives to dual-use by nefarious actors, and the coming years may see such events affecting human or environmental health. Successful biosecurity implementation must be adaptable to quickly incorporate uncertainty as well as new capabilities. Urgent steps are required to place such notions into practice before a major threat incident, which in addition to creating substantial damages could usher in policy changes that might limit or ban platforms of synthetic biology research entirely. Besides forgoing the benefits of the technology, such a ban could force development underground and further out of the reach of coordinated governance or risk assessment. By identifying the social, economic, institutional, and technological tripwires that influence a state’s trajectory towards biosecurity research of concern, now is the time to take steps to apply biosecurity to maximize technological benefits while minimizing the dual-use potential of synthetic biology by improving the framing, prioritization, and governance of biosecurity risks.