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Loss is more persuasive than gain for states and sub-state actors

Berejikian & Early 13, *PhD, Professor at the University of Georgia, Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs **PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science, Associate Dean for Research at the University at Albany, SUNY's Rockefeller College (Jeffrey Berejikian; Bryan Early, 2013, “Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve,” Political Psychology, 34.5)

Loss aversion is perhaps the most enduring and intuitive finding in behavioral decision theory (Kahneman et al., 1991; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1980). Experimental results suggest that the subjective pain of loss is greater than the benefit enjoyed from an equivalent gain, and scholars have extended this finding beyond the laboratory to explain a wide range of otherwise puzzling human behavior. Building upon these results, and adding new findings from the field of neuroscience, we seek to contribute to the theory-building enterprise in the study of foreign policy by constructing a gener- alizable theory of loss aversion and foreign policy behavior. The approach is consistent with the call to continue to develop theories of foreign policy built upon solid micro foundations (Hudson, 2005). Specifically, we hope to explain why policy makers stubbornly stand firm in their prosecution of some international disputes while in others they are willing to back down. The question is relevant for any number of foreign policy issues, such as territorial disputes, trade negotiations, conflicts over water rights, arms control, and international treaty compliance. Much of the research on loss aversion in the foreign policy literature has relied heavily upon case studies (Mercer, 2005). However, for some time scholars have suggested that loss aversion should produce broad patterns of behavior that could, in principle, be captured by statistical analysis (e.g., Jervis, 1992, Levy, 1996). Large-n analyses of broader behavior patterns thus remain fertile territory for research and contain the potential for advancing our understanding of how loss aversion affects foreign policy. As we demonstrate in this article, foreign policy behaviors, like trade disputes, can be analyzed using contemporary insights about loss aversion derived from neuroscience. Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. First, we build upon neuroscience research to argue that policy makers' aversion to accepting losses can affect their willingness to back down in international disputes. Cognitive science has convincingly demonstrated that individuals tend to strive harder and take more risks to avoid losses than they will to achieve similar gains. More recent neuroscientific findings show that unrealized expectations, like those observed in a broken agreement, are processed in the human mind in a way almost identical to actual losses. The result is that unmet expectations can also trigger loss aversion. Policy makers' resolve during disputes can thus vary if they perceive themselves to be defending previously established agreements from violations by their counterparts. Such violations diminish expected and hoped for gains, triggering loss aversion. Generalizing from this phenomenon, we then distinguish between preventive goals in which policy makers seek to protect against perceived losses versus promotive goals in which policy makers seek to make new gains. We theorize that policy makers should be less willing to back down in disputes initiated for preventive reasons than for promotive ones. We employ our theory to help explain cross-case variation in the level of resolve demonstrated by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in prosecuting Section 301 trade disputes designed to improve the terms of trade for U.S. businesses. Drawing on our preventive versus promotive framework, we hypothesize that the USTR should be less willing to back down in Section 301 disputes initiated because of breached trade agreements than those initiated to open up new markets. We test our theory via two different large-n analyses of a hundred Section 301 trade disputes. This approach is unique because - to the best of our knowledge - this study constitutes the first theoretically driven statistical analysis of loss aversion on foreign policy behavior grounded in a specific set of neuroscientific findings. In our first test, we conduct an analysis using binary logit, and, in the second, we employ a competing risks model. The two approaches allow us to model the effects of time on U.S. resolve in different ways. Our empirical results provide strong support for our theory, revealing that the U.S. Government was significantly less likely to back down in preventive disputes. Indeed, we find that the preventive/promotive distinction provides the single greatest determinant of U.S. resolve in prosecuting its Section 301 cases. We believe that this project offers a number of novel contributions. First, this study demonstrates that specific findings from cognitive neuroscience can make tangible contributions to explaining phenomena in international relations. Our study reveals that loss aversion and unrealized expecta- tions profoundly shape the behavior of even the most powerful states in the international system and that it does so in ways that traditional theoretical approaches are often blind to. This suggests that the loss-aversion-based framework we have developed may be able to yield novel insights into a host of other issue areas beyond the study of trade policy. Second, we test our arguments utilizing large-n statistical analysis - a method that has seen little use in evaluating cognitive and/or neuroscience theories of international relations (e.g., Drury, 2005). Moving forward with a program of quantitative analysis broadens the applicability of such theories and places them on equal analytical footing with rationalist models. Our project thus demonstrates that the empirical barriers that have to date "arrested" the development of the cognitive research agenda in international relations can be overcome (Walker, 2007). Lastly, our inquiry provides a number of case-specific insights explaining the comparative resolve demonstrated by the United States in prosecuting its Section 301 trade disputes and the policy implications that arise from them.

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