Only soft regulations are key to solve – any alternative means NATO say’s no and private organizations circumvent
NATO say yes—plan popular
Venkat Rao and Cassandra Waite, 12. “Soft Regulatory Mechanisms and Open-source Bioethics to Counter Biothreat Proliferation.” Rao is a chief scientist at ERP international and Doctor of Philosophy. Waite Applied Biosafety 17 (2012): 110 – 119//AL
Introduction Much of the current focus in biodefense, aimed at countering current and emerging biological threats, has been interdisciplinary in scope, drawn mostly from the foundational ethical guidelines for medicine, science, public health, law, the environment, war, and international relations. As a result, biodefense and counter-bioterrorism programs at national and international levels have sought to employ conventional regulatory frameworks by merging a collection of concepts and guidelines implemented as “hard regulations,” but without systematically addressing the unique challenges posed by biodefense and biological threats. Technical and policy experts concur that hard regulations are likely to be counterproductive in the long run, when the academic research and private enterprise business models thrive on the basic principle of freedom to pursue scientific research and free exchange of information among the community of researchers and biotechnology business entrepreneurs (Roland, 2007). Public policymakers in government and multilateral agencies faced with challenging tasks involving environmental protection, national security, economic policy, healthcare, and labor laws are beginning to explore a range of options that include command-and-control type regulations and others involving participatory instruments and working with stakeholders to change behavior (Gaudioso & Salerno, 2004; Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998). For example, comparative risk assessment is increasingly used as a decision-making tool in the environmental and public health policy decision-making process involving the scientific community, public policymakers, and public stakeholder communities (Alm & Rao, 1994). The U.S. National Research Council employed a biological risk assessment paradigm to assess the operational safety of advanced emerging pathogen disease research laboratories (NRC, 2010a), or the maximum credibility event-based environmental consequence analysis to assess safety of high biocontainment laboratories (NRC, 2010b). From a public policy standpoint, some experts and professional organizations have suggested the use of the public health model proposed by Buchanan (2000), where individual interests are subordinated to the interests of the common good of society as the guiding framework for what might constitute a “soft regulation” to biodefense bioethics and a basis for countering biological proliferation threats. Guzman and Meyer (2011) have proposed a formulation for international soft law on international common law to form the basis for international tribunals towards nonbinding interpretations of binding legal rules. As a result, legal consequences flow from a range of nonbinding international instruments similar to expert committee recommendations and advisories and guidelines developed by regulatory agencies in the domestic setting that do not have enforcement powers or legal consequences due to noncompliance. Legal experts have opined that the quasi-legal characteristic of international soft law will be attractive to state parties engaged in a multilateral forum on a regional or international issue. Application of soft regulations is a well-established mechanism in international diplomacy, such as in regional and global multilateral fora aimed at global health protection (Magnusson, 2007; Sutton, 2009; WHO, 2003), prevention and elimination of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (Lee, 2004), labor laws (Borghijs et al., 2003; Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006), environmental protection (Alm & Rao, 1994; Koutalakis et al., 2010), and human rights (Andorno, 2009, 2007; Hillgenberg, 1999). Articles Soft Regulatory Mechanisms and Open-source Bioethics to Counter Biothreat Proliferation Venkat Rao* and Cassandra Waite CSC Defense Group, Alexandria, Virginia Downloaded by 67.194.0.233 from www.liebertpub.com at 06/24/22. For personal use only. www.absa.org Applied Biosafety Vol. 17, No. 3, 2012 111 Using illustrative examples from these well-established international initiatives, this article outlines the basic framework for a soft regulatory mechanism as part of regional or global efforts to coordinate the pursuit of scientific investigations and to manage biological threat proliferation. At the conclusion of the 2006 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) meeting. titled “Sixth Review Conference of the State Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention,” held in Geneva, it was concluded that national implementation would remain the biggest challenge during the 2007-2010 Intersessional program, which focused on regional cooperation; biosafety and biosecurity; oversight measures for biological research; and increased awareness, educational measures, and international cooperation in biological science and technology. BWC review conferences implement a quasi-regulatory framework to meet the goal of the treaty, which is to promote the development of the peaceful uses of biological agents and toxins. The confidencebuilding measures outlined in these sessions are supposed to provide practical steps to increase the level of
participation at the national level and of various stakeholders in the biological research and the biotechnology industry communities. Exploring confidence-building measures in the context of the BWC might offer attractive alternatives in the formulation of advisories and guidelines as policies related to ethical, political and social issues have grown in tandem with the spectacular advancement in biological research and biotechnology. Evidently, scientific progress has outpaced science policy formulation, particularly regarding contentious bioethical issues. A growing concern over DURC among scientific researchers and security experts has provided sufficient impetus to explore alternate policies aimed at soft regulatory options (Sutton, 2009). Current mandates or treaty frameworks—be they at the national or international levels—are nowhere closer to addressing the intricacies of the policy challenges posed by advanced biotechnology; therefore, conventional regulatory mechanisms are not part of a long-term solution. Background In one of the first conferences of its kind in Europe, a panel of experts explored the ethical implications of scientific research on bioweapons and prevention of bioterrorism (EC, 2004). More recently, the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW), “Ethics, Morality and the Law: Managing Bioterrorism Threats,” convened an international panel of experts to discuss topics related to biodefense and bioterrorism. This has the potential to have a seminal impact on a wide range of national and regional security programs and science-policy areas covering life sciences research and development, dual-use research, health security, and managing bioterrorism threats (DTRA, 2010). In both events, participating experts were specifically tasked to: a) identify mutually contrasting and overlapping viewpoints on the interdisciplinary areas related to bioethics, life sciences research, jurisprudence, and bioterrorism preparedness and response initiatives; b) create a conceptual framework for extended discussions and interactions among the domain experts and key stakeholders; and c) recommend action plans for a systematic process to begin sustained engagements among key stakeholders at national and international levels. The discussions during the 3-day ARW covered an array of views and positions regarding contemporary bioethics and potential implications on education and awareness, advanced biological research and development, national and regional security, and legal and moral implications when managing bioterrorism response (Magnusson, 2007; Rao, 2010a). A key observation from the ARW deliberations was that better understanding and delineation of the public policy domains is the first point where bioethical issues directly juxtapose national security challenges. Relevant topics for further consideration were improved awareness and education, opportunities towards manpower training and harmonization, as well as the implications of bioethical issues involved in life sciences research and biosecurity (Rao, 2010b). Figure 1 lists topics discussed at the 2010 ARW where bioethics-related issues are likely to overlap with operational challenges associated with the implementation of bioterrorism preparedness and response measures. ARW participants considered these (among other key themes) as the basis for a more detailed review and discussion. Identification of these overlapping domains was a key milestone at the 2010 ARW. The working group considered these topics as the basis for constructing a sustained engagement aimed at improved awareness and education, review of DURC, and further exploration of policy options towards “soft” regulations and harmonization of best practices.