Cybersecurity discourses ignore and expand the infiltration of the cybersphere by deterritorializing flows of capitalist governance constitutive of Empire
Hong/Goodnight ’19 (Yu Hong; professor of media and international culture at Zhejiang University. G Thomas Goodnight; professor of communication at University of Southern California. “How to think about cyber sovereignty: the case of China” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17544750.2019.1687536 12 November 2019) // ELog
China’s stance on cyber governance marks a different way of thinking and praxis, but it should be viewed not in a binary relationship to the Global North but as intertwined with historical, geopolitical, and epistemological power relations (Wasserman, 2018). Borrowing from postcolonial infrastructure studies, critical algorithm studies, and internet histories, we use the cybersphere—defined as a historical ensemble of material, organizational, regulatory, and socio-cultural layers of communicative relations among populations, machines, and institutions developed across scales—as a substitute for cyberspace, to challenge the digital sublime and to underscore its emergent geopolitical nature. The digital sublime, whose influence has waned but is not finished, sees cyberspace as a de-territorialized virtual global village (Johnson & Post, 1996). Its mistake lies in exaggerating the social freedom to link and to exchange by rendering cyberspace as a natural given, rather than a geopolitical sphere. Enacted as a top-down model, cyberspace has been used to smuggle in universal norms that do not recognize historical struggle. The cybersphere, however, entails both materiality and relationality (Cooren, 2018). It entails not just virtual reality but material grounding. Power bases, storage, and server locations are one thing; the interconnection of information and things added by 5 G mobile networks, quite another. Furthermore, the cybersphere shapes, and is shaped by, relational dynamics. It mediates labor relations, production chains, innovative resources, knowledge production capacities, and human relations with environment (Aouragh & Chakravartty, 2016; Murdock, 2018; Srinivasan, 2017). Extending political economies and expressing power relations, the sphere has selectively amalgamated national, material, and territorial spaces on the one hand, and virtual networks of digital data exchange on the other. It features both interdependence and discontinuity, blending functional flows, spatial fragments, and social segments (Castells, 2010). In the cybersphere, the continuity and discontinuity of political economies are named and arranged by discourse for exchange, forming disagreement spaces that “express differences, disrupt convention, and field imagined alternatives” (Jackson, 2015; Liu & Goodnight, 2016). Notably, the assemblage of policies, organizations, and material structures that underpin the socio-spatial logic of networks and networking is such a focal site of struggles over ideas, interests, and power across scales and units. If the old romantic thinking of cyberspace as a separate realm subject only to community-supported self-regulation has long lost its force (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006), the multi-stakeholder model that has ever since prevailed evokes pluralistic participation but evades national sovereignty and hierarchical power (Mueller, 2010), even implicitly extending Northern bias against redistributive and developmental deficits (Chakravartty, 2007). Such failure ignites alternative politics centered on sovereign authorities, after decades of neoliberal regulatory reforms. Instead of being a natural space of unity or inevitability, the cybersphere— which entangles political economies and disagreement spaces, national and international relations, virtual and material ties—has evolved into an expanded geopolitics. Its boundaries and sources of authority are fought over by different groups and are therefore intrinsically political (Kristof, 1960). Various spaces have already shaped but do not define the cybersphere. History shows that states and societies make their own interpretations amidst global techno-economic trends— depending on their values, interests, and capacities. The most notable is the Sino-US digital interdependence and discontinuity. The US has made foreign policy efforts to extend the liberal capitalist model to cyberspace, but China has preserved some crucial political-economic and ideational foundations for selfdetermination despite its steadfast global digital convergence (Hong, 2017; Kiggins, 2012). Still, beneath the foreground of apparent variation lies the shared background of material ties and relational dynamics that defy binary distinctions. China’s internet has been conventionally rendered in the state territorial imaginary (Shen, 2017). By portraying a contest-and-conquest relationship between the state preoccupied with regime insecurity and varying social usages, the dual foci implicitly frame the Chinese Intranet against the globalist internet (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Rauchfleisch & Sch€afer, 2015). Whereas the latter associates its governance with the presumably pluralistic, fragmented, and competitive societies of Western democracy, the former illustrates the will of the state and the structures of state control. Indeed, although contested and compromised, the efficacy of state control has legitimized deploying the Great Firewall as a synecdoche for China’s internet governance (MacKinnon, 2011; Wei, 2017). Political economy