The impact is an all-encompassing algorithmic schema that reduces human life to units of calculability. Everyday interactions in a social arena are transformed into covert warfare waged against people.
Amoore 09 - Louise Amoore is Professor of Political Geography at Durham University and author of The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security beyond Probability, also published by Duke University Press, (2009), Algorithmic War: Everyday Geographies of the War on Terror. Antipode, 41: 49-69. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00655.x // eshaan
In August 2004, the US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) announced the testing of a new tracking technology at five US land border ports of entry. The trial—conducted by consultants Accenture and Deloitte in collaboration with Philips Semiconductors—embedded radio frequency identification (RFID) tags into paper I-94 customs and border protection forms.4 The RFID tags contain a “passive” chip and antenna, capable of transmitting a unique numeric identifier to a remote reader. By October 2006, though rejected for US passports, the same RFID technology became a US entry requirement for visa waiver programme passports. Later the same year, the UK’s Transport for London announced that its RFID-enabled Oyster travel payment card was to integrate with a Visa credit card, allowing the tracking and tracing of all small transactions, actions and movements on the London Underground system. How might we understand what is at work here? A virtually invisible technology, concealed within a paper document or “smart” card, is deployed with the precise purpose of rendering a person visible, identifiable and locatable. As architect Dana Cuff has noted, “there is an irony here”, it is “invisible, miniaturized sensors that are making formerly inaccessible realms visible” (2003:45). In part, of course, the apparent invisibility of the techniques for making visible is assured because of their already existing ubiquity in everyday commercial transactions. As the Vice President of Philips Semiconductors had testified to the US Congress Committee on Energy and Commerce in 2004, “consumers are already likely to encounter RF-enabled personal identification devices in their daily lives, such as secure access cards for building entry, speedy gasoline purchasing such as the Exxon Speedpass, vehicle anti-theft systems, and in transportation systems all over the world” (US House of Representatives 2004:3). What is taking place, then, is the redeployment of sensor technologies used in the commercial tracking of mobile things, objects, animals and vehicles into the domain of the tracking of mobile people. As a technology of location, tracking is central to the processes and practices of militarization. As performance artist and social theorist Jordan Crandall has argued, “militarization and movement intersect through the activity of tracking” (2005:19). The domains of geopolitics and geoeconomics cross over here (see Cowen and Smith, this issue) as the governing of the global economy draws into common assemblage with a state that is concerned to make visible the minutiae of daily life, to seek security in the transactions, journeys and movements that are the norm and those that are suspicious. Put simply, algorithmic war requires a target for its calculations, preferably a moving target. The practice of tracking, then, seeks to “detect, process and strategically codify a moving phenomenon in a competitive theatre”, whether this space is a “battlefield, the social arena, or the marketplace” (Crandall 2006:4). In this sense, tracking technologies enable the identification and location of moving targets. In the war on terror, the specific form has become what Samuel Weber calls a “target of opportunity”, a competitive “seizing” of “targets that were not foreseen or planned” (2005:4). The targets of opportunity in the war on terror, then, involve the depiction of mobile enemies: However different the war on terror was going to be from traditional wars, with their relatively well-defined enemies, it would still involve one of the basic mechanisms of traditional hunting and combat, in however modified and modernized a form: namely “targeting”. The enemy would have to be identified and localized, named and depicted, in order to be made into an accessible target ... None of this was, per se, entirely new. What was, however, was the mobility, indeterminate structure, and unpredictability of the spatio-temporal medium in which such targets had to be sited ... In theatres of conflict that had become highly mobile and changeable, “targets” and “opportunity” were linked as never before (Weber 2005:3–4, emphasis in original). Samuel Weber’s key point of discussion is the theatre of war, though his argument sheds significant light on the algorithmic wars on terror that I depict here. The identification, localization, naming and depiction of mobile targets is, in this war by other means, conducted in and through daily life, in advance of any possible future strike or intervention. The targeting of mobile bodies, things, objects or monies is becoming a matter of locating—positioning in the sights, if you like—so that the opportunities of a mobile global economy might be seized, while the capability to take out the target remains. “Freedom is nothing but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security”, states Foucault, “the very possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things” (2007 [1977]:49). For this reason, the geography of algorithmic war is a