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Partisanship and the news cycle destroy effective threats.

Warburg 21 [Gerry Warburg is a professor of practice of public policy at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, January 2021, “Congressional Accountability in Shaping United States Foreign Policies 1970-2020,” Center for Effective Policymaking, https://thelawmakers.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Working-Paper-Congressional-Accountability-in-US-Foreign-Policy-1.pdf] Eric

Research on this question, supplemented by interviews with leading policymakers, offer details that reveal how profoundly the policymaking environment has been altered.(30)

First, there are ever fewer centrists elected to Congress from either major party, and those that remain find few electoral incentives for taking tough votes on international policy. Consequently, there are fewer Members prepared to place institutional prerogatives over partisan politics. In the late 1980s, there were a dozen liberal Republicans to ‘the left’ of conservative Democrats, often from southern states, and vice versa. In the last Congress, the most conservative senator in the Democratic caucus, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, was still ranked as more liberal than the most moderate Republican, Susan Collins of Maine.(31) Those who challenge party orthodoxy, or who reach across the political aisle to support a bipartisan compromise—or to defend the institutional prerogatives of Congress—are at greater risk of being defeated. As a consequence, Members of both parties have adopted a classic ‘blame avoidance’ strategy to dodge difficult votes while reserving the ability to blame the President for foreign initiatives gone awry.(32) In fact, several powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairmen have lost their re-election bids. The list includes William Fulbright of Arkansas, Frank Church of Idaho and Charles Percy of Illinois. Many incumbents now fear primary election challenges more than general elections. Primary voters defeated relative moderates such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) in 2010, while Trump critic Bob Corker, a popular Tennessee Republican retired unexpectedly in 2019. The muchnoted ‘sorting out’ of parties has significantly increased party-line voting while dis-incentivizing would-be champions of the institution of Congress.(33) This has occurred most notably on domestic issues such as health care—not a single Republican voted for Obamacare, even after Democrats accepted scores of GOP-sponsored amendments. Stimulus spending and tax cuts also became party-line votes in the House. Yet, it also happened on issues like the Iran nuclear pact, where Republicans voted en bloc against an agreement that had been supported by U.S. and Israeli military and intelligence leaders, five United Nations Security Council partners, including key European allies, as well as Russia and China. This party-line voting on security matters and the failure to defend institutional prerogatives “makes it easier for future administrations to just ignore the will of Congress,” Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) observes, “it means there’ll be less and less bipartisanship in defending Congress.(34)

In this hyper-polarized legislative environment, bipartisan coalitions to sustain Washington’s international policy initiatives are very difficult to achieve. This harms U.S. national security interests. Former GOP Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen graphically describes the difficulty of passing even a routine State Department authorization in this environment: “The House Foreign Affairs Committee mark-up on the State Department funding bill suffered from dozens of amendments that were simply about social engineering and political messaging. When you try to bring a bill like that to the floor, with so many divisive social issues, you get a ‘No’ from leadership.”(35) Similarly, nonpartisan efforts to defend the institution of Congress have been weakened. As one former House leader and veteran appropriator, Vic Fazio of California, recently testified, “The job of the minority is now to make sure that the governing majority accomplishes little or nothing.”(36)

A second factor in Capitol Hill’s decline has been the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the rise of social media. Both have made nuanced positioning on breaking foreign developments more difficult. Flip comments by inveterate Twitter users crowd out more thoughtful analysis. Hard line positions are rewarded by voters and locked in early by earned media coverage. The President of the United States boasted by Tweet in 2019 about nominating a poorly qualified, controversial Director of National Intelligence, then counting on the press to ‘vet’ him after the presidential announcement.(37) Legislators also spend far less time in Washington working together. Bipartisan CODELS (“congressional delegations”) making fact-finding missions overseas, have been cut back. In the Senate, leaders have doubled the number of committee assignments while reducing the number of substantive bills given consideration. Consequently, recent research has shown, that there is greater policy diversification and less specialization.(38) Legislators are increasingly generalists, fewer are specialists in foreign or defense policy. The development of policymaking expertise, especially in foreign policy, an area deemed of less interest to voters, is punished rather than rewarded. In addition, term limits on committee chairs—a reform initiative from decades past—has further reduced the development of expertise necessary to stand up to a unified executive branch front led by the President.

A third factor is that the marquee foreign policymaking committees, panels that once wielded the power to check presidents, have themselves declined. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Exhibit A here. The committee was once a panel led by vigorous challengers to presidential authority. William Fulbright used it to build a national case against the Vietnam War expanded by his political ally, fellow southern Democrat Lyndon Johnson. Frank Church used the panel to build the case for nuclear arms control and the Panama Canal treaties, while checking CIA excesses. Republican Jesse Helms pressed from his leadership position on the panel to curb U.S. support for international organizations.(39) Such was the high esteem of the panel that Senator Jack Kennedy’s father, eager to prepare for the 1960 presidential contrast, implored then-Senate Majority Leader LBJ to grant his son a seat on the panel in the 1950s, blocking a more senior political rival, Estes Kefauver.

In the last Congress, the committee was led by a quiet isolationist from Idaho, Jim Risch, who is not held in high regard by foreign policy experts on both sides of the aisle. The Senate panel that once seated Dick Lugar, John Kerry, Chuck Hagel and Barack Obama still attracts White House aspirants. Ted Cruz of Texas, Rand Paul of Kentucky, and Marco Rubio of Florida all joined the panel prior to their own presidential campaigns. But this panel, and its House counterpart, are now deemed by most legislators less desirable than in previous eras. The House committee still attracts some legislators committed to a strong institutional role for Congress. But it also has Members enamored of foreign travel and well-supported by interest groups with a stake in international matters. In the House, where Members face voters every two years and are more tied to parochial districts, getting Members to serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee has been a challenge for party leaders.(40)

The reason why these two key authorizing committees have lost much of their luster and influence is clear: they rarely pass any significant legislation. In fact, few major committees of Congress act less on legislation. With no significant treaties coming before the Senate in the last decade, the Foreign Relations panel garners less public and press attention. With no authorization debates, it has legislative power over fewer funds and programs. In the void left by decades of failing to pass even an annual authorization bill for the State Department, the committees and their public education functions, even their champions and leaders concede, are less relevant.(41) Today the work of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees, which employ several dozen senior staff experts on bilateral relationships and regional security challenges, is often “eviscerated by four appropriations subcommittee clerks, who are not foreign policy experts,” as one veteran legislator laments.(42) It should be noted, this phenomenon obtains on most legislation, not just on national security matters.

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