frames a different cyber imaginary, one that loosens this stark dichotomy. Critical studies suggest that states co-exist with non-state agents in shaping the global internet and that the influence of ownership, policies, laws, and commercial interests renders the idea of a “singular virtual space” misleading (Graham, 2013). Cast in light of the cybersphere, China’s so-called Intranet also reveals entanglements with foreign capital, foreign technology, foreign markets, and foreign labor. Rather than hold up “highly conservative” telecoms policy or exemplify “cyber-conservatives” (Mueller, 2010; Zeng, Stevens, & Chen, 2017), the state has unleashed different sequences of liberalization, decisively exposing its share of the cybersphere to the dynamics of global digital capitalism (Hong, 2017; Schiller, 2014). Symbolic, cultural, and social dimensions are also folded into the cybersphere. From blogging to social networking to e-commerce, the platformization of cyberspace is structured by bottom-up vitalities, which sustain and derail top-down governance (Yang, 2003; Yu, 2017). Shaping and shaped by actors of the political economy, including states, markets, and societies, the cybersphere continues to extend social relations and material structures across boundaries, be they spatial, temporal, material, corporeal, or social. Its ubiquitous expansion, accelerated by the Internet of Things, the Internet of Bodies, and 5 G mobile networks, has enmeshed the state in a “variable geometry” of wills, interests, and values and even overwhelms it with torrents of capital, technology, information, and communication (Castells, 2010, p. 53). If it is true that “statism disintegrated in contact with new information technologies,” as Manuel Castells wrote in the Information Age trilogy, does the exercise of cyber sovereignty mark an orchestrated reaction of the state? What kind of state? And how? This brings back the state as a strategic actor in the generally “stateless” internet studies (Flew, 2018). Rethinking the state in transnational digital political economy China’s official vision regarding the state’s authority over internet-related public policy differs from the Western liberal model, and not only in the sense of opposing individualist democracies and authoritarian states. China’s communication policies persist as a dialectic between incumbent powers that own, regulate, and change the organizational apparatuses and material structures of communications and emergent powers that use, extend, and innovate counter-orders. Thus, the approach here is not to dissolve the state-centric framework, nor do we suggest an economic cosmopolitan account to replace the national framing. However, as an alternative to the ontological fracture between the state as a mutually exclusive territorial monopoly on the use of force, on the one hand, and market forces and individual rights that can be universally applied, on the other, we do want to deabstract the state—to see the state as mutually constituting, and frictionally meshing, with a broader network of power materialized by the cybersphere. This statement, along with the replacement of cyberspace by cybersphere, has implications for the theory of the state. A decades-long debate between liberal and Marxist strains of state theories has bearing on the state’s positioning in the cybersphere. Embedded in social science disciplines from the postwar era, the liberal theory of politics posits that power in Western democratic societies is diffused enough; the state responds to competing demands, rendering Marxist class-based notions, such as ruling class and corporate power, irrelevant (Miliband, 2009). Having rightfully constructed a liberal critique of traditional authoritarianism and even networked authoritarianism, this “class-less” thinking of pluralistic politics nevertheless leads to the obfuscation of state-society interlinks and thus unduly precluding capitalist, developmental, and legitimacy-seeking logics of the state—before and after the arrival of the networked digital age. At the international level, liberal and realist theories treat states as unitary and autonomous actors. In the case of China, national factors still offer compelling explanations for its performance—as the Chinese state rejected the outright Washington Consensus and has paced global integration. Still, this state-led global convergence created unexpected results and has fostered transnational imperatives from inside. Therefore, instead of deducing the logic of state actions from its arguably timeless essence of security and control, it is imperative to see the state’s wills, interests, values, and practices as relationally intertwined with global and marketbased structures of power and to appreciate the crosscutting of state agendas by various transnational interests across multiple scales. The neoliberal turn from the 1970s advanced the notion that it is desirable, and even feasible, to separate politics from economics, states from markets (Panitch, 2009). This fracture reflects neither the intervention-and-investment the US government makes in the internet nor the accommodations the Chinese state makes toward global techno-economic trends. Meanwhile, postwar neo-Marxist state theory has resisted reducing state interests and capacities to servitude for capital and instead notes the historical makeup of social forces and recognizes the state’s relative autonomy (Starrs, 2017). Extending this critical perspective, the political economy approach to communication examines historically specific relations between