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Boko Haram will get CBRNs---extinction

Dr. Bernard B. Fyanka 20, Ph.D. in History and Strategic Studies from the University of Lagos, Akoka Lagos Nigeria, "Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy", African Security Review, Volume 28, Issue 3-4, 2/17/2020, Taylor & Francis Online

The end of the Cold War might have represented the end of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but it did not necessarily dispel the dangers of the nuclear age – in fact, to some extent the globalised proliferation of non-conventional weapons has instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out. During the Cold War, the belligerents of any nuclear conflict would have been easily identifiable; however, in the post-Cold-War era, non-state actors and terrorist groups like Boko Haram have emerged as potential players in a new variety of nuclear conflicts that would entirely be based on terrorist models. The ominous possibilities for this new kind of warfare are indeed terrifying, and the rise in terrorist attacks around the globe enhances the likelihood of such an occurrence. Since 9/11, the body of academic literature on the threat posed by terrorists regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices has increased. In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett’s edited volume, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, there is disagreement as to whether this threat is overestimated or underestimated.1 In recent times, however, ample ideological incentive for the use of CBRN devices has been provided by the likes of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri – author of the ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ – who has stated that ‘[t]he aim of carrying out resistance missions and individual jihad terrorism “jihad al-irhabi al-fardi” is to inflict the largest human and material casualties possible on American interests and its allied countries’.2 This echoes the previous call of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Husayni al-Baghdadi, who maintained:

If the objective and subjective conditions materialize, and there are soldiers, weapons, and money – even if this means using biological, chemical, and bacterial weapons – we will conquer the world, so that ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet’ will be triumphant over the domes of Moscow, Washington, and Paris.3

For Boko Haram and other groups, there definitely exists a strong motivation for the use of WMDs, and the global reach of this thinking is not in doubt:

The globalization of the jihadist struggle has also led to an increased emphasis on Islamic identity. In combination with the ideological theme of revenge, the global struggle for Islamic identity has the potential to create a new jihadist cultic worldview in which its endorsers seek out WMDs because they represent the only means to significantly transform reality.4

Contextual scenarios in Nigeria strongly suggest that Boko Haram is one such group which has embraced the jihadist world view that endorses the use of WMDs. In this regard, the strengthened affiliation of Boko Haram’s splinter group – the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) confirms their ideological persuasions. The motivation for Boko Haram to use such weapons is thus grounded in the recent use of chemical weapons by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria against both military and civilian targets.5 If ISIS is claiming ownership of a faction of Boko Haram as its West African province, it is likely to extend its tactics to its African allies.

In the light of the above, the use of WMDs by terrorists cannot be explained within the framework of orthodox terrorism theories. With this in mind, what Russell Worth Parker refers to as the ‘Islamic just war theory’ suitably anchors a discourse on terrorism and advanced weapons of war.6 Most theorists do not support a subjective theory of ‘just war’, but rather the traditional version that relies on Western ideas of morality and proportionality, as well as on motives for waging war.7 On the other hand, jihadist traditions reinterpret just war’s key tenet of proportionality to suit Islamists’ conflict rationale. According to the Western form of just war theory, wherein discrimination proves strategically impossible, any response should be proportionate to the action that compels it – hence, proportionality dictates that a military operation should not cause greater harm than the act that it was designed to counter or prevent.8 This proportionality argument is exemplified in the use of nuclear weapons in the Second World War; since casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan exceeded one million Allied lives, with similar estimates for Japanese military and civilians, a nuclear attack was preferable. Eventually, the actual casualties suffered from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached 200,000, which represents 10% of the casualties that would likely have been incurred if Japan had been invaded (see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/). In the light of this argument, justification for the use of WMDs by terrorist groups would rest on their interpretation of the extent of the damage caused by the military aggression and long-term imperialism of Western powers.

