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Violence against Otherized bodies positions them as a “degraded human” which is distinct from violence against Black folk who are always positioned as antagonistic to the Human.

Wilderson 21 ( Frank Wilderson ; Frank B. Wilderson, III is an Associate Professor in the Drama Doctoral Program and the African American Studies Program at UC Irvine. He has taught literature at UC Santa Cruz; and at the University of Witwatersrand and Vista University in South Africa, where he lived for five years during the transitional years from apartheid to universal suffrage. While in South Africa he held elected office in the Congress of South African Writers and the African National Congress.; “Antiblackness” edited by Moon-Kie Jung and João H. Costa Vargas; "Duke University Press – “Antiblackness ". Dukeupress.Edu, 2022, https://www.dukeupress.edu/antiblackness. Accessed 19 July 2022.) Dōgen

The difference between Afropessimism and the major revolutionary theories of modernity are as glaring as the similarities. True Afropessimism is not animated by reformist desire to end discriminatory practices in the world; it is animated by an understanding that world itself is unethical and needs be undone. Also, it is a theory, like Marxism, radical feminism, postcolonial studies, and radical lgbt theory, which argues that violence is necessary to form an unethical paradigm (to create world) and, ultimately, violence is necessary to undo an unethical paradigm (to bring about the end of the world). Again, Afropessimism parts company with these theories, however, in that it does not offer an alternative worldview. The reasons for this refusal of the prescriptive gesture are complex, but, to state it simply, Afropessimists argue that whereas the paradigmatic antagonism that the aforementioned theories posit as being central to the formation of world are all subject positions of one kind or another, in other words, all various categories within the same species, that species being the Human (woman/man, worker/boss, native/settler, queer/straight are, in various paradigms, antagonists, to be sure, but they are also all Human beings), the Black or Slave is not a category of Human. We have here a critique that is far more comprehensive and whose implications are more far reaching than the implications of its theoretical counterparts. The antagonist of the woman is the man; the antagonist of the worker is the boss; the antagonist of the queer is the straight—but the antagonist of the Black is the Human. If revolutionary feminism is an immanent critique of the family or the paradigm of kinship, if Marxism is an immanent critique of capitalism or the paradigm of political economy as a structure, then Afropessimism is an immanent critique of the Human or the paradigm of Humanity.1 This is why Afropessimists are loath to offer what in revolutionary circles are called “alternative visions.” Whereas it is possible to imagine an alternative filial world (a kinship void of patriarchy) and it is possible to imagine an alternative economic world (an economy void of capitalism), it is epistemologically impossible to imagine an alternative Human world (a world void of relationality). Heretofore, revolutionary theory has concerned itself with unethical modes of relation: gender and economic, for example. These theories have performed immanent critiques in order to show how and why the way relations are organized and empowered (or disempowered) within a (filial or economic) paradigm are unethical. By contrast, Afropessimists argue that these immanent critiques do not go far enough; that if one were to deploy Blackness (or Slaveness) as one’s lens of interpretation, one would be able to critique not just the way relations are organized and empowered and find those modes of organization and empowerment to be unethical; but one would be armed with a theoretical apparatus that would allow one to perform an immanent critique of relationality itself. Looked at through the lens of Blackness, one would be able to see how relationality itself (all relations of any kind) is unethical because relationality, the capacity to be, is predicated on antiblackness. To be is to be other than Black. “Simple enough one has only not to be a nigger” (Fanon 1967a, 115). What Fanon alerts us to is another key Afropessimist tenet: that there is no analogy between the suffering of Black people and those others who find themselves subjugated by unethical paradigms (such as patriarchy and capitalism). Analogy is a ruse, in part because, once the subjects of unethical paradigms are liberated from their chains, they will still stand in contradistinction to the Slave. They will still be Human. Ergo, they will still be the Black’s antagonists. Afropessimism connects the work of scholars such as Saidiya Hartman, Jared Sexton, Hortense Spillers, David Marriott, Frank B. Wilderson III, and others, and builds on its own unique reading of the seminal works of Frantz Fanon, Orlando Patterson, and Sylvia Wynter. The vital and decisive move made by these writers is one that takes the Black out of the Human; or, more accurately, Afropessimism demonstrates how a Human is always already not a Black. Blackness, Afropessimists argue, is what makes the Human conceptually coherent because, if the positive attributes of what it means to be Human are ever in doubt, the meaning can be secured by a reflection upon what it is not: to be Human, one has simply not to be Black (just as capitalist stands in ontological contradistinction to worker and as man stands in ontological distinction to woman). In other words, Afropessimism argues that we cannot take the word “Human” at face value. Like any other word or concept, “Human” does not come with its meaning neatly tied in a bow. The Human is a construct. To know the Human is to know, first and foremost, what it is not. Humans are sentient beings who are not Black. Blacks are sentient beings who are not Human. There is a structural (which is to say, necessary) antagonism between