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Adding Russia to NATO fails – psychological incompatibility, diverging interest and their nuclear arsenals make it impossible

Something about perm do the AFF + add Russia to NATO – some intrinsic perm

Daydov 2000 [Prof. Yuriy Davydov, 2000, <<NATO Research Fellow>> , “Should Russia Join NATO (Final Report)”,

Russia in NATO: «...contra». However, possible membership of Russia in NATO entails not only the benefits mentioned above but also a number of unavoidable problems that could have influence on the decision making process Moscow's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation included. It could not have been any other way, keeping in mind decades of "cold" war and the recent tensions between the two sides on the issue of NATO expansion and the conflict in Kosovo. These problems may be common for both Russia and NATO but they also may be regarded individually as having importance to Moscow or Brussels. The following may be counted as problems common for both Russia and NATO: · psychological compatibility. Even with an expediency of the alliance in mind, it will be hard for both sides to make a 100 percent turn after decades of being enemies, after viewing each other mainly as targets through the slit of a sight and the relationship – as a zero sum game. The matter is not only with the countries' leaders but also the general public mood that can be easily used by the «hawks» (such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Senator Helms and 32 others). The West will probably go through an easier adaptation process since it already has such experience (Germany, Spain, former socialistic states). With its tendency to view the world in black and white colours only, Russia will have more difficulties overcoming the physiological barriers. · transparency, first of all in the issues of military (nuclear) and mobilisation planning, intelligence information, especially received through agents or electronic means of interception. Of course, the confidence measures practised in Europe since the times of the first detente in the 70's have somewhat weakened the obsession of military people for secrecy. However, the spy obsession still common for both sides. This question is extremely delicate; usually it is not discussed openly and honestly which may lead to additional tensions and suspicions in the process of Russia and NATO cooperation. It is enough to say that the presence of NATO officers in the headquarters of the General Staff poses great problems for Russian officers. It is also correct to say that many Western generals will find it difficult to adjust themselves to participation of Russian military men in the meeting of NATO nuclear planning committee. The probable Russia’s membership in NATO is more likely to cause a series of difficult questions for its politicians and militaries. However, they are quite predictable. So, there is time to think about ways of avoiding them or lessening their probable negative impact on the relations between Russia and NATO under new circumstances. Despite their difficulties, these problems are solvable. But because these are Russia’s problems, the responsibility for their solving is mainly on its side. The following are the problems caused by the country's probable membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. · First of all, it is important to understand that the Russian political elite is not ready for such a radical step. It is so used to exploiting the image of an external enemy (that was usually presented as NATO) for its domestic needs that losing such a possibility will cause a confusion in the ranks of political and military establishment. Joining NATO will mean that everything said about it before (and equally, about Russia itself) is exactly the other way round. That is why Moscow makes a lot of reservations even if cooperation with NATO is very limited. The main idea here is to make the public believe that Moscow cooperates with NATO only because the alliance constantly makes fundamental concessions. However, the details of such ‘concessions’, for example during the eastward NATO expansion, the Dayton Agreements or the military actions in Yugoslavia, are usually not revealed to the public. In the 33 end the Russian political elite will have to decide on what NATO means and can mean for Russia? Is it an ally? A partner? Or an enemy who skilfully covers its true intentions? There are reasons to believe that the Russian establishment does not have answers to these questions even for itself.. · Russia will have to determine the form of joining NATO: will it become member of the political or the military organisation as well? Those who think that under current conditions Russia simply does not have any choice and thus is faced to join NATO believe that membership in the political organisation is the lesser of the two evils. Those who think that joining NATO would benefit Russia rather than harm it are certain that the country should join the military organisations as well. Thinking rationally, Moscow will (under any circumstances) go for the first option and only then, having gained certain experience, decide on the second one. · Russia will have to make a decision on its nuclear arsenal. No doubt, it will remain under national jurisdiction just as it is in the case of all NATO members who posses it. But Russia will have to answer the question whether this kind of arms will constitute a nuclear shield for the collective defence of NATO or rather be used for collective security of the post Soviet space only? Will the NATO Nuclear planning committee determine its probable use in some way (what way)? To what extent does the nuclear cooperation between Russia and NATO fit the nuclear policy of the latter? Is the cooperation of all four nuclear possessing members possible in the framework of the alliance? · The unpredictable response of the CIS countries to Russian membership in NATO may also raise a very important questions for Moscow. Involved in ethnical and territorial conflicts, all these countries, especially in Central Asia, have problems interpreting democracy. These states