Fighting faceless enemies in a CBRN conflict, whether in West Africa or the Middle East, is hard to imagine. Enemies who can easily blend into the crowd and take on the face of ordinary civilians represent a nightmare scenario for security strategists all around the world. The risk of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groups is largely dependent on their ability to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material like uranium and plutonium, combined with gaining the capability to build and deploy weapons which make use of them. The global proliferation of nuclear material has made this possible today.

Global proliferation of fissile material

The collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex ushered in a period of uncertainty regarding the security of nuclear material. Consequently, the risk of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorist groups – or into the hands of states that sympathise with or harbour such groups – increased considerably. Lax security at former Soviet nuclear facilities was widespread, making the theft of nuclear material possible. In the chaos that followed the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, radioactive material was frequently stolen from poorly guarded reactors and nuclear facilities in Russia and its former satellite states. Police operations have intercepted shipments of Soviet nuclear material in cities as far away as Munich and Prague, and experts believe that large batches are still unaccounted for and most likely accessible to well-connected traders on the black market.9

Over 1800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in facilities belonging to more than 25 countries all around the world.10 Not all of this material is located in military stockpiles – in fact, most countries maintain civil stockpiles of plutonium for use in nuclear power reactors. The civil stockpiles in the United Kingdom (UK), India, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan and Russia add up to over 230 metric tons of plutonium. In spite of these enormous quantities, the UK, India, France, Japan and Russia have not yet reduced the reprocessing of plutonium for civil use. Although civil plutonium is not weapons-grade, it remains viable as a raw material that can be transformed through an enrichment process for use in a bomb. The United States (US) on the other hand has a comparatively small amount of civil plutonium because of its 1970 policy to suspend the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.11

About 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is required to build a bomb – an insignificant amount in comparison to the global stockpile, which is in excess of 1.6 million kg. On the other hand, about 8 kg of plutonium is needed to build a bomb – a tiny fraction of the 500,000 kg global stockpile.12 Nuclear facilities that are relics of the Cold War era, especially those located in Eastern Europe, represent a high security risk. More than 130 nuclear reactors powered by HEU are operational in over 40 countries – the fallout of an early Cold-War-era programme in which the US and the Soviet Union helped their allies to obtain nuclear technology. Several other reactors have been shut down but may still contain nuclear fuel on site. In total, the world’s research reactors contain 22 tons of HEU – enough to build hundreds of nuclear bombs. The problem is that research reactor fuel tends to be stored under notoriously light security, making it a very vulnerable target for terrorists.13

In 2004, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report that details security lapses at civilian nuclear installations, citing a case in which the fences surrounding an unnamed foreign research reactor were in very poor condition and there were no guards securing the reactor building itself. In this report, Harvard expert Matthew Bunn explains that unlike the bulky and extremely radioactive fuel rods used in commercial nuclear power plants, research reactor fuel consists of small pellets that weigh only a few pounds each and moreover are easier to handle –a simple backpack can conceal several pellets.14 Naturally, civilian stockpiles are at greater risk of theft than those held in military installations. Consequently, the possibilities of such dangerous material falling into the hands of terrorists groups have become increasingly plausible.

Regarding military stockpiles, Russia and the US possess the largest amounts of weapons-grade plutonium – 100 and 150 metric tons, respectively. Diplomatic attempts aimed at reducing these stockpiles have resulted in an agreement for the two countries to dispose of 34 metric tons each via the method of turning the weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors. Although this agreement has not been effected yet, it is obvious given the above that the process may expose the material to greater risk of theft rather than securing it.15 On the other hand, in 2005 the US Congress eliminated the long-standing restrictions that were placed on the exporting of HEU to other countries for the purpose of manufacturing medical isotopes, which has also created new avenues for the proliferation of nuclear material through civilian use.16

Although the civilian use of nuclear material has increased the risk of its proliferation, the military facilities currently holding nuclear material around the world – especially in Russia – are also not well secured. Thousands of Cold-War-era tactical weapons are stored at very poorly guarded military installations, and most of these weapons are small and do not have electronic locks that prevent unauthorised usage.17 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no viable security strategy for securing the nuclear material contained in many of the former empire’s cities. During the Cold War era, the citizens of these cities had access to these facilities – and they still do, a problem further compounded by the fact that a strict inventory of the nuclear material contained in these facilities is not maintained.18

The likes of infamous arms dealer Leonid Minin (who was found guilty in a court of law for supplying weapons to non-state actors in African conflicts) are all too willing to do business with terrorists.19, 20 Arms dealers and smugglers all over the world are always seeking lucrative opportunities, and it is almost certain that some nuclear material has already been acquired by dangerous fanatics.

