In the era of contemporary geopolitics, war and peace have become indistinguishable. The 1AC is the rhetoric of the traveling preacher shouting extinction by escalation while ignoring the inherently paradoxical nature of conflict. Secrecy cannot be remedied by “information sharing” or “security cooperation” because secrecy is a precondition to justify war absent moral responsibility. The impact is a ‘forever war’ of negative peace characterized endless militarized warfare.
Fazendeiro 21, Bernardo Fazendeiro is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and an assistant professor in International Relations (IR) at the Faculdade de Economia of the University of Coimbra. (2021). Wartime Is Peacetime: Undeclared Armed Conflict in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries. International Studies Review. 10.1093/isr/viab022 // eshaan
Secrecy, Escalation, and War Secrecy regularly plagues the conduct of war (Carson 2018). Combatants and politicians have always attempted to conceal their actions, often with a view to securing tactical victories. Carson (2018) takes the argument in an innovative direction, however; enemies cooperate “backstage” during war, not so much to gain an edge in battle as to contain the destructive capacity of modern wars. The Cold War, for example, “started hot.” Recently declassified documents disclose the direct involvement of nearly 30,000 Soviet military personnel in the Korean War (Carson 2018, 2). This would not have been a surprise to the public if most US intelligence services had publicized this information (which they held); they deemed it best not to publicize it, though.3 The question is: why? Carson (2018) develops a more general version of this question about the character of twentieth-century warfare—namely why covert operations were considered preferable and, relatedly, why enemies would cooperate in secret. To answer these questions, Carson (2018) claims that contemporary political authorities (more or less) agree that open, acknowledged combat could lead to unlimited war and, thus, to unlimited destruction. Secrecy and “non-acknowledgment” of “open secrets” therefore provide a means by which to keep armed conflict private, not least to restrict the potential for further escalation (Carson 2018, 44). To that effect, Carson draws from theater to explore how overt and covert playacting allows a suitable way to deny intervention. Put differently, “non-acknowledgment allows a widely exposed covert intervention to still remain an ‘open secret’” (Carson 2018, 31), thereby avoiding “domestic hawks” who may otherwise be in favor of escalating the conflict. Carson (2018) subsequently applies this theory to several twentieth-century conflicts, particularly great power intervention in the Spanish Civil War, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. In doing so, he reveals how technological developments have encouraged covert operations. From aerial bombardment to submarines to drone warfare, great powers now hold numerous means by which to guarantee secrecy and deniability. That, in turn, has led to countermeasures. The invention of radar, for instance, meant states could determine more accurately who had intervened and whether they ought to disclose their involvement. As such, Carson (2018) offers us much food for thought on the changing nature of armed conflict, many of which now consist of covert, non-acknowledged intervention—or an explicit reluctance to declare war. The current international order, predicated on the values of peace and IHL, has also opened the way for secret wars. While Carson (2018) does not cover this topic in detail, some passing insights explain how secrecy contradicts the United Nations’ (UN) core principles: “my theory suggests that such institutions could undermine the ability of major powers to manipulate information to control escalatory pressures and communicate their interest in limited war” (Carson 2018, 310). Limited armed conflict, in other words, depends less on how institutions regulate conflict than on how actors deploy secrecy and non-acknowledgment to prevent escalation. This is a damning critique of the international order, for it challenges mainstream liberal assumptions (e.g., Bentham and Wilson) that conflict results from secrecy, and therefore that public discussion and mediation provide the antidote (Gittings 2012; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017). It also contradicts existing realist hypotheses on the need for transparency to contain the use of force (Van Evera 1999). Carson (2018) might have expanded on these myriad ramifications. Carson (2018) also does not fully consider how secret wars unsettle the relationship between formal wartimes and peacetimes, particularly when the former ends and the latter begins. If actors supposedly do not acknowledge and barely (if at all) admit to armed conflict, when and how does one determine “peace”? Relatedly, when do societies augment or curtail executive powers? Many competing audiences surround the political leaders to which Carson refers; yet, these leaders gather enough