International organization are autonomous actors and distinct from their member state
Hirschmann 21 [Gisela Hirschmann, November 2021, “Article Navigation International organizations' responses to member state contestation: from inertia to resilience,” <<Hirschmann is the Assistant Professor of IR @ Leiden University>>, International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 6]\\pairie
The responses of IO bureaucracies to member state contestation The existence of IOs relies on contributions of money and personnel, a functioning membership body and policies implemented by member states.10 States use numerous ways not only to influence IOs according to their interests, but also to contest IOs’ authority or individual policies.11 While membership withdrawals and budget cuts are nothing new in the history of IOs, these acts can pose a significant threat to the existence of IOs, especially if driven by nationalist and populist attitudes.12 This article is based on the assumption that IOs are autonomous actors and therefore have an inherent interest in maintaining their positions in the current multilateral order.13 In response to member state contestation, some IOs opt for a conciliatory tone in their communicative responses, whereas others are more assertive.14 This article builds on previous studies by focusing on the role of bureaucracies in shaping IO responses to contestation by member states. Drawing on the insights of organization theory, I propose three types of bureaucratic responses: inertia, adaptation and resilience-building. Inertia. We should not expect IOs always to respond with action to member state contestation. On the contrary, there might not be any immediate response to the challenges. Not responding can be a strategic decision; but it can also mean that an IO is simply ignoring the challenge and sticking to institutional routines.15 Inertia can therefore be a result of either a strategic decision or an organization’s ‘blind spots’.16 Following McConnell and ’t Hart, I define inertia as ‘an instance and/or pattern of non-intervention’ by an IO in response to member state contestation.17 How can inertia be observed at the bureaucratic level? Research has shown that IOs communicate strategically.18 Avoiding ‘unfavorable headlines’ through overt judicial activism has been identified as a ‘survival strategy’ used in particular by international courts and human rights institutions facing a populist backlash.19 Hunkering down allows the IO bureaucracy to keep a low profile and to continue its work without changes. Empirically, hunkering down can be observed, for example, in an IO bureaucracy’s refusal to issue public statements or press declarations on a contested issue, or regarding its relationship with the challenging member state, indicating an overall decrease in public visibility. Adaptation. This response type is based on the theoretical assumptions of the principal–agent approach, according to which IOs, as the agents of their member states, make efforts to satisfy the principals’ demands.20 Thus the IO changes its policy to maintain the support of the challenging member state(s). Some decades ago, the threat of significant budget cuts by the US government under President Reagan led to adaptation in policy- and decision-making in, for example, the World Bank.21 Further indicators of adaptation are policy reforms that grant the challenging state greater influence. Adaptation aims at accommodating the contesting state to the point where this state refrains from further contestation. IO bureaucracies actively shape adaptation through framing and negotiation. To demonstrate to the challenging member state its willingness to adapt, an IO may rename a contested policy (e.g. adopting ‘maternal health’ instead of ‘reproductive health’) or stop the implementation of contested programmes (e.g. projects addressing climate change in response to the Trump administration’s budget cuts). Moreover, we know from previous research that IO bureaucracies influence institution-building and shape the agenda of international negotiations.22 We can thus expect these bureaucracies to actively negotiate aspects of policies and budgets with individual member state governments, especially if their resources are based primarily on voluntary contributions.23