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Spending sufficient now – coerced, rapid increases in spending fail

Horn and Eloranta 2018

Heather Souvaine Horn global affairs editor at The New Republic, interviewing Jari Eloranta, an economic historian at Appalachian State University who specializes in military spending July 12, 2018 “Is It Fair for Trump to Bash NATO Over Military Spending?” https://newrepublic.com/article/149819/fair-trump-bash-nato-military-spending

To what extent has the president pointed to a real problem?

It’s very artificial to point at the 2 percent target. The financial crisis and downturn after 2008 was much more severe in Europe—it has taken them much longer to recover from it. It’s kind of artificial to use GDP as the measuring stick for military spending at all. Because obviously if your GDP declines, typically budgetary spending doesn’t change that much for a while, so, for example, states like Greece look like they’re spending almost 3 percent of their GDP on defense when in fact it’s just an artifact of their GDP having plummeted massively.

Same thing for the U.S.: Right after 2008 U.S. military spending as a percentage of GDP jumps from a little over 3 percent to a little over 4 percent, so it looks like Obama increased military spending when he didn’t. Often budgets are immobile and you can’t change them as quickly. So right now because U.S. economic growth has been so strong, it looks like from 2010 U.S. military spending as a percentage of GDP has dropped from a little over 4 percent to a little over 3 percent. And, in fact, in recent years it looks as if European military spending as a percentage GDP has been declining, but mostly that’s because of the late recovery that started in 2013 and 2014, when a lot of their economies started to rebound.

To what extent, then, was this current conflict within NATO a matter of long-term trends?

I think this is absolutely a longer trend. Military spending obviously is always driven by economic development. When countries become more developed they are able to dedicate less money for defense respective of GDP because if your GDP doubles and you maintain 1.5 percent level of GDP on military spending that still means a huge increase in military spending. And there are also fewer conflicts in the world and less sort of external violence and need for defense: Ever since the end of the Cold War there’s been less need of unified-alliance defensive efforts.

In recent years in Europe, of course, the Russian aggression in Crimea and Ukraine has been a huge worry, and has led to an increase in military spending in the Baltic and Eastern European countries. Military spending is always driven by threats as well, and some European countries don’t feel the threat as acutely as others.

In general, the Trump administration’s, or Trump’s, efforts are very disingenuous, because European countries already agreed in 2014 to start increasing their military spending. This was a whole NATO-wide effort projected to last until 2024, and it’s in response not to U.S. needs but to increased threats from Russia, and trying to create more unity within the alliance.

What about Germany’s difficulties meeting its targets, with Merkel recently downgrading expectations about when the country is going to reach two percent spending?

Well, typically I’d say it’s very much a positive thing that a country takes care in terms of planning military spending increases very carefully and slowly. When you rapidly increase military spending, that creates opportunities for waste, for rent-seeking, for companies to take advantage of opportunities that are not well-thought-out—opportunities for defense contractors to make a quick buck.

All these spending increases are always slow anyway, because governments have other budgetary concerns. For Europe as a whole, and particularly Germany, the big policy problem right now is the refugees and immigration, which is creating a huge deal of tension within the Merkel administration—that’s their priority. So I’m not surprised at all that this is not one of their pressing concerns right now and they don’t quite necessarily see Russian threat as an acute one that they would require massive quick spending increases. Whether they’ll meet those targets or not, that’s somewhat arbitrary, because if the German economy increases rapidly they’d have to ramp up spending even faster to meet that target. So that’s a mechanism that’s difficult to predict overall.

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