legal and political leeway to authorize covert military action in the absence of public discussion. It remains to be seen whether leaders facing greater constraints when deploying the military (including covert operations) would be capable of overcoming public scrutiny. All the same, the extent to which secrecy challenges the principles of the global order (i.e., peace and humanitarianism) says something about how international actors seek to evade moral responsibility. Carson (2018, 94–97) alludes briefly to this issue (i.e., that denial opens the way for the extensive use of war euphemisms). Hoffman and Weiss (2017) and Fazal (2018) develop that allusion in detail. Humanitarianism and War Hoffman and Weiss (2017) thoroughly survey the origins of humanitarianism and its relation to war and politics. In so doing, the authors explore the extent to which humanitarian norms have encroached upon—if not constituted—the international order, from armed conflict to adjudication to disaster relief. Compared to the humble, nineteenth-century beginnings of humanitarianism, which sought to abolish war or (at least) contain its effects, the tasks and aims of humanitarianism have expanded considerably. As Hoffman and Weiss (2017, 3) note, humanitarian principles “have not changed much, but what has changed is greater calls within the humanitarian sector to expand its work.” Hoffman and Weiss (2017) first detail how the destruction caused by war gradually led to the rise of humanitarianism in the nineteenth century. They subsequently show how IHL—and humanitarian action in particular—shifted in the aftermath of the Cold War, becoming ever more linked to the provision of security. This new breed of interventive humanitarianism, often labeled new humanitarianism, spawned a whole array of debates about the nature of peace, and the UN’s role in providing it. That shift also instilled a sense of urgency about addressing the weak nature of international criminal adjudication, leading to the Rome Statute and, thus, to the International Criminal Court. Finally, interventive humanitarianism prompted discussions on the principle of Responsibility to Protect, the legacy of which remains under intense debate (Bellamy 2008; Chandler 2010). All in all, the expansion of humanitarianism has affected war significantly, including the practice of declaring war. Much of IHL depends on the formal acknowledgment of armed conflict. Hence, for Fazal (2018), the prominence and sheer number of regulations pertaining to IHL have “created perverse incentives for states engaged in interstate war” (Fazal 2018, 5). Any international lawyer will be aware of these developments. More disconcerting, however, is how such regulations became the grounds on which to evade political and moral responsibility. State representatives were obliged to weigh the bureaucratic, strategic, liability, and reputational disadvantages that accompany strict adherence to IHL. Put differently, declaring war became too burdensome from a moral, political, and military point of view. As a result, leaders opted for secrecy or euphemism4: Fazal (2018) offers an especially pertinent illustration: the 1999 Kosovo War, a conflict officially deemed less of a war than a “humanitarian intervention” (Roberts 1999; Ignatieff 2000; Booth 2001; Wheeler 2002). Euphemisms aside, had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) acknowledged that it was conducting a war in Kosovo, its pilots would have needed to comply with IHL or be liable for violating IHL. To comply would require flying at a much lower altitude than they did, conflicting with NATO’s strategic and tactical considerations (Fazal 2018, 153). Fazal (2018) also explains the more unintended consequences. On the grounds that openly acknowledged wars are fairly accurate “predictors of peace treaties,” the decrease in formal declarations of war also lowers the likelihood that actors sign such treaties (Fazal 2018, 158). Paradoxically though, combatants in civil wars, especially secessionists, tend to pay more attention to IHL. Because many of these combatants (unlike de jure states) lack international recognition, they have traditionally abided by IHL more often, in order to obtain that recognition (Fazal 2018). Regardless of whether responsibility lies with international law, IHL, or some combination of the two, the current international norms place a heavy legal and political burden on those who recognize wartime formally. Those who use force openly, or who otherwise acknowledge armed combat, consequently face major legal and political consequences. They may also create too many duties. As a result, leaders eschew formal declarations; Schadlow (2017) addresses how that loss of responsibility leads to less unity during war efforts, thereby contributing to strategic confusion. The Consequences of Euphemism and Secrecy: Operational Confusion Schadlow (2017) argues that war is, and has always been, about re-establishing order—that is, about reinstating a workable system of governance. She therefore rejects the claim that the military ought to engage only in