states, markets, and social actors and explores how these factors parlay into structural, institutional, and discursive transformations of international/national policy-making (Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006). The cybersphere adds a new twist to the dynamics of the state. To reckon the recursive relationship between the state and the cybersphere, a holistic conception and historiography of the state should be framed. The transition literature on China notes that the formerly Leninist state has internalized a liberal orientation and even moved to a globally integrated model of policy process (Fewsmith, 2010). The state-led capitalist socio-economic transition has accelerated in and through the cybersphere but spurs intensive social dissent, which invites an ever-expanding state information control regime (Zhao, 2008). Thus, after having alternately unleashed, shaped, and stalled the cybersphere that extends change and disturbance, the party state becomes a major contested site as well as a contesting subject. Notably, the party state can adapt, contract, or expand its power over the cybersphere. The state under Xi’s leadership generates sweeping transformative initiatives, holding China at an “inflection point”: the post-WWII capitalist order is mired in chronic crises; the party state-led China continues to grow stronger, after weathering market reforms; therefore, the responses to global crises must be organized to achieve the millennial mission of national rejuvenation (Economy, 2018). Pivoting to developing digital economy, digital government, and digital society, the state attempts to re-organize the symbolic protocols, social norms, or economic organizations that have hitherto defined the cybersphere, taking cyber sovereignty as a salient position. Despite the state’s transformative agency, a more fundamental dialectic between geopolitics and globalization has been at work, altering the state’s will and dispersing its capacity. As the driver of globalization, capitalist development transcends national boundaries through the cybersphere, inducing states to facilitate internet development and commercialization (Simpson, 2004). However, globalization as such, mediated by states and geopolitics, is never a completely finished set of projects. Developing states are strategic actors in contesting the global order—increasingly in and through the cybersphere (Desai, 2013). Still, states cannot afford alienating capitalist logic too much, as contemporary geopolitics is increasingly tied with inter-capitalist competition (Woodley, 2015). The cybersphere also deepens the state’s entanglement in the multilateral order of interdependence. While the state can act on its transformative initiatives, it is variably involved in ad hoc networks with subnational, national, and international actors and must “ensure the balance and power of the network state to which they belong” (Castells, 2010, p. 361). When the US government asserts unilateralism over bilateral and multilateral issues at the cost of losing global moral appeal, and when the field of internet governance features layered, diffuse, and even privatized control of power (DeNardis, 2014), China’s position is likely to oscillate between reclaiming state sovereignty and supporting shared sovereignty. Thus, the internet is a new sphere, where the state extends political authority, prioritizes certain rights, responds to capitalist cycles, and enters a multilateral interdependence. It endorses and acts on contradictory initiatives, mostly within the capitalist global order. These range from subsuming the directionless logic of capital to the territorial logic of the state to facilitating transnational capital accumulation; from strengthening the social and symbolic foundation of the party’s rule to encouraging the digital turn of globalization; and from promoting itself as a champion of globalization to sponsoring regional factions and domestic protectionism. The mixture is an empirical question, which nevertheless cannot be exhausted by the control protocols of the state—authoritarian or liberal democratic—but is conditioned by the dialectics between the intra-national needs the state prioritizes and the global legitimacy and sphere sustainability the state seeks. The following section addresses how to qualify, rather than reify, the cyber sovereignty mandate. Cyber sovereignty in historical perspectives Sovereignty, in its modern conception, “implies a theory of politics which claims that in every system of government there must be some absolute power of final decision” (Crick, 1968). Territoriality strongly defines sovereignty (Betz & Stevens, 2011), but this definition obscures the fact that sovereignty is both territorially and non-territorially circumscribed. From a standpoint of political economy of communication, the status of sovereignty works, out of and against, a disagreement space crossing boundaries and denotes the state with questions of who has standing and controls resources for decisions over senders, receivers, codes, messages, channels, audiences, and feedback. Claims to sovereignty offer an index of power relations among nations and register the spread of capitalism, as well as the geopolitical pressure and popular resistance that follows (Desai, 2013). A historical association of communication with capitalist states means that the principle of territorialized sovereignty, when put in practice, has incorporated the need to trade, to flow, and to invest. Hence, globalization from the 1990s has not linearly undermined the state but has