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Nuclear deterrence theory – Putin will only lose a nuke if he barely wins – a crush means he’ll be deterred.

Geist 22 [Edward Geist, policy researcher with a PhD in history, 03-8-2022, "Is Putin Irrational? What Nuclear Strategic Theory Says About Deterrence of Potentially Irrational Opponents", No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/is-putin-irrational-what-nuclear-strategic-theory-says.html, DOA: 7-3-2022 //ArchanSen]

As nuclear strategists recognized decades ago, deterrence is necessary—but it isn't always sufficient. The analysts and theorists who worked on these issues were bedeviled, in particular, by the problem of nonrational opponents. As the nuclear strategist Herman Kahn put it in 1962, “We want to deter even the mad.”

Kahn took comfort in his conclusion that “irrationality is a matter of degree,” so scaling up nuclear deterrence might still impress a “need for caution” upon irrational adversaries. Furthermore, “if the irrationality is sufficiently bizarre, the irrational decisionmaker's subordinates are likely to step in.”

Theorist Patrick Morgan preferred the term “sensible” over “rational” to make it clear that an adversary doesn't have to be perfectly rational to be understood and his actions anticipated. Sensible actors may have goals that are anathema to our own, but they pursue them in ways that appear likely to attain those objectives. They also may commit human errors. But even Morgan acknowledged that not every opponent will be “sensible” enough to respect a deterrent threat.

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