combat. Military personnel and strategic planners (e.g., politicians) must consider not only the tactical considerations required for a successful military operation, but also the political measures necessary for obtaining peace. Most of the study focuses on circumstances specific to North American politics; even so, this more general relationship between politics, peace, and armed conflict likely travels to other regions as well. Schadlow (2017) does not fully explore how norms (e.g., IHL or international law) came to affect American military thinking; nevertheless, she does account for how euphemistic uses of the term “war” hinder the development of an effective long-term strategy. Doing so, or narrowly focusing on the military “fighting” dimension, leads to strategic confusion (e.g., reducing “wartime” to combat). Unity of purpose and command then slips away, with many tasks increasingly delegated to nonmilitary actors. In other words, the reductive categorization of armed conflict, prompted by euphemism, conflicts with Schadlow’s (2017) general understanding of war—not least because it compromises the war effort’s chain of authority and, thus, the unity of purpose on which that authority depends. In her words, “given the centrality of politics to war, the United States must realize that unity of command is essential to operational and strategic success in war” (Schadlow 2017, 274). The war effort in Afghanistan illustrates the point. It cannot simply be coined or reduced to “counterterrorism,” as the military also needed to pursue a lasting peace there. That requires a comprehensive strategy and an all-encompassing hierarchy of command with differing levels of responsibility for distinct tasks—a comprehensive approach (to peace) unattainable if one delegates tasks to distinct, nonunified authorities (e.g., various nongovernmental organizations, or allies). Schadlow (2017) consequently speaks disparagingly of the US military’s decision to assign noncombat operations to nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, without fully integrating them into its own long-term strategy. Schadlow’s (2017) discussion of the lack of strategic planning and governance complements ongoing research about the global obsession with neutralizing terrorists (Whitaker 2007; Noxolo and Husymans 2009; Piazza and Walsh 2009; Fairweather 2015). It also reveals just how much political authorities, at least in the United States, have neglected the development of feasible, long-term governance models. That neglect results partly from domestic and international pressures, as Carson (2018) implies, but also from the trend toward not taking responsibility for a general (formal) war effort. As the trend toward a division of labor in armed conflict tasks accelerates, these tasks increasingly fall to a cacophony of actors—sundry technocrats, soldiers, mercenaries, allies, and international organizations—thereby diluting any one actor’s responsibility for the task and the overall unity of command. This division of labor contributes, in other words, to the ability of leaders to avoid responsibility for the activities formally contained together within the broader wartime context. Other (Complementary) Explanations George Orwell foretold the decrease in formal declarations of war and peace as World War II ended (Orwell 1968). In 1946, not long after the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Orwell presciently claimed that international politics would witness the rise of superstates that coexisted in a permanent state of fear. Powerful and capable of mass destruction, these superstates would no longer fight one another. That development alone would be positive; yet, the mutual mistrust that accompanied superstates’ rise would also generate significant fear, thereby precluding the possibility of peace. “[A] permanent state of ‘cold war’” would develop (Orwell 1968). Orwell’s dystopian masterpiece, 1984, provides further insight into his argument. In a (not so hypothetical) future, the wartime–peacetime distinction dissolved in the face of euphemism, manipulation, and plausible deniability; the so-called Ministry of Truth would face little compunction in claiming that “war is peace” in its party slogan (Orwell 1977, 26). The books reviewed in this essay clarify why wartime and peacetime have become Orwellian in nature—that is, roughly equivalent to one another. As legal constraints grew (Fazal 2018), politicians exercised greater caution to avoid the moral and legal responsibility attached to war. They also moved wartime from a formal (i.e., declared) to an informal (i.e., undeclared, or covert) setting for a similar reason (and to manage escalation; Carson 2018). As the reluctance to formally declare war intensified, the need to define a clear enemy and purpose for fighting weakened; that undermined strategic thinking, threatening the efficacy of the military hierarchy and its response to armed conflict (Schadlow 2017). To be fair, alternative explanations for the evaporation of a wartime–peacetime distinction exist as well. In one of the most prominent