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Turning inward causes European re-investment into domestic arms

Trofimov 19 - Columnist and Senior Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal [Yaroslav, Jan 4th, Wall Street Journal, “Is Europe Ready to Defend Itself?”, https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-europe-ready-to-defend-itself-11546623417]

The new Republican administration in Washington issued a blunt warning: Unless Europe quickly set up its own unified army, the U.S. would be compelled to undertake an “agonizing reappraisal” of its commitment to defend its European allies.

The year was 1953, and the main target of American ire was France, whose delay in ratifying the European Defense Community treaty, signed the previous year, meant that preparations for a federal European army had to be paused. But the pressure applied by the Eisenhower administration backfired spectacularly: A joyous choir of French lawmakers broke into the “Marseillaise” when France’s parliament finally rejected the treaty in August 1954. The idea of a joint European defense policy was shelved for decades.

Today, the push for European autonomy in defense—and even for a common European Union army—is gathering momentum again, in part because of doubts in many European capitals about President Donald Trump’s willingness to defend the continent against a renewed threat from Russia. Mr. Trump’s abrupt decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, which prompted Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to resign, has added new urgency to the drive.

This time around, the revival of European defense integration is championed by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while the American president keeps lobbing angry tweets at the very idea. And inside Europe, the skeptics today aren’t in Paris but in the former Soviet vassal-states in the east that, despite all their misgivings, still view the U.S. as the only credible guarantor of their survival as independent nations.

A historic swing in Europe’s public opinion, particularly in Germany—the EU’s most powerful state and one where trans-Atlantic cooperation was the bedrock of the political consensus since the end of World War II—has fueled this change.

Mr. Trump has described the EU as a “foe” and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as “obsolete,” and he has publicly questioned why American soldiers should die for a NATO ally like Montenegro. One recent opinion poll showed that Germans now rank Mr. Trump as the greatest threat to their country. In another, 73% of Germans described their relationship with the U.S. as “bad,” and 72% wanted a foreign policy more independent from Washington’s.

“The shift in public opinion is due to a mix of disappointment and fear,” said Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, a think tank that advises the German government and parliament. “There is a fear that the U.S. will be less interested in Europe, and that the security commitments of the U.S. will no longer be reliable.”

It was in this political environment that Ms. Merkel told the European Parliament in a landmark speech in November: “The times when we could fully rely on others have ended.…If we Europeans want to survive as a community, we must make a greater effort to take our destiny into our own hands.”

Achieving such “strategic autonomy” became the EU’s official policy in 2016. Though calls by Mr. Macron and Ms. Merkel for a European army are largely rhetorical so far, several concrete initiatives to achieve that goal have been launched since then. Probably most significant is the $15 billion European Defense Fund, which aims to spur Europe’s military industry and could limit the influence of American weapons manufacturers. Another new initiative is the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation system, under which European armies seek to remove the barriers to joint action that stem from fielding so many different—and often incompatible—types of weapons. Addressing a frequently voiced demand of Mr. Trump, European governments have also raised their defense spending to get closer to the NATO target of 2% of each country’s GDP.

On the face of it, there is no reason why an economic giant like the EU shouldn’t be able to protect itself against Russia even without American help. Setting aside Britain (which seeks to continue to cooperate with the EU on security and defense even after leaving the bloc), the remaining EU’s population and defense budgets are roughly three times Russia’s size. France, the EU’s military powerhouse, spends almost as much as Russia on defense just by itself and operates an independent nuclear arsenal. All those sums, of course, are dwarfed by the U.S., whose military budget is nearly double the defense spending of the EU (minus the departing U.K.) and Russia combined.

“Europe is addicted to the American security umbrella,” said Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think tank that advises the French government. “But if the U.S. weren’t there, Europe would have found a way to defend itself.”

Yet there is a Catch-22 that makes these aspirations risky. Building up European defenses after seven decades of American protection would take time. Meanwhile, every move that Europe attempts in this direction spurs an American backlash, further undermining NATO’s cohesion—and its deterrent capacity against a rapidly militarizing Russia.

“We have to hedge. But it is a very tricky situation: When does the hedge become a wedge?” said François Heisbourg, a veteran French expert who advised Mr. Macron’s presidential campaign on security and defense.

“Trump doesn’t believe in alliances and doesn’t understand what an alliance is,” he added. “So if we discover that Plan A—what has happened over the last 70 years—is no longer on offer, we would have been remiss if we had not worked on Plan B. But of course, we do not want to precipitate the end of Plan A by getting Plan B wrong. This is the challenge for every country that is allied with the U.S.”

It is a particularly urgent challenge for NATO countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Officials there fret about loose talk of a European army and dislike the very concept of EU “strategic autonomy,” fearing that it may needlessly alienate the U.S. After all, if you border on Russia, what you want is more Americans in your neighborhood now, not a pretext for cost-conscious Washington to pull the plug. “Autonomy means autonomy from someone—it’s better to use another term, such as a European push forward or European structural strengthening,” said Lithuania’s defense minister, Raimundas Karoblis.

Poland, another neighbor of Russia, has even offered to pay more than $2 billion to set up a permanent U.S. base on its soil, proposing to call it Fort Trump in a not-so-subtle appeal to the president’s vanity. (Washington is still evaluating the proposal, while German officials are lobbying against it, fearing that it would further antagonize Russia.)

“We believe that the United States is indispensable in European security,” said Bartosz Cichocki, Poland’s deputy foreign minister for security affairs. He held up the November 2018 incident in the Black Sea, where Russia attacked and seized three Ukrainian navy ships, as a sobering example of just how hollow the EU’s role in defending the region’s security remains. “Where was Europe? Nowhere. Those who advocate a European army, European self-sufficiency, had a great opportunity to take the lead, to show us the way of how to de-escalate and how to stop Russia,” he scoffed.

Such divisions within Europe on security matters make it a much weaker adversary for Russia, which has spent the past decade upgrading its military and is now fielding an entire new tank army on the EU’s eastern flank.

The EU is likely dealing with a lasting change in the global security architecture.

“In defense and defense industry, it is not Europe, it is 28 European states,” said Christian Mölling, deputy director of Germany’s DGAP research institute, who co-wrote a recent report outlining the shortfalls in the EU’s military muscle. “If you take trade, we are acting as one with a central and single policy, which makes us the biggest trading bloc in the world. But in defense, we are not able to act as a huge force.”

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