The alternative is a form of self-security – a bottom-up relationality that unsettles the securitized narratives in the postcolonial LIO. This allows us to imagine futures outside liberal institutions in a decolonial frame.
Darby 09 - Phillip Darby is co-founder of the independent Institute of Postcolonial Studies based in Melbourne, and a principal fellow of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne, (2009) Rolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial, International Peacekeeping, 16:5, 699-716, DOI: 10.1080/13533310903303347 // eshaan
If the critique of the liberal peace project advanced here has any credibility, a fundamental change is called for in our mode of thinking about peacekeeping. As a rule of thumb, it might be said that any postcolonial approach worthy of the name must go beyond highlighting the shortcomings of the present system to showing how things might be done differently. This is hardly possible within the framework of liberal peacebuilding. It is hard to imagine how a postcolonial take could be given to what is essentially a colonial undertaking. For this reason, I advance some thoughts about a preferred security schema within which an alternative to peacekeeping could emerge – rather than tinkering with the dominant framework of thought that informs the making of policy. Accordingly, this section will not take up issues such as ‘institutionalization before liberalization’42 which leaves the structure of the peacekeeping project intact, or localization through regional bodies such the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which remains an essentially top-down, state-centric approach.43 We might start with the increasing recognition, even in international relations and other discourses of the international, that to change the existing structure of things we need to modify traditional scholarly procedures to bring out the heterogeneity of knowledge and the messiness of its construction. The Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of Social Sciences stresses that contemporary social science must break with mechanical models and open itself to complexity, uncertainty and creativity.44 Robert Cox argues similarly: social sciences should set aside the approaches of the past that sought to define persisting structures and laws, and adopt less deterministic approaches ‘by being sensitive to emerging and declining historical structures and movements of self-organisation in social and political relations’.45 Picking up on self-organization, it is my argument that the most promising approach is assumed to be anchored in the concept of self-securing. The idea of securing the self dovetails nicely with postcolonial thought – though postcolonialism has no proprietary claim on it. It addresses several of the lines of critique of the liberal peacekeeping project advanced earlier in the essay. Self-securing unsettles the understanding that security is best handled from ‘above’, traditionally by the state and now, quite often, by the state acting together with the United Nations. Following the thrust of complexity theory, it challenges hierarchy, centralization, linearity and separation (borders). It would harness the social, so downgraded since the advent of neoliberalism, and thereby make evident alternative ways of building better relationships with others. Of its very nature, self-securing looks to the everyday. An archive needs to be developed on neighbourhood and more dispersed practices of self-securing, the shaping and use of public space to provide meeting places, and the role of dissent as a form of community-building. Good use could be made of documented cases of popular responses to natural disasters and financial collapse in various parts of the world which show the capacity for self-organization. In such ways, people who are mostly the objects of security policies could be brought into the discourse: victims, the poor, those in pain and suffering. Clearly, pursuing these ideas is a research venture of a wide-ranging nature. One such project goes forward under the aegis of the Institute of Postcolonial Studies in Melbourne;46 others are working on similar material, some in related fields.47 A first step towards putting flesh on the bones of these arguments is to examine the pre-colonial practices of non-European peoples which helped regulate self –other relations. Frequently expressed in ritual, ceremonial exchange, and gifting, they broaden our understanding of the role of performance in the business of securing. This is not to romanticize the past or to imagine that earlier practices could somehow be transposed to the present, but rather to ask whether in modified form they might have a contemporary relevance. Account should also be taken of the variety and ingenuity of the adaptation of nonEuropean concepts and practices to the compulsions and inducements of the colonial order. A particular significance attaches to the experience of Aboriginal peoples, Karina Shaw has argued, because it provides a microcosm of the struggles faced by a large percentage of the world’s population and is revealing of the character of modern politics.48 Then there is the rich tradition of alternative security practices developed on the Indian subcontinent during the colonial struggle and, on the diplomatic front, in the years immediately following decolonization. There is also a growing body of contemporary work being done that takes its