Several incidents in recent decades give every reason to believe that this is the case. In 1993, Kazakhstani authorities discovered HEU capable of arming 20 bombs in a building that was poorly secured.21 In 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia for carrying 100 g of HEU and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed was many additional kilograms.22 In 2011, six men with 4 g of uranium were arrested by security forces in Moldova. Upon questioning, they claimed that the 4 g represented a sample of the product they were ready to market. They claimed to possess an additional 9kg, which represents one third of the quantity needed to create a nuclear weapon. The leader of this group and the North African buyer escaped.23 Four years before this incident, gunmen raided a facility in Pelindaba, South Africa; the details of the event are still shrouded in mystery.24

Efforts by terrorist organisations to purchase and use nuclear weapons continue unabated. The most high profile of these known efforts is that of Osama bin Laden, who in 2001 attempted to purchase a canister of uranium in Sudan for US$1.5 million. Intelligence reports claim that he also met with two Pakistani nuclear scientists, and sketches of nuclear weapons were found at an al-Qaeda training camp.25

From the foregoing, it is clear that there exists a robust and thriving black market in fissile material that seems to be tailor-made for use by terrorists groups. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had recorded in its trafficking database a total of 2889 incidents involving losses, thefts and/or attempts to traffic fissile material across international borders.26 This is an incredibly high rate of security lapses considering the security priority that nuclear facilities are supposed to possess. More pressing is the fact that the agency does not inspect every nuclear facility globally, and as such is not in a position to comprehensively enforce strict security and safety regulations. As a consequence of this, fissile material often goes missing and subsequently appears on the black market without being reported to the agency. Furthermore, several nations which maintain nuclear facilities do not possess the requisite resources to subject employees to the kind of extensive background checks that can ensure their trustworthiness for working at such high-security sites. In the absence of this screening, the likelihood of people with terrorist ties applying for jobs at nuclear facilities for the purpose of obtaining nuclear material is very high.

There is mounting evidence worldwide that increasing amounts of fissile material are being stolen and traded. Although the Russian government refuses to admit that it has lost any nuclear weapons, at least four Russian nuclear submarines have sunk, and it is believed that the warheads on board are yet to be recovered. The US on the other hand has admitted to losing a staggering 11 nuclear weapons.27

How can Boko Haram obtain nuclear material?

Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Since 2009, it has engaged with the Nigerian state in a lethal terrorism campaign aimed at toppling the secular structure and replacing it with an Islamist state. By May 2014 over 12,000 Nigerians had been killed in the insurgency,28 while one in five persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states had been internally displaced. According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram ranks as the second deadliest terrorist group in the world, with an all-time high death toll of over 6000 in 2014 alone.29

With known ties to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has an estimated annual income in excess of US$25 million.30 By 2017, Boko Haram had been forced to retreat from the large areas it had previously occupied in the north-east of Nigeria, driven back by the joint international military efforts of several countries in West and Central Africa. This created the need for them to reassert themselves. The likelihood of this group re-strategising and reconsolidating is high. Consequently, their acquisition of fissile material for the development and deployment of radiological ‘dirty bombs’ has increased in probability. The availability of this material on the continent and within Nigeria itself presents ominous opportunities for the group. Apart from large deposits of uranium ore found in Africa, several countries including South Africa, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria itself presently possess nuclear research reactors.31

