The Settler/Native/Slave triad relegates the position of the slave into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation–––blackness is resistant to projects of recovery
Garba, T., & Sorentino, S. (2020).[ Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies, University of Alabama, Independent Scholar, “Slavery is a Metaphor: A Critical Commentary on Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor.” Antipode. doi:10.1111/anti.12615]//sheima
Slavery The positivist affirmation of land is not methodologically innocent. Its implications can best be understood in how it indents the political ontology of slavery and the methods of Black studies. As we have noted, by framing the “settler-native-slave” triad through the presumptive totality of settler colonialism, Tuck and Yang bring the slave into the fold only to disavow its premises.12 Slavery can be a component of settler colonialism, but when consigned to the “labor theory of slavery”, the constituent elements of the slave position (and the possibility that slavery might be in excess to the demand for labour) can never be broached. Further, the Indigenous quilting point—land—enables a chain of meaningful struggle and recovery unavailable to the enslaved. Indigenous peoples have protection against the threat of their struggle being “turned into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation” (Tuck and Yang 2012:7) through access to the physical object of land which, even if understood relationally and through remembrance, can only be returned in its total physical presence. Tuck and Yang’s analysis and citational practices demonstrate that while land rescues Indigenous peoples from the condition of interminable metaphoricity (the driving thesis of their essay), Black people are in the singular position of beginning and ending their “track towards Liberation” as empty signifiers. Land is the signifier that secures the impossibility of Indigenous fungibility.¶ Take the telling seventh footnote, in which Tuck and Yang clarify the structural logics of their triad—a footnote worth quoting in full because, if brought into the body of the text, it would wreak havoc on its premises: ... although the setter-native-slave triad structures settler colonialism, this does not mean that settler, native, and slave are analogs that can be used to describe corresponding identities, structural locations, worldviews, and behaviors. Nor do they mutually constitute one another. For example, Indigenous is an identity independent of the triad, and also an ascribed structural location within the triad. Chattel slave is an ascribed structural position, but not an identity. Settler describes a set of behaviors, as well as a structural location, but is eschewed as an identity. (Tuck and Yang 2012:7n7)13¶ Whereas the native, we are told, can claim both “an identity independent of the triad” and “an ascribed structural location within the triad”, the slave is positioned through “an ascribed structural position, but not an identity”. It is the native’s independent identity, always stabilised by the relationship with land, that can stop what would otherwise be a runaway chain of signification. It is clear that by this differentiation Tuck and Yang want to preempt falling prey to Wilderson’s (2010) “ruse of analogy”. 14 As we will see, Tuck and Yang (2012:17) mobilise a similar refrain, “colonial equivocation”, to guard against coalitional appropriations of colonialism. What their metaphysical commitment to positivism misses, however, is the doubled valence of the ruse. Slavery is resistant to the project of recovery—there is no hidden material, neither land nor identity, to be recovered. The slave’s lack of identity, as postulated by Tuck and Yang, also doubles to expose a lack in their theorisation of slavery because of the problem at the constitutive core of slavery: not the presence of land, appropriated identity, or alienated labour, but, as we will argue, the lack of anything to lack. Their method cannot accede this aporetic possibility.¶ “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor” instead intensifies the difference formulated by Wolfe between (1) Blackness as “expansive”, “inherited” through the one-drop rule “by an expanding number of ‘black’ descendants”; and (2) Indigenous peoples “racialized” as “subtractive”: “Native Americans are constructed to become fewer in number and less Native, but never exactly white, over time” (Tuck and Yang 2012:12; see also Wolfe 2006:387).15 This subtractive logic is propelled, not surprisingly, by the priority of land: “Native American is a racialisation that portrays contemporary Indigenous generations to be less authentic, less Indigenous than every prior generation in order to ultimately phase out Indigenous claims to land and usher in settler claims to property” (Tuck and Yang 2012:12). What might animate the anti-Black logics of the one-drop rule dissolves except in a synthetic analysis that would collapse both “the racializations of Indigenous people and Black people in the US settler colonial nation-state” as “geared to ensure the ascendancy of white settlers as the