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Technological development leads to blind faith in tech which obliterates subjectivity and expands social control

JERUSALIMIEC 18 (Lucas Jerusalimiec - PhD Candidate in Political Theory and Comparative Politics at McGill University), 11-13-2018, "Technology, Hegemony, and Citizenship," https://curve.carleton.ca/f3bb23c1-4d5e-49cc-862d-d5cfabc24b83//vivi

1.7 Technology and Hegemony The philosophers of technology agree that while rigid technological thinking hides the possibility of citizenship, it encourages a vision of a totalizing state. This technological state, or condition, defines a world in which autonomous systematization no longer faces any friction or resistance. In this version of the eternal present technological progress is allowed to legislate for human affairs in addition to conditioning them. As Feenberg writes: Technology is power in modern societies, a greater power in many domains than the political system itself. . . . if this is true, technology should be considered as a new kind of legislation, not so very different from other public decisions . . . . The legislative authority of technology increases constantly as it becomes more and more pervasive. But if technology is so powerful, why don’t we apply the same democratic standards to it we apply to other political institutions? (1999, 131). Here Feenberg draws our attention to the danger that the philosophers of technology see in uncriticized hegemony. When citizens see politics as nothing more than a system of power relations, it becomes normal to equate systematizing technology and the political system. According to Feenberg, we should not think that technology’s autonomy frees it from the need to exist within society. As he puts it “[t]he technical always already incorporates the social in its structure” (1999, 210). Along with the other authors in the Heideggerian/Ellulian tradition, Feenberg is concerned with the damage that an unquestioning belief in technological autonomy will cause to political freedom. Verene explains the danger of the autonomous technological state in terms of myth. He claims that To redefine the state through the logic of mythical thought is to eliminate the possibility of moral judgment . . . . Politics becomes not a matter of ideas put into action but the purveyance of images and rites that relieve the self of individual responsibility and the state from any acts of rational justification. . . . Myth is always present in the background of social life, ready to appear as the manner of thought to grip the individual and unite the individual with the collective in times of political tension or crisis” (2016, 34). Verene explains that the technological state as a vision of public life excludes deliberation and political action. Even though, like Feenberg, he does not hold that citizens are constrained to accept this myth, he believes that it can exist as a substratum of civic consciousness. Verene is pointing to a myth that claims that society can survive without citizens. Simpson writes that when citizens choose to believe this myth, the technological state can actually become self-perpetuating and self-directing: “technology itself decides upon the best means, and, to the extent that we increasingly abdicate our power to make legitimate choices . . . . it becomes self-determinative without any decisive human intervention” (1995, 21). For the philosophers of technology, citizens may choose to believe in the full autonomy of the technological state because it seems to incarnate systematic progress. This attitude reflects a citizen belief that self-making is a feature the non-human rather than the human. Thinkers in the Heidegerrian/Ellulian tradition think that systematic and autonomous progress belong first to historical humanity, and that the technological state is merely one possible expression of this power of self-making. In Darby’s analysis of how technology combines both techne and logos he writes that Techne pertains to the universalizing and homogenizing of making (poesis). This re-presentation in the form of a thing (= object = a being that stands before us) is demarcated by clear boundaries (= completeness = wholeness). . . . Logos, in an archaic form, is a gathering together of experience that leads to perception, or, we might say, to knowledge (2004). Techne is homogenizing because the form in which a thing is made obscures our perception of its composite elements. In this interpretation, forms result from the human desire to have names for the parts of our experience. There are “objects” of experience because we have made objects that can be experienced as unities. For the philosophers of technology, technological progress reveals that the unity of experience is imposed within the human being before it is imposed on the world. Thus technological hegemony is really internal hegemony, because human beings can break and make the boundaries of their own natures by imposing unity on self-experience. When speaking about Hobbes’ technological attitude toward human nature, Darby writes that all boundaries originate with, and are shaped by, the self-made being: man. As the being who makes himself from an infinite array of possibilities, man makes his own purposes and shapes his own ends. In doing so, he becomes the spirit of modern science: technology (2016, 305). The modern belief in the power of information technology is representative of the view that human beings are self-making. Information technology is supposed to manipulate the disembodied data of experience in such a way that it can become raw material for the construction of a mind or person. In this context, to “in-form oneself” means to choose both the categories and the content of one’s own experience, and to shape the previously formless data into a personal identity. Human beings must begin as a non-persons so that they are not constrained by previous forms as they progressively