The IAEA has reported no less than 12 incidents of natural uranium smuggling between 1995 and 2005 in Africa alone. In fact, illegal uranium mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, DRC is presently a source of great concern. More importantly, this is where the source material for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was obtained.32 The proliferation of fissile material across the continent heightens the possibility of non-state actors like Boko Haram gaining access to it. Although there has only been one recorded theft of eight uranium fuel rods from a Kinshasa research reactor in 1997, the disturbing fact about this is that seven of the rods were never recovered.33

Within Nigeria itself, opportunities abound for terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other militant organisations to obtain fissile material for use in nuclear devices or dirty bombs. In 2004, Nigeria commissioned a 30-kW miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1) for the purpose of nuclear energy research.34 This nuclear facility is located at the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria in the north of the country, where terrorist activities and Islamist extremism have been going on for centuries. The possibility of Islamist extremists infiltrating nuclear facilities and smuggling out fissile material has been an ongoing security concern for a number of years. An outright attack on a lightly secured facility is a second possibility that actually played out in 2007, when a nuclear research facility in Pelindaba, South Africa was raided by armed assailants, who breached its security perimeter and gained entry.35 Another concern is unsecured radioactive waste – namely 234 legacy sources presently located at the Ajaokuta Steel Company in Kogi State – that has not been disposed of and could easily be obtained by Boko Haram.36 To complicate matters further, the construction of a low to medium radioactive waste management facility at Nigeria’s Nuclear Technology Centre has been abandoned.37

Can Boko Haram build and use non-conventional weapons?

The poor state of nuclear security combined with the tenacity of Boko Haram makes Nigeria a prime location for the advent of nuclear terrorism. Knowhow on building a nuclear device is widely available, as is the key component, HEU, which can be found all over the world in dozens of military and civilian nuclear facilities – like the one at Ahmadu Bello University. Once Boko Haram has obtained enough HEU, a choice can be made between two types of nuclear device. The first is the gun-type mechanism, in which the HEU is smashed together to produce an explosion. The second type, which is more advanced, requires a chamber in which the HEU is compressed in a highly symmetrical manner in order to create an implosion. The gun-type mechanism is the more likely option for terrorist groups because it is simpler.38

In order to use the gun-type mechanism to activate a nuclear device, Boko Haram operatives would need to assemble a crude cannon that can smash HEU together – and the more highly enriched the uranium, the less advanced the weaponry that is needed. The viability of any terrorist group accomplishing such a task has been tested by US senator Joe Biden. In 2004 he asked scientists at three national laboratories to see if they could assemble the mechanical components of a gun-type bomb with commercially available equipment alone. A few months later, they reported back that they had succeeded.39 With over US$25 million in annual income, Boko Haram has the resources to obtain both the scientific knowhow and the materials needed to build and deploy a gun-type nuclear weapon.

Radiological dirty bombs

The threat of non-conventional weapons proliferation and terrorism goes beyond nuclear weapons – it also encompasses radiological dirty bombs. The raw materials used to create nuclear weapons are very dangerous; they contain highly radioactive substances that would pose a serious health hazard if dispersed in human populations using a detonation device. Plutonium and uranium could thus be weaponised in the form of a radiological dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), which would cause widespread fatalities and cost billions of dollars in clean-up, evacuation and relocation operations.40

Terrorist groups like Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD, given the widespread proliferation of fissile material – and more importantly given the dual-use materials that can produce the same radiological effects as fissile material from nuclear installations. Radiological dual-use materials from smoke alarms and medical services are among the most easily accessible; highly radioactive isotopes are in fact used in life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments in hospitals all around the world, including several in Nigeria. These isotopes include cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192, which can easily be used as base materials for a bomb or an RDD.41 The challenge is that most of the medical, commercial and industrial groups that handle these materials are not adequately equipped to provide the security needed to prevent them from being stolen. On the other hand, the lack of regulatory controls in many countries has led to thousands of instances of missing or stolen radiological material that cannot be accounted for. Recently, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies found in an alarming study that 170 incidents where nuclear or radiological material was lost, stolen or outside regulatory control occurred in 2014 alone.42

RDDs are viable weapons for terrorist groups like Boko Haram to pursue – and terrorist states have also attempted to obtain them. On 28 March 2002, Abu Zubaydah – a key al-Qaeda operative – was captured in Pakistan. He is widely believed to have told US investigators that al-Qaeda was ‘interested’ in building or obtaining a dirty bomb. Further evidence emerged on 8 May 2002, when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrested Abdullah al Muhajir on charges of planning a radiological attack in the US at the direction of al-Qaeda operatives.