of these, technological developments facilitate quick reprisals among powerful states—reprisals short of mobilized warfare, but that also lack any semblance of peace. Schelling (2008), for instance, acknowledges that the capacity for mass destruction encouraged leaders to question the relevance of a direct military confrontation (i.e., a battle between forces) for their strategic policies. Warfare in the late twentieth century, especially in nuclear era, consequently became more about activities like concealed threats, diplomatic coercion, targeted assassinations, covert operations, economic sanctions, and terrorism, rather than military deployments. The development of drone warfare likely falls here too (Kennedy and Rengger 2012; Sauer and Schörnig 2012 Boyle 2013; Chamayou 2015; Sandvik and Lohne 2015). Each of these tools allows leaders an opportunity to respond rapidly and coercively (to varying degrees) to adversaries without a declaration of war—and therefore, an extensive military mobilization. That proves particularly convenient for liberal, democratic governments, whose politicians must circumvent public opinion while simultaneously showing a strong determination to punish enemies (Sauer and Schörnig 2012). Irrespective of contemporary developments, technology is a tool. It can restrict or amplify the means at a decision-maker’s disposal, but the decision-maker ultimately creates and implements policy. Moreover, current norms and ongoing global trends shape the policies that leaders develop. A look at these trends suggests two other alternative accounts: the growth of civil and police wars, respectively. That intrastate armed conflict (i.e., civil war) has increased as interstate armed conflicts (i.e., wars between states) have decreased offers one explanation for this trend. Intrastate conflicts frequently avoid a formal declaration of war, since sitting governments do not wish to legitimize those challenging it. Doing otherwise would not only grant the challenger political recognition, but also admit it as an authority to whom the laws of war (or IHL) apply (Armitage 2017). Governments therefore go to great lengths to brand the challenges as anything but a combatant (e.g., an outlaw, a criminal, or a terrorist). Although promising, this explanation remains partial at best. The refusal to declare war—including to recognize a substate challenger as a lawful combatant—does not merely happen in the context discussed here. It extends to the international sphere as well. Even NATO leaders (i.e., outside Yugoslavia) refused to declare war against the Yugoslav (or Serbian) government in 1999. Alternatively, then, perhaps the growth of “police wars” accounts for the disappearance of formal war declarations (Hardt and Negri 2004; Howard 2008; Jahn 2009; Holmqvist 2014; Neocleous 2014). Tying war activities and policing together exposes how ambiguity pervades the international liberal order. Peacetime police deployments often assist with state-building activities: extending sovereign authority within and patrolling the state’s territory, protecting the state from—if not punishing—those who disavow the rules, and so on (Neocleous 2014). To that end, integrating policing with war unsettles the distinctions between war and peace, between the military and the police, and between combatant and criminal. In effect, contemporary police wars mirror erstwhile colonial wars, and rightfully so. Although European statesmen had few qualms about formally declaring wars on their sovereign counterparts, they seldom issued such declarations in wars against colonial territories (Neocleous 2014; Bartelson 2018). Colonies, as “non-states,” did not receive the status of equal combatants; they were territorial holdings for the parent state to patrol and control, with the parent state even building the colony’s administration in line with European practices. As such, states maintained the international order with recourse to great power patrol—a traditional police function—remedied through state-building, and enforced by punishing those who reject its rules (Kaldor 1999, 2003; Mueller 2000; Howard 2008; Holmqvist 2013, 2014; Bartelson 2018). These police wars partially unsettle the basis on which the distinction between wartime and peacetime rests, for they apply concepts and means traditionally associated with peacetime to the armed conflict setting. Although the myriad wartime activities relate to one another, a division of labor now undermines what once constituted a united and comprehensive war effort (Schadlow 2017). It is therefore unsurprising that academic observers question the UN’s practical distinctions, insofar as UN actions in some contexts resemble war more than peacekeeping or peacebuilding (Fortna 2004; Peter 2015; Hunt 2017; Karlsrud 2017, 2018). In this respect, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) illustrates the point. It carries all the features of the modern police wars. It tasks external military forces with neutralizing terrorists (i.e., peace enforcement), deploys a robust international peacekeeping force to patrol swathes