Patriarchal violence is built on the dichotomy of zoe and bios – we control the root cause
EDKINS 00 (Jenny Edkins - political scientist, Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester) “Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000, pp. 3–25. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644981. Accessed 14 Jul. 2022.//vivi
As feminist political theorists have long argued, from the Greeks onward the political has operated through the inclusion by exclusion of the female.lo Women are invisible in international politics, too.11 Crucial to both exclusions is the way the domestic is excluded from the po- litical and/or the international. There is disagreement on the im- plications. Jean Elshtain wants us to resist the extension of the po- litical to the domestic or family realm since she regards that realm as emblematic of values more conducive to the feminine. Cynthia Enloe argues that we should regard the personal as international. Indeed, Enloe stresses the impossibility of making the distinction. However, both agree on the importance to Western sovereign order of the dichotomies of female and male, the oikos and the polis, domestic politics and the international, inside and outside.12 Like the feminists, Agamben argues that the separation of zoe and bios is a practice of inclusion by exclusion that is constitutive of sovereignty in the modern Western sense from the beginning.l3 In other words, the exclusion of zoe from the polis is at the same time an inclusion. It is not just with the rise of the modern state, as Michel Foucault would have us believe, that zoe is included in state power. Foucault argues that at the beginning of the modern era, natural life comes to be included more and more in the mechanisms and calculations of state power. At this point, politics becomes biopolitics, and whereas for Aristotle man was a living an- imal with a capacity for political existence, modern man becomes “an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question.”14 Modernity for Foucault is the point at which the species and the individual as a simple living body become what is at stake in a society’spolitical strategies. At one and the same time it becomes possible both to protect life and to organize a holo- caust. However, according to Agamben this picture needs to be corrected and Foucault’s analysis of power in modernity com- pleted. Sovereign power in the West is constituted from the start by the very inclusion by exclusion of natural life: sovereignty is the originary structure in which law refers to life. More than this inclusion by exclusion, sovereign power in the West is constituted by its ability to suspend itself in a state of ex- ception, or ban: “The originary relation of law to life is not appli- cation but abandonment.”15The paradox of sovereignty is that the sovereign is at the same time inside and outside the sovereign order: the sovereign can suspend the law. What defines the rule of law is the state of exception when law is suspended. The very space in which juridical order can have validity is created and de- fined through the sovereign exception. However, the exception that defines the structure of sovereignty is more complex than the inclusion of what is outside by means of an interdiction.16 It is not just a question of creating a distinction between inside and out- side: it is the tracing of a threshold between the two, a location where inside and outside enter into a zone of indistinction. It is this state of exception, or the zone of indistinction between inside and outside, that makes the modern juridical order of the West possible. The camp is exemplary as a location of a zone of indistinction. Although in general the camp is set up precisely as part of a state of emergency or martial law, under Nazi rule this becomes not so much a state of exception in the sense of an external and provi- sional state of danger as a means of establishing the Nazi state it- self. The camp is “the space opened up when the state of excep- tion begins to become the rule.”17 In the camp, the distinction between the rule of law and chaos disappears: decisions about life and death are entirely arbitrary, and everything is possible. A zone of indistinction appears between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit. What happened in the twentieth century in the West, and paradigmatically since the advent of the camp, was that the space of the state of exception transgressed its bound- aries and started to coincide with the normal order. The zone of indistinction expanded from a space of exclusion within the nor- mal order to take over that order entirely.