spatiality of locatability in movement, with origins in the interplay between military logistics and the commercial logistics of tracking objects through a supply chain. As consultants Accenture, Deloitte, IBM and PricewaterhouseCoopers lead the drive for multiple networked public and private applications of technologies of location such as RFID, the commercial “targets of opportunity” that allowed the production of goods to become dispersed and diffuse are clearing space for more diffuse modes of sovereign power. The technologies that have made possible a global supply chain of export processing zones and offshore sites are simultaneously being embedded into border crossing cards, visas, passports and immigrant ID cards that include mobile people within governable space by means of their targeted exclusion. How has locatability emerged as a key means of tracking mobile targets? The emergence of knowledges of location, what Nigel Thrift has called “our conventions of address”, follows a tacit and often unacknowledged sense that we somehow know “what will show up where and what will show up next” (2004:176). In other words, a system of address has been central to our ability to spatially and temporally locate events, objects, people and so on. The history of addressability displays a significant playing back and forth of military logistical knowledges and commercial supply and transportation knowledges. Thus, for example, the origins of 1940s bar code technologies lie in the communication techniques of Morse code. Historical records of early bar code techniques describe a graduate student, Joseph Woodland, marking the dots and dashes of Morse code into the sand on a beach as he thought through a research problem of how to identify a product at a check-out. Extending the dots and dashes to two-dimensional wide and narrow lines in the sand, Woodland later successfully patented the first binary barcode system. As computing technologies began to enable the electronic reading and recognition of patterns, new relationships between the identifier (postal code, ZIP, barcode, personal identifiers such as date of birth) and the identified (people, places, parcels, vehicles) become possible. Consider, for example, IBM’s “punch cards” of the 1950s, patterns of punched holes in a card to be fed into the pattern recognition programmes of IBM machines.5 The “patterns of data on the IBM cards”, writes architect Reinhold Martin, “made visible what was invisible” (2003:158). The machine’s ability to “read” the cards extended beyond the mere processing of data and into the almost magical realm of animating a life unseen. In a 1955 publicity brochure, IBM reminded the American public of how their lives were locatable in the traces of actions and transactions left in the card and “read” by the machine: IBM first came into your life when your birth was recorded on a punched card. From then on many such cards have been compiled, giving a lifetime of history of your important decisions and actions. If you went to school, entered a hospital, bought a home, paid income tax, got married or purchased an automobile, the chances are that permanent records were made of these and other personal stories (cited in Martin 2003:159). What we begin to see with the intersection of systems of address with systems of recognition, or the marrying of addressability and readability, if you like, is a computer-enabled system of locatability. While even rudimentary systems of address involve recognizing identifying markings, whether these are numbers, features of the natural landscape, or codes, the computer reading of markings and the recognition of patterns makes possible novel forms of location. Here, the emphasis is on a more mobile and agile mode of address that does not “stop at the door” of delivery, but instead dwells inside, making visible, readable and locatable the traces of daily life. With the rise of what Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff call “computer addressability”, the fixed location of the address is loosened via “unique identification codes” (2005:94). Because the codes dwell inside a body or object in the physical environment, they do, at least in theory, make it locatable in movement. In this shift from addressability to locatability, the ability to track and trace mobility is achieved by animating the physical environment so that it is able to “respond directly to what it sees” (Kang and Cuff 2005:94). Thus, the “reader” of traces, markings or transactions, established via the early technologies of punch cards and barcodes, becomes ever more important to the system of location as “addresses move with human and non-human actants” (Thrift 2004:183). Rather as IBM’s early computers inferred people’s life histories from the patterns punched into the cards, and from the intervals between them, contemporary readers of location, as a group of researchers at Intel have put it: “infer people’s actions from their effect on the environment, especially on the objects with which they interact” (Smith et al 2005:39). The embedding of RFID tags into objects, as Smith and his colleagues have shown at Intel, can be understood as one means to achieve a novel and mobile form of targeting. The origins of contemporary RFID technology, perhaps unsurprisingly, also find some roots in military communications and logistics, with the earliest writings on the problem to be found in research by radio engineers seeking more efficient readability of signals (Stockman 1948). It should be clear, then, that we cannot say that contemporary security applications