States that sponsor and support terrorist groups are likely to pass on fissile and radiological material to them. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is known to have sought radiological material for this purpose. In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb weighing 1400 kg that carried radioactive particles derived from irradiated impurities in zirconium oxide. A further 100 prototypes were designed from the casings of Muthanna-3 aerial chemical bombs, which were then modified to a 400-kg weight so that aircraft could carry more of them. It is likely that only 25 of these prototypes were destroyed, and that the other 75 were sent to the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment, a massive Iraqi weapons facility; their current status and whereabouts remain unknown.43

Chemical and biological weapons

The most commonly used non-conventional weapons are chemical or biological in nature. The long history of chemical and biological weapons usage dates as far back as 600 BC when, during a siege, Solon of Athens poisoned the drinking water of the city of Kirrha.44 More recently – starting with the use of mustard gas during the First World War – nations have acquired chemical and biological weapons easily, deploying them against enemies and their own citizens alike. For terrorist groups like Boko Haram, chemical and biological weapons are uniquely suited to their agenda and as such present very attractive alternatives to nuclear; they are extremely difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy. Aerosols of biological agents are invisible to the naked eye, silent, odourless, tasteless and relatively easily dispersed. Most importantly they are 600 to 2000 times cheaper than other WMDs. Recent estimates place the cost of biological weapons at about 0.05% of the cost of a conventional weapon which could produce similar numbers of mass casualties per square kilometre.45

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century due to advancements in technology. Production is comparatively easy via the commonplace technology that is used in the manufacturing of antibiotics, vaccines, foods and beverages, while delivery systems such as spray devices deployed from airplane, boat or car are widely available. Another advantage of biological agents is the natural lead time provided by the organism’s incubation period (three to seven days in most cases), allowing the terrorists to deploy the agent and then escape before an investigation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies can even begin. Furthermore, not only would the use of an endemic infectious agent likely cause initial confusion because of the difficulty of differentiating between a biological warfare attack and a natural epidemic, but with some agents the potential also exists for secondary or tertiary transmission from person to person or via natural vectors.46

Unlike their nuclear and radiological counterparts, biological and chemical weapons have been used for terrorism by both state and non-state actors. The challenges faced in preventing the use of these weapons through international control mechanisms include the increasing availability of larger quantities of substances, ease of use and most especially advanced technological deployment facilities that portend a high risk factor to larger populations. Table 1 catalogues the use of biochemical weapons in warfare and by terrorists and other groups or individuals over the past century, offering concrete historical precedent and empirical grounds for the potential future actions of Boko Haram. The data shows consistent recourse to the use of these weapons, in spite of the chemical and biological weapons conventions outlawing them. It can be seen that from the 1970s onwards there has been an increase in the use of biochemical weapons by religious cults and terrorist groups in pursuit of their agendas. The rise of Boko Haram and its ISIS affiliation could lead to a future where the use of biochemical weapons is the norm rather than the exception.

As stated previously, the contextual scenarios in Nigeria that validate this prognosis regarding Boko Haram’s possible actions are strongly supported by their ideological persuasions. The fact that Boko Haram embraces a jihadist world view which endorses the use of WMDs is strengthened not only by its affiliation to ISIS through ISWAP but also by the similarities in its strategic modus operandi. Like ISIS, Boko Haram both believes in the slaughter of other Muslims who are deemed to be in cahoots with infidels, and advocates for the destruction of civilian populations – whether Muslim or otherwise – that are regarded as obstructing the advancement or creation of their caliphate.47 This was practically demonstrated by ISIS in Syria and Iraq when they used chemical weapons against both civilian and military populations, as shown in Table 1.48

Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy

The central control measure for preventing nuclear terrorism is to ensure at the international level that nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other non-state actors in the first place. This is very difficult to achieve, given the lax security measures found at nuclear installations all over the world. Recognising the danger, the US under the Obama administration committed in 2010 at a nuclear security summit in Washington DC to securing all nuclear material within four years in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.49 Nigeria was a participant of this summit and is also committed to implementing the agreements that were reached. These attempts by the Obama administration followed up on the efforts embedded in the landmark 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which was meant to prevent nuclear material from being obtained by terrorists. The provisions of this convention were amended in 2005, and by 2010 the Washington summit had created the needed sense of urgency regarding the security of fissile material.50 Negotiations around the CPPNM started in 1979,51 and over the decades the growing proliferation of fissile material has combined with the increase in global terrorism to raise the profile of the issue of fissile material security. As of 2016, a total of 93 states including Nigeria had ratified the CPPNM, resulting in tighter security around the world at nuclear installations and border controls.

Nigeria has been engaged for decades in international efforts to control nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The country has ratified and acceded to over a dozen international instruments since 1963, including the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the CPPNM (1987), the Amendment to the CPPNM (2006) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007).52 At the level of global collective security, Nigeria is involved in implementing the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288.53 At the regional and subregional levels, the counterterrorism strategies of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been ratified and are in the process of being implemented. In pursuance of effecting these various international agreements, Nigeria has also instituted their National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was revised in 2016. Presently the country is also working with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) on projects designed to build community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthen judicial institutions.54

Towards an integrated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counterterrorism protocol

The CBRN terrorism threat in Nigeria is both real and present. The country has one of the highest rates of terrorist activities in the world; in fact, according to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria ranked third among 163 countries, with a terrorism death rate of 16.8% of the global total.55 Although attacks declined in 2017, Nigeria still retained third place on the Global Terrorism Index.56 Recently, Boko Haram has initiated a comeback that has seen renewed attacks and the abduction of more girls from schools in the north-east of the country. Security forces have continued to engage the group on the frontlines in their forest bases; with the assistance of local and international joint task forces, much of the conflict has been shifted to more remote areas in the north-east. Although the government security forces have gained the upper hand in their frontal clashes with Boko Haram forces, by January 2018 the group had successfully carried out several brutal assaults, including one on UN and Doctors Without Borders staff, shifting their strategy back to traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. During Easter of the same year, a single attack utilising 5 suicide bombers resulted in over 29 dead and 84 wounded.57

The likelihood that Boko Haram may begin to use CBRN weapons is increasing, and biological and chemical terrorism is potentially more difficult to prevent than conventional terrorist attacks. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the Internet has contributed to the spread of chemical and biological weapons knowhow, thereby increasing the likelihood of Boko Haram being able to obtain not only the ingredients needed to create biochemical weapons but also the information needed to build and successfully deploy them. Some of the base materials for such weapons even occur naturally, like castor beans, which can be processed to produce the dangerous toxin ricin and deployed against unsuspecting populations. Furthermore, live strains of very dangerous viruses like Ebola can be found in high-tech research labs, like those at the African Centre of Excellence for Genomics and Infectious Diseases (ACEGID) at the Redeemer’s University Ede in Osun State. If Boko Haram were to secure this virus and weaponise it, the age of biowarfare would arrive in Nigeria – with deadly consequences. More importantly, the materials that are needed to create most chemical weapons exist in large quantities as dual-use materials that can be purchased on the open market and ferried into the country via forged end-user certificates.

The chemical and biological weapons conventions represent control structures geared towards the containment of these non-conventional weapons, and to a large extent state signatories like Nigeria have implemented a good level of the instruments contained in them; however, some nations still maintain secret stockpiles and have used them in recent conflicts, like Iraq against Iran and Kurdish dissidents in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Syrian government, which is presently using them against its civilian population.