lead from complexity theory. The study of networks is a case in point. It has not made much headway in security studies except in relation to terrorist groups and criminal networks trafficking in drugs, but it might yet. Indeed, it could serve as a platform for putting security on a new footing. In other areas such as cyberspace, globalization and new transnational actors, the network metaphor and the relationality involved have figured large in debates about the changing politics of the international. Despite its association with postmodernity, Morgan Brigg points out that local people in many parts of the world have long used notions of tangled nets, and their untangling, as metaphors for managing and resolving conflicts.49 For many years networks have also been central to attempts to change the trajectory of development. In a classic article published in 1992 which appears on every development reading guide – or should – Arturo Escobar wrote of networks as part of the submerged cultural background from which social movements emerged. Stressing the centrality of everyday life to an understanding of social movements, he went on to point to the transformative potential of such movements because of their ‘self-producing and self-organizing’ character.50 Escobar has recently returned to this theme, showing how complexity theory and cyberspace strengthen the case for the principle of self-organization being the way to a more equitable global order.51 These last remarks lead into the question of how far the development constituency – or parts thereof – might connect with a revisioning of security along the lines we have been considering. Here I am thinking not so much of development networks that might be expected to be well disposed to self-organization in related fields, but to the development community more generally. It has been argued in this essay that NGOs have come to accept the close linkage between development and security, thus falling into line with the prescriptions of states and the World Bank. It has also been suggested that despite humanitarian motivations the involvement of NGOs in the non-European world has often functioned to legitimize the present international system. Tomohisa Hattoni has in fact argued that the extension and acceptance of gifts is a mechanism of consent to the capitalist order,52 and, moreover, that foreign aid works to confirm the existing material hierarchies between North and South.53 Duffield’s argument should also be kept in mind that the NGO movement did not expand politically by supporting peoples’ struggles against imperial domination or racial oppression but on the basis of emergency.54 Clearly, humanitarianism needs separate and sustained treatment, but the humanitarian urge should not be discounted because it is tinged with pragmatism and at times it is channelled to support unworthy causes. The question for us is: how can it be better directed to advance constructive social change? There is a strong case to be argued that humanitarianism as it relates to development could be so redirected by connecting with peacekeeping reconceived in terms of self-securing. If, as policy-makers now insist, development and security go together, recasting one should facilitate recasting the other. There is much in the practice of development that stands in need of overhauling. For one thing, less emphasis on immediate relief work and more on fostering self reliance in the longer term. Almost certainly this would mean elevating the social and downgrading the economic. Recently the renowned development economist Kari Polanyi Levitt spoke of her commitment to reclaim development, by which she meant ‘the right of a society to define its priorities on its own terms’.55 She went on: I used to make complicated development plans. I don’t really believe in that anymore. I believe development has to do with how people relate to each other, whether co-operatively and with synergy or competitively, with conflict. The one will produce development, the other will produce chaos.56 Working along these lines would bring development into a parallel track with the security agenda canvassed here. Advocacy is another area that could bring the reform agendas of development and security into a closer relationship. It has been aptly said that NGOs have tended to follow rather than lead public opinion. Nearly two decades ago, John Clark declared that the challenge facing NGOs was to shift attention from expanding their projects and increasing their turnover to marshalling their influence to effect changes in ‘attitudes, institutions and policies’.57 That there has been so little change, except in a few instances, must in large measure be attributed to the reluctance to speak out for fear of losing state and World Bank project money and putting at risk charitable and tax-deductability status. There is also the belief that representations of starving people and, to take a less common case, child sponsorship are more effective in bringing in funds from the general public. Yet if NGOs remain more intent on toeing the line with established authority and urging people to donate than to thinking critically about development issues, the consequences are very serious. The linkage between development and security provides a window of opportunity for the NGO sector to strengthen its educational and advocacy role. With established approaches to security increasingly in question, the case for