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Compliance in a bordered nation-state paradigm invests in a logic of necropolitics that render the bodies between borders as expendable

BUCKEL & WISSEL 10 (Sonja Buckel, Jens Wissel - Fankfurt Institute of Social Research) “State Project Europe: The Transformation of the European Border Regime and the Production of Bare Life, International Political Sociology”, Volume 4, Issue 1, March 2010, Pages 33–49, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2009.00089.x//vivi

Agamben refers to a basic problem in the constitution of modern nation states: The state as a nation implies that ancestry—in his terms ‘‘bare life’’— becomes the foundation of sovereignty. The community created by the nation is based on a biopolitical imagining, to use Balibar’s terms, on the illusionary yet powerful assumption that ‘‘generations reproducing within an almost unchang- ing territory in almost stable relationships for centuries have passed on an unchanging essence.’’ Such a ‘‘created people’’ is considered as the basis and origin of political power (Balibar 1992:107, 115). Following Agamben, refugees thus represent an ‘‘alarming factor’’ because they question the congruence of descent and nationality, of human being and citizen. Immigration to countries in the European Union has grown to such an extent that this reversal of perspec- tives is now ‘‘fully beyond doubt,’’ as a growing number of people are no longer represented in the nation. The refugee turns from the ‘‘apparent marginal figure’’ into the pivotal figure of our political present (Agamben l.c.). Agamben’s thesis ties in with thoughts Hannah Arendt had already formulated in 1955 when reflecting on her own experience as a refugee. She had argued that human rights, which claim to ‘‘originate solely from the very fact of personhood’’ regardless of any political status, are in fact questioned by the mass emergence of refugees (Arendt 1955:438). For the deviation of refugees consists in the fact that they are not officially represented by any state, since the national way of life ties the enforceability of rights to citizenship; by doing so, it expels a growing number of people into a no man’s land with neither right nor law: ‘‘Whomever the course of events expelled from the old trinity of people-terri- tory-state, grounding the nation, was left home- and stateless; whoever lost the rights guaranteed by citizenship, would remain without rights....Whoever was chased out of the country by their pursuer like a reject of humanity—Jews, Trotskyists and so on—was received as a reject of humanity everywhere else’’ (Arendt 1955:402 et seq.). The moment individuals left the state to which they were subservient by birth and national affiliation, the moment they were unable to claim their civil rights outside of their territory, they became uncertain about their fundamental human rights. So the very instant they were referred back to the rock bottom of rights which they had ostensibly gained through birth, it became apparent to them as the social construct of a nation-state, which rules the population as a people on the territory it has constituted. The borders of the nation-state that were sup- posed to mark nothing but the jurisdiction of the democratic constitution according to democratic republicanism, and were supposed to be traversable for everyone willing to accept the applicable law (Maus 2002:231), turned out to be a technique for the deprivation of rights. Once expelled from the trinity, the ref- ugee’s ‘‘nothing-but-personhood’’ catapulted them into some kind of a ‘‘state of nature,’’ in which they lost any relation to the world built by human beings. As soon as all other social and political qualities were lost, no rights whatsoever arose from the remaining mere personhood. The world showed no high regard for the abstract bareness of personhood (Arendt 1955:449). The spaces in which no rights can be asserted anymore thus stretched and assumed the shape of ex-territorial zones of an ‘‘invisible police state,’’ in which the sphere of police control expanded immensely and detention centers would become the only practical substitute for the lack of a national territory: ‘‘They are the only fatherland the world has to offer to the fatherland-less’’ (Arendt 1955:431). As far as its inhabitants are stripped of any legal status and entirely reduced to bare life, Agamben concludes in apparent parallel to Arendt (Agamben 2002:180, 183) that ‘‘the camp is the most absolute bio-political space that has ever been realized, in which power is confronted only by pure life with- out any means of mediation’’; it is the ‘‘materialization of the state of emer- gency.’’ With the loss of their citizenship, refugees do not only lose all of their rights, but more fundamentally, the ‘‘right to have rights’’ (Arendt 1955:446). By taking the European Union as an example, in the following, we would like to show that this historical analysis of European migration policy is still highly relevant, although the transnationalization of state and law has fundamentally transformed the international arrangement of states compared with Arendt’s times. As a result, we can perceive a new European state project currently reproduc- ing the loss of ‘‘the right to have rights’’ in extended form. What we want to introduce to the discourse of critical migration studies (Guild 2009:11) is a critical state theoretical approach. In our view, this is necessary as we witness a period of grave institutional displacements in the way political domination is exe- cuted, while we are at the same time confronted with a certain state-theoretical dilemma: On the one hand, the focus of mainstream migration studies is state- centric (ibid. 22); on the other hand, critical approaches abandon this statist approach to the benefit of a perspective of migratory movements—a move that is definitely a sign of progress in critical thought. However, this constellation leads to a dichotomous separation of both perspectives, and thus a failure to challenge traditional notions of the state used in mainstream migration studies and international relations alike. This traditional understanding assumes the state as a taken-for-granted entity mostly represented as ‘‘sovereignty,’’ under- stood as a legal rather than as a sociological category. To overcome this dilemma, we conceive the state following the materialist tradition as a social rela- tion, or to cite Poulantzas (2001:154) as ‘‘material condensation of social rela- tions of forces.’’ By arguing in this way, we apply from the outset a political sociological approach which seeks to transcend the dualism of state and society. The practices of migratory movements are therefore an integral part of the social relations crystallizing in the state. What follows from this is that the state can no longer be understood as a mono- lithic entity, but as an ensemble of heterogeneous competing apparatuses stitched together only by a fragile state project. Accordingly, the state is neither simply an instrument of powerful actors in control of national borders nor a problem solver in the service of common welfare, as it is seen in the tradition of German idealism. The contradictions between the demand for increased global mobility and the intention to wall off societies that we can observe in many states is conceptualized as the ‘‘liberal paradox’’ (Hollifield 2003:35 et seq.). As for our state-theoretical approach, we take this apparent paradox as a structural feature of modern state- hood and its institutions: The failure of migration control policy is per se not a loss of function; rather, such contradictions are always inherent in capitalist socie- ties. The conflicting actions of different state apparatuses are the result of varying social contradictions manifest in competing and heterogeneous apparatuses. In short, the state exists not outside of society and its contradictions. In some respect, this becomes even clearer with regard to the process of European integration. In developing this analysis, we demonstrate that in the context of Europeanization a process of rescaling the state takes place in which a new control regime of global mobility evolves producing specific zones of stratified rights (see Bach 2008:153). Our investigation focuses on the zone of illegalization: We concentrate on the two techniques that produce the ‘‘bare life’’ highlighted by Arendt: the ‘‘camp’’ and the invisible ‘‘police state.’’ It will become clear that the institutionalizing of the ‘‘the right of every human being to belong to mankind’’ (Arendt 1955:446 et seq.), and that means: to an international regime, in which ‘‘the right to have rights’’ is detached from citizenship (Benhabib 2004:68), is still lacking. In con- trast to Giorgio Agamben, we do not trace this constellation back to the collapse of the concept of human rights, but to hegemonies and power relations.

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