of territory and to protect civilians (i.e., policing), and mobilizes UN specialists to advise and support Mali’s governing authority (i.e., state-building). As a result, MINUSMA occupies neither the wartime nor peacetime space; it is instead a sophisticated policing and state-building operation premised on a division of labor: the military, the police, and political advisors. This division of labor reflects and reinforces how the international order has developed since 1945—especially the increased desire to avoid political responsibility for war. Euphemism and the rise of new terminology not only diffuse political and legal responsibility for war, but also exemplify how the system has disassembled wartime into its component parts. War increasingly ceased to be a comprehensive political and military task, being instead divided into several specialized tasks. Nevertheless, the range of creative terminology reflects not so much an attempt to deploy euphemism as the fact that armed conflict can no longer be reduced to war. But that raises a larger question: what is the threshold that separates lower levels of combat from war?5 In the absence of such criteria, wartime is peacetime. Concluding Remarks: Where to Go from Here? Further inquiry into the relationships discussed here might continue along two major fronts. The first addresses whether the diffusion of responsibility, and the rise of police wars, reflects the demise of the international order or enhances its robustness. With regard to the latter, for example, broad agreement about the rules to armed conflict exists, even as economic quarrels continue over which state benefits the most from the current order. The UN’s twelve peacekeeping operations across Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean are only possible in light of agreement among United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members (ongoing as of December 2020). This need not downplay the sundry disagreements among UNSC members, as well as among the other rising powers across the globe; rather, it reveals a measure of convergence in expectations—namely, the acceptability of pursuing police wars, of punishing the order’s enemies, and of strengthening the state wherever it seems fragile. Hence, although assessments of the liberal order’s future most often rest on economic considerations (e.g., welfare and progress), one can also evaluate it according to the standard found in the UN’s Charter: whether the order has saved “future generations from the scourge of war.” From that angle, the absence of formal war declarations—along with widespread agreement on the need to punish, police, and build the state across global armed conflicts—indicates that the UN is largely fulfilling its role. The world may not be entirely peaceful, but it is not embroiled in major warring either. It is something in between: a policing world. Further research might inquire about whether this policing consensus will be sufficient to overcome future disputes over the distribution of power, wealth, and authority that will inevitably challenge the international order. A second line of inquiry looks elsewhere—to ascertain how the end of the wartime–peacetime distinction, coupled with the division of labor that now addresses armed conflicts worldwide, compromises the international order’s longevity. Neff (2005) aptly suggests that a legal order may sit on the brink of transformation once the understanding of war and peace ceases to inform practice. After all, when politicians cease to invoke the traditional wartime–peacetime distinction, or otherwise conceal it through euphemism, then a fundamental question comes to the fore: who is responsible for declaring war and peace? Managing international security lies under the UNSC’s purview, at least in the current order; yet, quarrels over the legitimacy of great power intervention—as seen in Kosovo (1999), Georgia (2008), Libya (2011), and Syria (2011)—make one wonder whether reviving the wartime–peacetime distinction would be the best means by which to deal with armed conflict. That revival may not only lead to clearer lines of authority, but also facilitate the attainment of peace. At least, this has been the position of some who consider traditional wartime—as an all-encompassing effort, involving combat and governance from the outset—to be more effective than the present-day alternative (e.g., see Luttwak 1999; Schadlow 2017). In the end, the international order’s trajectory is an old, if not foundational, question in international relations. The tradition of formally recognizing wartime—and, therefore, peacetime—provides yet another prism through which to investigate that topic. Further inquiry might indeed question whether the international order is moving toward the consolidation of the practice of global policing, punishment, and state-building, which ultimately threaten to dilute political and moral responsibility at the state level, or alternatively, toward the reinvigoration of the state’s role in determining when wartime exists. These are all questions for and of our time.