NGO activism is more persuasive than at any point in the past three decades. This brings us to a point that I think has been implicit in much of the argument of this paper. Rather than being regarded as a discrete field, perhaps peacekeeping should be understood as but one of an ensemble of approaches to the problem of conflict, sitting alongside not only development but international political economy, world order studies, conflict resolution and similar. Peacekeeping might then become part of a consortium that addresses conflict with an awareness of the need for change in the structural relationship between North and South (remembering that there is a North in the South and a South in the North). I suggested above that peacekeeping needed to go out into the world and connect with the everyday. It is increasingly apparent – if as yet insufficiently acted upon – that in the South this involves listening to and taking bearings from people outside what is usually understood to be the formal political process. One thinks of members of social movements, squatter communities or ordinary people whose lives have been disrupted by violence: perhaps non-combatants unable to live up to the model of masculinity into which they have been socialized because they cannot provide for and protect their families;58 or women who find that the borders created by the state and the violence that results are refracted in their family relationships.59 In many situations, whether a peace can be made or maintained may depend more on these grounded, personalized understandings – experiential knowledge – than on the geopolitical calculations and theoretical postulates of those skilled in state-building and diplomatic negotiation. What is perhaps less appreciated is that peacekeeping must connect with the everyday in the North as well as in the South. Over the past two decades various writers have drawn attention to the culture of self-satisfaction that permeates Western societies, which is often accompanied by a marked impatience with the developing world and its problems.60 Taking account of the revival of interest in ideas about empire and the emergence of what has been called the ‘new racism’, one might speak of a culture of insecurity that drives forward the search for security in the formerly colonized world. The contention is persuasive that, at least in part, this insecurity goes back to imperial times.61 Now insecurity can be politically enabling if it is channelled in such a way as to establish commonalities with others.62 But it can also be very damaging if it is harnessed to the pursuit of overbearing external policies – as it mostly is. Here it is worth recalling Slavoj Zˇ izˇek’s point: ‘ruling ideas are never directly the ideas of the ruling class’.63 This is why it is so important to engage with the culture of the everyday; it is drawn upon selectively by the state to advance the interests of the state and of those who manage the state. Surveying the experience of peacekeeping and promoting development, it is striking that invariably the problems are located ‘out there’ in the otherness of the non-European world. Very seldom has analysis and prescription been related back to the role of the First World and what could be done within metropolitan societies or with regard to the structure of the international system. One of the objects of studying other peoples and cultures is surely to better understand ourselves, but it is not much in evidence in the debates about peacekeeping. Somehow, it appears, the discourse has failed to make significant use of knowledge about the part the West has played – and continues to play – in creating instability and insecurity in the Third World, together with widespread poverty. Colonial rule deepened existing divisions in the non-European world; it solidified religious and ethnic identifications; it eroded earlier ways of managing conflict. After decolonization the ruling security and development paradigms cut across the grain of politics as practised. At the same time, the structural violence of the leading powers and global agencies ensured the continued subordination of the Third World to the First. On a charitable reading, perhaps this was not so much by design as by default. Knowledges that could have made a difference were devalued or simply not taken up. On the first count, there was the dismissal of much non-European knowledge – as the World Bank infamously declaimed: ‘Poor countries – and poor people – differ from rich ones not only because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge’.64 On the second count, knowledge that is part of the Western canon – in imperial history, in postcolonial studies, in international political economy and in international law – was allowed to remain in separate compartments. Thus deeply troubling aspects of the politics of the First World were screened from view and characterizations of the many ‘lacks’ of the other were given free rein. The need now is to challenge conceptualizations of both violence and underdevelopment as a problem embedded in the difference of the non-European world. Or to put it another way, to carry out a spatial reorientation, focusing for a bit on here and not there and showing how ‘we’ are heavily implicated in ‘their’ predicament. The question then becomes: what can be done at home about fixing the processes of international exchange to provide the conditions for self-reliance to flourish?