could deliberately draw Russia into the processes of conflict resolution in the area. In the case of Moscow’s membership in NATO, Russia would have to deal with those issues not as a neighbouring state but rather as a member of the alliance. However, other NATO allies would not be too happy about that: through Russia they could also become involved (military) in conflicts. In this situation, it is unclear how the system of collective defence will function: will Moscow remain its participant or not? Finally, a paradoxical situation can occur in the triangle NATO-Russia-Belarus. Will Minsk be automatically seen as member of the alliance keeping in mind that the two neighbouring 34 countries form something like a union state? It is very probable that the reaction of some post Soviet states who regard NATO with suspicion may be similar to the reaction of Russia as the ex-WTO allies were joining NATO and as the Baltic states are being considered for membership. · Used to gaining benefits from the contradictions between Russia and the West in the recent years, China will be not too excited about Russian membership in NATO. Peking usually frightened Moscow with closer relationship with the West, and the West – with probable coming together with Moscow. In this manner, China hoped to gain certain benefits on both directions. China will lose this possibility as soon as Moscow joins NATO. However, it can do nothing to oppose their united efforts. Besides, after Russia joins NATO, the enlarged alliance comes closely to the Chinese borders. For Peking, this would bring a change in the whole geopolitical configuration in a region where its influence has not been questioned before. The reaction of PRC on the rapprochement between Russia and NATO and the participation of Moscow in the alliance’s structures will probably be similar to that of Russia during the NATO eastward expansion. On the other hand, the reaction of Japan may be more favourable since a compromise between Russia and the West may be viewed as a precursor of a compromise between Moscow and Tokyo on the issue of the Kuril Islands. · Joining NATO may have positive effects on both the process of democratisation of military forces and the society as a whole as well as on emerging of the civil structures in Russia. However, under conditions of not finally asserted democratic values, it is important to understand that those who have not yet accepted these values or even deny them may accuse NATO and the Russian political leaders of imposing the alien values upon the society and the country. This mainly applies to the Russian generals who have lately build up their influence on the country's political leaders. As a result, an ideological confrontation and even a significant split in the Russian society on that issue may be expected. In turn, the possible membership of Russia in NATO may cause certain difficulties and problems for the West and the members of the alliance. There are those in the West who believe that these problems may be insoluble for the alliance. To which extent are these assumptions well grounded? And what are the most obvious problems nowadays? · The main concern of the West comes from the contention that Russian presence in the alliance may simply destroy it. Chaos and lack of stability in the country, corruption among 35 political elite, including military one as well, the penetration of criminal elements into business – all these distinguishing feature of contemporary Russia could spread to other members of the alliance. As a result, instead of positively influencing Russia, NATO will be negatively influenced by the new member. That is more than probable if Russia turns more clearly towards an authoritarian rule. Of course, by the time Moscow enters the alliance it will have to meet the majority of the problems; otherwise it will not be accepted by NATO. However, Russia is a transforming country; its internal as well as external structures are not yet stable. These structures are in a state of flux; they are renewed in some areas while go back to the old model (today Russia counts 89 subjects of Federation, tomorrow there may be seven left; Today Moscow has good relations with Byelarus, tomorrow they may be changed for the worst; Russia’s nearest environment is too hostile to be predictable) So, Russia may be a powerful generator of instability inside the alliance. That is why NATO members will always be afraid of having to deal with inner peacekeeping rather than with outer one. · The post Soviet space by itself is an enormous conflict area; and Russia has to a certain degree taken the responsibility for settling the ethnical and political conflicts in the region. There is a concern that having joined NATO, Russia would try handing this burden over to other alliance members. However, they are not interested to overburden themselves with different problems in Georgia and Abhasia, Tadjikistan, Azerbaijan, Nagorny Kharabach and Armenia. Chechnya alone poses enough difficulties to the West. Quite possibly, NATO will not be willing to handle territorial problems that exist between Russia and Japan, Russia and Finland, or the problems of illegal migration form China to Siberia and the Far East. · All that mentioned above brings up the following question: to what extent is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty applicable to Russia? For example, to what degree is it applicable in the case of the Chechen invasion into Dagestan in the fall of 1999? Some Western experts believe that if Russia joins the alliance, there will be a need for certain qualifications that would exclude automatic application of Article 5 to Russia and require additional consultations. However, this would change NATO status from an organisation of collective defence to an organisation of collective security. To what extent do other members agree with that? Another question – in that case, is there any sense for Russia to join NATO? If NATO does not want to take over responsibility for Russia, what sense does it make for Russia to take the responsibility for other alliance members in terms of their security?

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