On the whole, the counterterrorism measures put in place to deal with the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack have gained more credibility in the international community. Although there is no dedicated international inter-agency mechanism for coordinating the response to terrorism involving the release of toxic chemicals or biological agents, there are mechanisms that have evolved in the context of humanitarian assistance and emergency response after natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes; these include the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS), the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TAD) and the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN). The primary inter-agency mechanism that coordinates responses to emergencies involving the agencies mentioned above is the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC).58 To further strengthen inter-agency coordination in the wake of a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions, the UN CTITF is also focusing on planning for such an eventuality.

At the local level, several key aspects of Nigeria’s NACTEST are presently being utilised. The strategy is divided into five work streams:

Forestall: Prevent terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns and deradicalisation programmes.

Secure: Ensure the protection of life, property and key national infrastructure and public services, including Nigerian interests around the world.

Identify: Ensure that all terrorist acts are properly investigated, and that terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice.

Prepare: Prepare the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents can be mitigated.

Implement: Devise a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated, cross-governmental, population-centred effort.59

Presently, the first three aspects of these work streams are receiving full attention. However, in regard to WMDs, the counterterrorism strategy is lacking a well-integrated CBRN protocol for engaging with the work streams for preparation and implementation. Nigeria currently handles issues relating to nuclear and radiological matters through two institutions: the Nigerian Atomic Energy Agency (NAEC) and the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA). It is therefore expected that, given the growing CBRN threat level in the country, these agencies will collaborate with the Office of the Security Adviser to the President in order to initiate a proper CBRN counterterrorism protocol.

The NACTEST does not currently include a dedicated protocol for handling CBRN threats; Nigeria is however involved in nuclear security at the international level, which has primarily provided for capacity-building and human resources development. Activities in these areas include the gradual process of converting the miniature neutron source reactor in Zaria from using HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), partnerships for nuclear and radiological security with the US Department of Defence (DoD) and the IAEA, establishing a nuclear security support centre in the country, reviewing the 2012 design basis threat (DBT) for protecting nuclear and radiological material, the development of a programme for locating and securing orphan legacy radioactive sources, training security officers, the installation of a radiation portal monitor at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos in 2008 and the acquisition of three more monitors for other international airports in the country.60

An integrated CBRN protocol would fall under the preparation and implementation work streams of the NACTEST. The protocol should include a strategy for detecting CBRN agents in the wake of terrorist events, followed by disaster response and countermeasure initiatives to be carried out by security, medical and disaster response teams. Given the availability of advanced technology, the integrated CBRN counterterrorism protocol should also include the deployment of handheld radiological and biochemical detectors to high-risk areas, and security forces and disaster response teams should be trained in their usage. Embedding a standard protocol in the NACTEST on how to prepare for and respond to CBRN events is essential for repositioning counterterrorist activities in the country to meet the present threat level. The US and Canada along with the UK and most other European countries facing CBRN threats have already repositioned accordingly in order to accommodate this new reality.

Conclusion

Any terrorist attack involving WMDs is the ultimate nightmare scenario. Fortunately, at least some of these potential attacks are preventable. If and when the nuclear security summit achieves its goals, the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in Nigeria will be immensely reduced. Unfortunately, the likelihood of radiological, chemical and biological attacks is more difficult to regress, making it all the more vital to integrate a CBRN protocol into Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy.

Preventing such a tragic event from occurring will require very close ongoing monitoring of the strategic manoeuvrings of Boko Haram. From its inception to the present day, the organisation has depended on the looting of military armouries to source most of its heavy weapons and equipment. It has built up an impressive arsenal in this manner and there is no indication that the group will stop using this highly profitable strategy, which could be further employed to obtain advanced CBRN weaponry from facilities that are vulnerable to being raided. The civilian facilities mentioned in this paper are at high risk of being targeted in this fashion; hence, the recalibration of Nigeria’s CBRN counterterrorism protocols should include a security framework that provides military security for facilities like the ACEGID in Osun State and the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Lastly, although the IAEA has assisted in the conversion of Nigeria’s reactor from HEU to LEU,61 the availability of fissile material at the facility means that the risk of radioactive dirty bombs being created from looted material is still present.

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