In response to the 1AC’s call for transparency, the alternative is to embrace an algorithmic ethic of opacity as a precondition for political action. The alt is generative of ethical algorithmic governance.
Amoore 20 - Louise Amoore is Professor of Political Geography at Durham University and author of The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security beyond Probability, also published by Duke University Press, (2020), Cloud Ethics: Algorithms and the Attributes of Ourselves and Others, Duke University Press, https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1215/9781478009276 // eshaan
Amid the widespread moral panic surrounding the black box of the algorithm and the political demands for transparency, accountability, and explainability, in this book I make a counter case for opacity and the giving of partial accounts. I have argued that responsibility for algorithmic decisions can never take the form of a clear-sighted account of the action. “Responsibility,” as Thomas Keenan writes, “is not a moment of security or cognitive certainty” in which one makes a “choice between yes and no, this or that.”26 To establish a moment of cognitive certainty regarding the algorithm—to demand its transparency and accountability—is not at all the politics of a responsibility worthy of the name. Indeed, with its new forms of cognitive computing and cloud reasoning, as I discuss in chapter 1, the contemporary algorithm is well attuned to generating clear-sighted precise outputs from otherwise occluded situations. Contra the demand for transparency, then, the opacity of the scene, and the undecidability of its salient features and attributes, is the precondition for politics and ethics. “What could responsibility mean,” asks Keenan, “without the risk of exposure to chance, without vulnerability,” without the undecidability of what is taking place in a scene?27 Running against the grain of algorithmic logics that show, attend, and tell the meaning of a situation, responsibility means that one cannot see a clear path ahead because the meaning of the situation is undecidable. The multiple branching points of the decision tree or random forest algorithm do in fact carry the risk of exposure to chance and vulnerability. A different kind of responsibility dwells at these forks in the path, bearing the opacity of future consequences of the weighting of one route over another. In this book I differentiate the search for an encoded ethical framework for algorithms from an ethicopolitics that is already present within the algorithm’s arrangements. In so doing, I draw a distinction between a moral code of prohibition and permission (what algorithms may or may not do) and an ethics of the orientation one has to oneself and to others (how algorithms are generating relations of self to self, and self to others).28 This distinction follows Spinoza’s broader philosophical concern that “ethics has nothing to do with a morality.”29 Our ethicopolitical relations do not follow strictly from some already formulated moral code, for we never have the security of these grounds from which to act. As Deleuze has reflected on Spinoza’s ethics, “You do not know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you do not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination.”30 Similarly, for Isabelle Stengers, “every time we use the term ‘ethics’ we must obviously distinguish it from the term ‘morality,’” so that her speculative ambition is ethical in the sense of ethos or habit.31 Just as Spinoza’s ethics are ever in formation, forged through ethos, encounters, arrangements, and combinations, so a cloud ethics is located in the encounters, arrangements, and combinations through which the algorithm is generated. Some of these encounters and arrangements involve human beings; others are between unsupervised algorithms and a corpus of data; and more still involve algorithms interacting with other algorithms. This is an ethics, then, that puts into question the authority of the knowing subject and opens onto the plural and distributed forms of the writing of algorithms. Understood in this way, “ethics is able to exceed its traditional determination” and be “displaced” and considered “anew” in the relations forged with other beings.32 The possibility of what Derrida calls “the opening of another ethics” is a different kind of opening to the imagination of the prizing open of a black box or the illumination of a dark calculus with moral oversight.33 It is an opening onto the edges and limits of an iterative writing that is profoundly political, each one of us drawn into the proximities of the output. Algorithms engage in writing in and through their dense relations with people and things in a data scene, their authorship uncertain and their emergence opaque. Here, in the opacity of not knowing in advance what the relations could be, we have found an opening for taking responsibility. If an ethical response to algorithmic decisions is to begin from opacity and not from the demand for transparency, then what does this mean for the strategies of a cloud ethics? Where the political demands for transparency reassert the objective vision of a disembodied observer, to stay with opacity is to insist on the situated, embodied, and partial perspective of all forms of scientific knowledge.34 Understood in Donna Haraway’s terms, to confront opacity would not be a matter of failing to open the black box or to see something, but rather it would acknowledge that “the knowing self is partial in all its guises,” that practices of visuality necessarily enroll the opacity of ourselves and others.35 Far from a lack of transparency limiting accountability, the condition of opacity “allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see.”36 This “we” who learns, as I discuss in the machine learning practices of chapter 2, is a composite figure, “stitched together imperfectly” from the iterative learning of humans and machines.37 In the chapters of this book, I have been concerned to show how machine learning algorithms generate their outputs through the opaque relations of selves to selves, and selves to others, and how these outputs then annul and disavow the opacity of their underlying relations in the name of a crystalline clarity of the output. One mode of resistance to the clarity of the algorithmic decision resides within the opacity of the subjects and what cannot be known of their relations. Let us consider a practical example of such a strategy. In the experimental development of the neural networks for show, attend, and tell, the algorithm designers explain that when their model makes a mistake, they are able to “exploit” what it manifests to gain “intuition into what the model saw.”38 This kind of seeing on behalf of the algorithm sustains the god’s-eye vision of a computer scientist who may redistribute their way of seeing at will. A cloud ethics can stay with the difficulty of intuiting what the model saw as a form of partial, situated, and locally specific account. Among the examples of the mistakes used to productively generate new learning is “a woman holding a clock in her hand” and “a man wearing a hat and a hat on a skateboard.” The algorithms have learned to recognize a clock and a hat, even when these are absent in the scene, via their exposure to a corpus of data that has supplied the feature vectors for these objects. The algorithm’s relations with a contingent and opaque set of multiple other gradients have generated the mistaken presence of a clock and a hat (figures 6.4 and 6.5). The cnns have generated an output of attentiveness to the focus of the scene (shown in the images as an area of white light)—this output itself contingent on millions of past parameters—which enters the rnn as a data input. The rnn then generates the “tell,” or the natural language description of the scene, assigning a probability for each word in the descriptor. In the (mis)recognition of “A man is talking on his cell phone while another man watches,” the algorithm has assigned a probability of 1.00 (or a certainty) to the indefinite article A, for example, but probabilities of 0.46, 0.24, and 0.17 to the nouns man, cell, and phone. These likelihood scores—low and yet apparently the most probable—are entirely contingent on multiple algorithms’ past relations with unknown other scenes. As I explain in chapter 4, the mistaken recognition of the algorithm is not merely error or errancy, for the output is entirely reasonable given the algorithm’s relations with a data world. In terms of resistant practices, a cloud ethics is concerned not with fixing the algorithm or eradicating its errancy, but rather with attending to how these moments give accounts of algorithmic reason. What will take place when the recognition of a clock that is not present becomes the recognition of a weapon? What will be authorized by the most likely cell phone that is an absent presence in the scene? To be clear, a cloud ethics will point to the moments when partial and situated algorithmic reason is sheltered as “mistake” or “error” and will reopen what is incomputable in the making of a likelihood score. Such a strategy is not the same as making a calculation transparent or accountable because it recognizes that the 0.14 assigned to child or 0.46 and 0.37 to border and fence are contingent on a vast multiplicity of necessarily opaque relations between other people, algorithms, things, data, gradients, features, and images. When the algorithm “tells” us that this is what matters in a scene, one could never have a transparent account of how the story has been made tellable. Instead, there are only the intransigent political relations that persist in the scene, the moments of nonclosure that reopen the problem and the politics.