bring themselves into appearance. For the philosophers of technology, the totally self-sufficient technological state presents an attractive but impartial vision of the reality of self-making. The technological state appears free to homogenize experience without the interference of social authority (Juenger 1949, 79, 99). This apparent freedom allows the modern citizen to believe in the possibility of progressive self-making, but the impersonal nature of the technological state obscures the roots of its autonomy within human existence. Technology can help lead us to adequate self-knowledge as the beings that are always becoming, but the reality of mortality causes us to retreat into the homogeneous present and away from our destinies in the past and the future (Simpson 1995, 24, Heidegger, Question 1977, 32). This is an ironic and anxious situation because there is no necessary relationship between the technology of becoming and the advent of a totally impersonal state. For Ellul, impersonal technological hegemony traps citizens into a kind of progress that is unfree and closed, rather than free and open: The rapid changing of these social relations gives an illusion of freedom. But it is not man who causes these changes. It is they, stemming from the progression of the system, that determine man, and it is their ‘pressing’ character that restrains his liberty. He is constantly more and more defined by his situation in the system (1980, 322). The hegemonic claim that technological progress will inevitably systematize human nature in a particular way destroys the possibility of deliberating about the reality or advisability of the technological state. Feenberg writes that “[I]n the technical sphere, it is commonly said, legitimacy is a function of efficiency rather than of the will of the people, or rather, efficiency is the will of the people” (1999, 131). For the philosophers of technology, the identification of politics and society with an impersonal system of causes and effects legitimizes the suppression of the particular ends and particular means of individual persons (Angus 1987, 111). Ellul puts the homogenizing effects of the technological system on human nature in terms of anxiety. He claims that the technological state produces a type incapable of reacting directly to . . . the forms of concrete things, incapable of functioning without anxiety in any domain, and even incapable of feeling alive unless authorized or commanded by a machine and with the aid of the extra-organic apparatus furnished by the machine deity (1980, 313-314). For the philosophers of technology, persons in the grip of this kind of technological thinking believe that their very existence depends on the technological state.11 Every aspect of experience is viewed as the product of impersonal mediation. Questioning the nature of things or persons becomes an insupportably anxious activity. What does this underlying anxiety tell the philosophers of technology about human nature? Heidegger writes that technology endangers our ability to see that the essence of nature is fundamentally becoming. He thinks, however, that along with this danger comes the possibility of human beings realizing that technology calls them to cooperate with it and reveal themselves as the ones who determine the direction of natural becoming: the coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its destining without the cooperation of the coming to presence of man. . . . Man is indeed needed and used for the restorative surmounting of the essence of technology. . . . man’s essence must first open itself to the essence of technology. This opening is, in terms of that coming-to-pass which discloses, something quite different from the event of man’s affirming technology and its means and promoting them (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 39). For Heidegger, human beings can redirect technology away from the radical systematization of experience, but they cannot destroy technology. Technology and humanity are co-products of a world that is always changing the way it reveals itself. Technology is the means by which this change is expressed, and humanity is the means by which it is understood. Heidegger thinks that true self-knowledge will result from a successful integration of technology and human nature.12 This true self-knowledge will come into existence through a ‘turning’ that applies technological thinking to technology itself. Heidegger says that [i]n the coming to presence of the danger there conceals itself, therefore, the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself that, with this turning, the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in—turn homeward—into whatever is (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 41). Heidegger claims that Being has its home within human nature, or, that humanity is where Being can be known as Being. In this passage Heidegger shows that he is thinking of Being as an essentially empty category since oblivion is what the ‘turning’ reveals. The rescue Heidegger offers from the systematization of experience is another kind of homogenization. Rather than technology operating as an active force of historical progress toward stasis, technology is that by which humanity examines itself and finds literally nothing (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 44). Heidegger’s ‘coming to presence’ seems to come from and lead to a place without any tangibly existing things other than technological process. This ontological nowhere contains the possibility of creating a world, but this possibility exists because Being needs a way to reveal itself (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 43). In this interpretation of technological becoming, however, human individuals do not appear to have any ontological status as persons apart from their role as knowers of Being (Heidegger, Turning 1977, 42).

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