further complicated the relationship between a bounded physical territory and the state as the presumably supreme authority therein—as sovereignty operated through multiple spatial modes, and non-state actors even shared the operation of sovereignty (Agnew, 2009). This proposition applies to China. Despite its stance to push against hegemonic intervention, sovereignty is in no way unyielding in the postMao era (Carlson, 2005). A new school of international relations, intent to qualify the diluted but still crucial role of sovereignty-based states in the age of globalization, disaggregates sovereignty into multiple components, foregrounding multiple yet inconsistent practices of redefining sovereignty (Biersteker & Weber, 1996). As the cybersphere extends globalization, how does it redefine sovereignty? Adopting Krasner’s concepts (Krasner, 1999), Betz and Stevens (2011) argued that the internet compromises the regulation of cross-border flows, or so-called “interdependence sovereignty,” which further weakens Westphalian constructs and domestic authority; yet, it does not affect the legal integrity of states in international law, which means that states persist. Still, if the cybersphere is not universally experienced, the re-configuration of sovereignty is not a homogenous process either. Two trends vie for acceptance. First, sovereign relations are being worked out with a great range of variation. The US government has supported a presumably benevolent and borderless corporate-run cyberspace. However, its security rhetoric, which transcends the distinction between inside and outside, legitimizes an empire model, wherein military capacity is kept constant and co-extensive with its global networks (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Katin-Borland, 2012). Still, even a US-based Leviathan is not immune from cyber-attacks. As fake news, internet-enabled theft and disruption, and cyber weapons have shaken the American internet, a Foreign Affairs commentary proclaimed that “state sovereignty is alive and well on the Internet” (Flournoy & Sulmeyer, 2018, para. 4). In an emergent counter-position, the EU uses privacy as a lever to rein in Silicon Valley-originated platforms (Dijck, 2013). However, this rights-based cyber sovereignty in no way negates strong strategic purpose (Pohle, 2019). If the tension between users and corporations obscures the roles of states in liberal democratic contexts, the Chinese state plays a salient role in ousting Western platforms, blocking IP addresses, silencing dissent, and orchestrating propaganda campaigns to the extent that Western security and policy studies conveniently equate a cyber-sovereignty position with coherent statist control ( Tai, 2017; See Harold, 2016 ). Yet, despite the state’s sustained efforts to control the flow of information to its people, the bigger picture is more complex. To participate in the cybersphere, the state both practices negative proscription, such as censorship, and makes proactive moves to legalize non-state forces. To the extent that states unleash the cybersphere, states and the cybersphere then become co-constituting (Kohl & Fox, 2017). A state generally deploys its sovereign power to project national interests and to bolster certain values, interests, and projects. The cybersphere modifies this equation to the extent that sovereign power is no longer a status that states can either own or not. Vulnerability and interdependence are built into a cyber-committed nation. First, as the internet’s choke points often transcend state jurisdictions, it is inconceivable to squeeze the transnational nature of technical standards, supply chains, material and virtual architectures, and multidirectional communicative activities all into traditional jurisdictions (Kohl, 2007). Second, if internet governance is mostly enacted through technical design, private corporations, and nongovernmental organizations (DeNardis, 2014), the specific governance structure in China expresses its unique global history. Still, the Chinese state must negotiate with supranational entities, corporate infrastructures, and networked publics. Third, the prosperity of a digital ecosystem driven jointly by expressive, productive, and commercial energy challenges the ability of the state to define information flows in distributed networks (Navarria, 2016). Embedded in this sphere, state policies are subjected to ideational, institutional, and material contestations—within the country and without. On what terms, then, and in what mode can states seek to redefine cyber sovereignty? Ideally, as the cybersphere has become the dominant medium of global and public communication, the deployment of cyber sovereignty as a heuristic device would reveal, and even encourage, a disagreement space for peaceful negotiation among states, whose networking, competition, and collaboration inevitably interact with the non-traditional power structures made up of private companies, expert groups, civic organizations, and institutional and individual users. As the Chinese state advocates cyber sovereignty and globalization at once, how is it expressing this set of goals through concrete constructing practices? In the following, we examine China’s institutional and normative vocabularies that organize material governance of cyber sovereignty, trace these into the international realm as a case for global connectivity and relationship development, then review domestic, negotiated policies designed to work through disagreements, leveraging domestic ends against China’s standing in a global cybersphere.