true and rightful owners and occupiers of the land” (Tuck and Yang 2012:12), which is to say both Indigenous and Black peoples are structured by a common settler-colonial project, even as Black people (insofar as “the US government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery” [Tuck and Yang 2012:29]) are also figured as proto-settlers.16 The grounding “settler” concept frays further when considering that (1) the “Indian Removal Act” also rendered native peoples unwilling settlers by relocating them to already Indigenous populated territories (Smithers 2015:117–128); (2) Indigenous peoples remain Indigenous when they move or are forcibly moved, because indigeneity expresses relationality, not possession (Blackwell et al. 2017:127; Radcliffe 2017); (3) in Latin America, creolisation has, complexly, been referred to as an “indigenizing process” (Castellanos 2017:777; Jackson 2012:42–44); and (4) African indigeneity meant a unique intensification of structures of slavery on the African continent through settler colonialism (Kelley 2017).17 The last two points also serve to underscore the Anglo-centrism of Tuck and Yang’s argument, as Canada and the United States remain their point of departure for understanding of the relation between Blackness and Indigeneity, rather than the Western hemisphere as a whole.¶ Consider too how the asymmetry between native and slave operates within Tuck and Yang’s discussion of “playing Indian” (Tuck and Yang 2012:8–9), which in Tuck et al. (2014b:16) means not only tribal garb but also those “alternative” settler cultures of “communalism and counterculturalism, such as in rural communes, permaculture, squatting, hoboing, foraging, and neo-pagan, earth-based, and New Age spirituality ... formed by occupying and traversing stolen Indigenous land and often by practicing cultural and spiritual appropriation”. 18 “Playing Indian” involves putting on the accoutrements of Indianness in much the same way that Blackness is performatively appropriated—the difference is that the decolonization metaphor is never theorised as central to the struggle over land. In “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor”, the impulse to “go native” is instead nonessential to the subject-formation of the native. It is a late, superstructural practice meant to relieve settler anxiety, to provide “some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting” (Tuck and Yang 2012:9), but whose embrace of a kumbaya sensibility, while advocating a “reinhabitation” of the environment on ethical grounds, actually tends towards the replacement of Indigeneity.19 “[J]ust as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native”, playing Indian (“the desire to become without becoming [Indian]” [Tuck and Yang 2012:14]) “is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore” (Tuck and Yang 2012:9). As the performative expression of the metaphorical conceit, playing Indian is a secondary (not constitutive) strategy en route to extermination.20 It drives towards “moves to innocence”, from the invention of long-lost ancestors (Elizabeth Warren comes to mind)21 to settler adoption fantasies (Dances with Wolves and The Last of the Mohicans [Tuck and Yang 2012:13–17]) to the “colonial equivocation” of coalitions that proclaim “We are all colonized” (behind which is the implication “None of us are settlers” [Tuck and Yang 2012:17]).¶ Unlike the late origins of the decolonization metaphor, we argue that the slave metaphor is central to the structuring logics of slavery, not an after-effect. While Tuck and Yang see “colonial equivocation” as an erasure of what is distinct about settler colonialism (land), Wilderson’s “ruse of analogy” registers the distinction of racial slavery as the absence of anything to claim. This means that, as “a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society” (Wilderson 2010:21), slavery is only ever available as semantic displacement. Slavery-as-metaphor is the beingof-slavery, what Wilderson (2010) calls its “political ontology”. Tuck and Yang’s mis-reading of this ruse is replicated in J. Kehaulani Kauanui’s (2017) critique of Afro-pessimism. For Kauanui, the political-ontological approach, which would make Blackness-as-slaveness immanent and essential to a violent political determination of being (rather than exogenous and contingent), is a symptom of what it means to critique: “to assert blackness as ontological is to recapitulate colonising thought, to take colonial ideology as truth” (2017:258).22 In order to extract Blackness from its colonial-ontological confines, Kauanui proposes a turn to the historical and concrete. By identifying the contingency of racial slavery as “rooted in historicizing race” (2017:259), Kauanui searches for a non-ontological Blackness. She finds it in a twist to the (by now much disputed) origin story ascribed to late 17th century Virginia and Bacon’s Rebellion, arguing that slaves and indentured servants were not only equally (and economically) oppressed but also united in “efforts to commit genocide against indigenous peoples” (Kauanui 2017:261).23 This reading renders race an “additional pliant” (Kauanui 2017:260) to the conquest of native lands, which is to say that slavery is internal to settler colonialism. ¶ We offer an alternative structural history, one that neither cedes to the pressures of empiricism as grounds for critique nor falls prey to the obfuscation of metaphor that Tuck and Yang charge non-land-based struggle with. By centralising political ontology precisely as the problem of the relationship between history and contingency, materiality and the symbolic, we attempt to account for the genesis and structure of modernity, and propose slavery as the code that functions as “the a priori or ground of the history to which it gives rise” (Scott and Wynter 2000:197; see also Warren 2018). For Tuck and Yang, the “current colonial era goes back to 1492, when colonial imaginary goes global” (2012:4n2). For Sylvia Wynter (1995, 2003), by contrast, the basis of the triadic political ontology of the post-1492 Americas was well established prior to the Columbian expedition (see also King 2019:15–21).24 Black slaves—as they crossed from the “old world” sugar-complex to the new world—would play a central role in the formulation of what we recognise as the modern world. If slavery is essential to the grounding logics of capitalism, it also needs to be situated in the political-economic geography of the Mediterranean within which the conquest of the New World was conceived. The Columbian expedition would not have been possible without the inauguration of slavery earlier in the 15th century, as “the Portuguese landing on the shores of today’s Senegal and their drawing of areas of West Africa into a mercantile network and trading system” (Wynter 1995:10) challenged the geographical and technological orthodoxy of late medieval scholasticism, and solidified the political-economic relations that would blossom into global civil society. The position of the slave was both materially and symbolically significant, for the reification of Africans as the only “legitimately enslaveable population” enabled the emerging discourses of republicanism and civic humanism, and thereby sutured the “moral and philosophical foundations of post-1492 polities” (Wynter 1995:35; see also Wynter 2003:309). Likewise, McKittrick argues that the “‘naturalization’ of difference” was “bolstered by the ideological weight of transparent space, the idea that space ‘just is’” (McKittrick 2006:xv). The political-symbolic structures of slavery are essential to the production of space and its meanings. By condensing this lattice into “forced labor” in extremis, Tuck and Yang miss how the conceptual density of slavery might always already condition the positivism of land. Slavery cannot be added as an afterthought without diminishing the historical-geographical scope of modernity and leaving the constitution of the material and symbolic conditions of conquest unthought.¶ With the “labor theory of slavery”, slavery has been drawn into the whirlpool of Marxist critique (e.g. Beckert and Rockman 2016; Tomich 2004). And while Marxism certainly has methodological and political purchase, we argue that the now perennial and unsolved problem of how race connects to class (and slavery to capitalism) points to the need to call upon and develop new frameworks of approach (Bledsoe and Wright 2019; Sorentino 2019; Wilderson 2010). Drawing from a tradition of theorising interested in the non-economic utility of the slave (Sexton 2010, 2014; Spillers 2003a; Wilderson 2010; Wynter 1995, 2003), we are interested in what becomes available for critique when identifying the constitution of slavery through its “metaphorical aptitude”, the way the slave operates as “the imaginative surface upon which the master and the nation came to understand themselves” (Hartman 1997:7). Focus on formlessness or, as Hartman calls it, the “figurative capacities of blackness” (1997:7) complicates critiques of colonial sovereignty, property, and land acquisition. The metaphoricity of the slave is a feature of the global fungibility of the slave—its interchangeability and replaceability. Fungibility renders the slave a vessel through which the settler-master regenerates their position: “The dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion” (Hartman 1997:21). Hartman’s reading of fungibility provides a possible reading of the constitution of settler’s capacity to undertake the settler-colonial project in ways that don’t simply take for granted Lockean conceptions of history and property. King does precisely that, identifying how the slave’s role in signifying “expansion and spatial possibility became a feature of the spatial imagination of the conquistador-settler” (2019:120). Taken further, as “an open sign that can be arranged and rearranged for infinite kinds of use” (King 2019:104), the slave enables the very possibility for the settler to accumulate land and wealth. Blackness is rendered “a-spatial” (Bledsoe and Wright 2019:12–13) and “unsovereign” (Sexton 2014:11) such that slavery provides the “enabling postulates” for the “social and discursive practices” of the post-1492 world (Spillers 2003a:18; Walcott 2014). ¶