Blacks and Humans; and this antagonism hinges on violence. The paradigm of violence that positions and oppresses degraded forms of Humanity, such as colored immigrants, women (who are not Black), lgbt people, Indigenous people, and working-class folks (who are not Black), cannot be analogized with the paradigm of violence that positions and oppresses Blackness. Any analogy between the grammar of suffering of degraded Humans and the grammar of suffering of Blacks is hobbled by the ruse of analogy. Degraded forms of Humans are positioned and oppressed by a grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation. But Black people are positioned and oppressed by a grammar of suffering known as “fungibility and accumulation” (Hartman 1997). Blacks are objects and implements to be possessed (accumulated) and exchanged (made fungible) in the material and psychic life of Human subjects. Black people are the things that belong to Humans. In this way, all Humans are Masters in their relation to Blacks; and all Blacks are Slaves in their relation to Humans—and this paradigmatic arrangement holds true, Afropessimists argue, whether we are speaking about exalted Human formations, such as heterosexual White males, or degraded Human formations, such as the lgbt community or Brown immigrants or the working class. Afropessimists interrogate the historic development of the Human, and what that development has meant for the creation of the Black as nonHuman. Blackness is an ontological position; that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a positionality against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal integrity. In this way, the socially dead or fungible Slave is a necessary foil for the construction of the socially alive Human. This relationship is both fundamentally destructive and necessary for the construction of liberated Human subjects. For example, the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image within progressive multiracial (meaning, decidedly nonblack) movements produces dreams of liberation which are, as we will see, parasitic on the suffering of Blacks without, in any essential way, contributing to the liberation of Black suffering. As Black people, we often mistake this as being the highest form of empathy and recognition. In point of fact, to paraphrase Hartman, it’s just an extension of the master’s prerogative. We facilitate the imagination of people and worlds in which we play no part. Afropessimism is not a politics, but it does point to the need for a new kind of politics that resonates with Fanon’s call for the “end of the world”: a complete revolution of what currently exists. And this undoing is aimed at exalted Humanity (White men), as well as degraded Humanity (oppressed people of color). Afropessimism is not a politics, in part, because the politics that arise from modernity’s treatises of Human liberation (e.g., Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, Indigenism) are all constructed by two scaffolds—one of which is conspicuously absent from Afropessimism. Those two scaffolds are description and prescription. Marx, for example, describes the world as being out of joint, as being unethical in its essential arrangements because of the distribution of capacities in political economy: capitalists are the only ones with the capacity to accumulate surplus value. This mode of accumulation is parasitic on the labor power of the working class. Therein lies the descriptive scaffold, and it is thoroughly explicated in over three thousand pages in Marx’s (1976) Das Kapital. To put it simply, the world is unethical and out of joint due to a structural antagonism between the haves and the have-nots. The prescriptive scaffold is Marx’s answer to the question, What is to be done? Here Marxism is unwavering in its answer: destroy capitalist capacity, bring about the end of the capitalist political economy, and usher in a communist political economy, by any means necessary. The prescriptive scaffold can be summed up in a word—communism; or in a phrase—the dictatorship of the proletariat. His prescription offers not just the promise of redress and renewal in some abstract, ideal, or spiritual sense, but a concrete proposal as to how the working class will be liberated and what liberation will look like on the other side of capitalism. No such concept or proposal is offered by Afropessimism, for who can say what liberation looks like on the other side of Humanity? Instead of interrogating the capitalist and the capacity of her or his position, Afropessimism interrogates the Human and its capacity as being parasitic on the absence of the Slave’s, or Black’s, capacity (the absence of agency). Therein lies the descriptive scaffold of Afropessimism, and it is explicated by the scholars cited above, as well as in countless articles and an archive of monographs that are being written and published. The Human has three constituent elements: natality, honor, and contingent violence. These constituent elements of Human subjectivity are not embodied by the Slave or Black, and their conceptual coherence is vouchsafed in contradistinction to the Slave’s or Black’s lack of them. (Just as the cap- A fropessimism and the R use of Analogy 43 italist has the capacity to accumulate surplus value, and this capacity is necessarily lacking in the worker; but the absence of this capacity in the worker is required to give its presence coherence in the capitalist.) The social death of the Slave, or Black, has three constituent elements: natal alienation, general dishonor, and naked or gratuitous violence (Patterson 1982). Gratuitous violence secures natal alienation and general dishonor. The Black body, or Black “flesh,” as Spillers (2003) would say, is a sentient being for which no form of violence is psychically beyond the limit. In other words, there is nothing one can do to this body, in the collective unconscious or the libidinal economy, that would be deemed “violence beyond the limit” (Eltis 1993).

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