of RFID are simply drawing on commercial knowledges of location. The 1940s research was, in many ways, the precedent for contemporary RFID technologies that deploy miniature tags, emitting a radio signal with a unique numeric identifier that can be received by a reader up to 25 ft away (Borriello 2005). Composed of a silicon chip and coiled antenna, usually sandwiched inside a plastic tag, so called “passive” RFIDs use the power supply from the reader to send their signal and are, therefore, smaller and require closer proximity to the reader than “active” tags that carry their own power supply. For example, a passive RFID application such as a supermarket loyalty card that is read at the till is, in effect, inert until it is in range of the reader that activates it. Once in range of the reader, the RFID’s numeric identifier allows the reader to locate the tag and to associate data on past readings of transactions. For a supermarket shopper’s “loyalty card” this might include patterns of past purchases, coupons or vouchers for savings and such like. For a US–Mexico border crossing card holder, the passive tag signals an identifier that can be mapped across past patterns of travel, criminal convictions or terrorist watch lists. In this way, the RFID identifies the target for algorithmic calculation, at the border, at the supermarket checkout, at the entrance to the sports stadium, in the subway ticket hall. “Through RFID tags”, as Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff have it, address is specified “to a fine level of granularity, much finer than a zip code”, so that we “will likely authenticate our identity to multiple queries of ‘who are you’ made by the enacted environment” (2005:106). What are the implications of mobile forms of locatability for algorithmic war and, in particular, for the exercise of sovereign power? As RFID stands on the brink of replacing bar code and paper-based markers of location (I 94 forms, passports, train tickets, paper money at toll booths, tickets for sports events),6 how does the war on terror become enmeshed with the geographies of everyday life? To be clear here, the seizing of targets of opportunity by commercial players can in no sense be interpreted as transcending the nation-state or outsourcing state security decisions to the market. Rather, a logic of outsourcing and targeting that exceeds any specific public or private domain—that is, as Samuel Weber suggests, a “militarization of thinking”—works to sustain the “hyphen” in the imagination of nation-state differently (Sparke 2005:48). It does so, I will argue here, via a spatial and temporal deferral of security decision that follows the dispersed geography of the commercial supply chain. The state’s ability to track and trace people or objects in movement, across or beyond its borders, is increasingly bound up with commercial techniques for tracking and tracing objects through the supply chain. The paradox of security and mobility—the problematic of the moving target—is given the appearance of being fixed by technologies of locatability. As David Campbell writes, “were it possible to bring about the absence of movement”, that would represent “pure security”, yet it would be at that moment that “the state would wither away” (1992:12). The question is not one of how to arrest mobility, then, but how to govern mobility in such a way as to allow circulation and to sustain the impression of securability. Put simply, to secure the sovereign power of the state in a global economy of mobile things and people precisely by means of targeting bodies in movement. The contemporary decentred state shares much of its spatial character with the diffuse and dispersed capillaries of global capital. If William Connolly (2005:148) is correct and sovereignty is “migrating to a layered global assemblage”, then one aspect of this layering is the profusion of ambiguous locations of many kinds, where the distinctions between legality and illegality, work and violence, onshore and offshore are increasingly blurred. Just as the dispersal of a global supply chain into offshore sites and export processing zones permits the deferral of many kinds of commercial decision—at least in terms of Jacques Derrida’s sense of decision as responsibility (1999:25)—so the diffusion of state authority into ambiguous locations of many kinds appears to institute the deferral of decision on behalf of the state. In the marketplace that is the test laboratory for RFID applications, for example, the tagging at item level by Wal-Mart, M&S and Gillette has allowed these commercial players to seek efficient locations in distant places, and yet to sustain the ability to control with precision (Eckfeldt 2005). The very idea of an animated supply chain, making its own algorithmic calculations and judgements—from “smart refrigerators” to smart supermarket shelving and tracked shipments (Gunther and Spiekerman 2005)—incorporates ¨ the bodies and objects of production and consumption, from the growers, pickers and producers of raw materials, through manufacturing, supply and retail workers. In the most vulnerable offshore spaces of the global economy, where commercial firms seek only the most fleeting of finger holds in a specific territorial space, we begin to see how the commercial targeting of things and objects plays into and through the targeting of people. Thailand’s export processing zones—or “free zones”—for example, have become “e-free-zones”, using RFID to track the movement of imported materials, deliveries, exported goods and, significantly, the bodies of workers, as they traverse the boundaries of the zone. The fortified security fences associated with export processing zones, then, are augmented by equally carceral, but less obviously visible, lines that track and trace the movements of workers via “contactless” smart cards, and the mobility of objects via RF-enabled smart labels. Similarly, the extension of RFID into border crossing cards and immigration documents allows the feigned impression of an open world, while it institutes new lines and boundaries. There is a growing resonance, then, between apparently geo-economic systems of locatability (of course always also political) that target the bodies of workers and the movement of the objects with which they interact, and the algorithmic security practices of the state: It plays out in new systems of production that aim to narrow the intervals between conception, manufacturing, distribution and consumption—shrinking the delays between detecting an audience pattern and formatting a new enticement that can address it. It plays out in pre-emptive policing and warfare systems that aim to close the gap between sensing and shooting (Crandall 2006:13). As Jordan Crandall depicts the geographies of tracking and targeting, they play in and out of the plural spaces of our world. As the commercial tracking technologies enter the sphere of security—RFID passports, “smart” national ID cards, RF-enabled immigration and visa documents, the tagging of detained asylum seekers, employee “contactless” buildings access cards—they defer security decisions into algorithmic calculation. The participation of RFID in violent geographies is thus often obscured. When global consultants Accenture made their successful bid for the USVISIT “Smart Borders” contract, for example, they simulated the ability of RFID to target from a distance: Using a nearby facility belonging to Raytheon, a subcontractor on its team, the Accenture team constructed a mock border point kiosk at which the government team had an RFID tag attached to their passports. They also constructed a mock land border crossing where a scanner read the RFID passport tags of the government officials inside the car. Even though the car became momentarily airborne after hitting a speed bump—the scanner read the digital information contained on the RFID chips of all four government officials in the vehicle, displaying their pictures on an electronic billboard as they passed by (Accenture 2005:242, emphasis added). Accenture’s business partner Raytheon, the world’s largest manufacturer of so-called “smart weapons”, produces the cluster bombs widely reported to be responsible for the violent deaths of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here we see the targeting of markets and neighbourhoods by military hardware segueing into the targeting of people at border crossings and in the spaces of the airport. Indeed, it is Raytheon that, in November 2007, was awarded the £650 million UK e-borders contract as the leading contractor of the Trusted Borders consortium, with Accenture the IT systems subcontractor. Where RFID appears to render movement around the subways, highways and superstores of the global economy as a smooth and seamless experience, it does so by aligning the security practices of the state with the mobilities of the consumer. In this sense, our everyday geographies do spiral into and across the daily violences of the algorithmic targeting of “others” and the visceral military violence of bombing campaigns. It is important to recognise at this point that we can only gain a limited understanding of the technologies of algorithmic war by seeing them as explainable by the post-9/11 deepening of political economies of surveillance (Lyon 2003). The capacity of RFID to make us locatable is actually acutely ambivalent: we feel its potential to watch and to incarcerate just as we simultaneously feel it fulfil some of our desires and pleasures. As Matt Sparke has illustrated in his study of the biometric proximity cards used in the US–Canadian border NEXUS programme, the appeal is made to “the fast lane, where you want to be” (2006:167). Similarly, RFID is offered as a means of expediting mobility in the UK’s Heathrow airport “MiSense” programme, promising to “simplify your journey through the airport while maintaining security”.7 The MiSense programme, by incorporating smart sensors into the possession of the subject—“my sense”—invites an almost playful encounter with RFID sensors. This stitching together of playful leisurely RFID encounters with security practice asks the subject to voluntarily offer themselves up to tracking technologies in return for expedited movement. In some of the most playful forms of RFID use in the leisure industry— subcutaneous chips inserted into the arms of customers at a Glasgow nightclub so that they may pay for their drinks without the hindrance of cash or cards; RFID golf balls that communicate their location to a remote reader—we can see security dreams fulfilled. Night club patrons secure their pre-cleared identity and financial details beneath their skin, and golfers seek out a means of securely locating distant objects. Where RFID “pleasures and anxieties cohabit”, the targeted line of sight sorts and segregates finite degrees of visibility so that, for some, “the edges are smoothed” as they “blend seamlessly into the crowd” (Crandall 2006:12). For others, of course, the line of sight targets for heightened exposure to visibility—to stop and search, to continually verify identity, to have movement in public space checked and intercepted.