The affirmative project of self-care fails to address the nature of an anti-black world – their project creates a condition of self-injury that ultimately get mapped over in discussions of humanist redress
Warren, Assistant Professor of American Studies, 2015 (Calvin, research fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in Africology, "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope", CR: The New Centennial Review, 15.1, accessed on 9/26/15, BEN)
For West, this crisis of meaning and hope can be rectified through the “politics of conversion” (we can read in this Kierkegaard’s idea of a “conversion experience”). This is deliverance from the bondage of market moralism, which results in the “politicization of love”—conceptualizing love as an organizing political principle (another spiritual principle appropriated by the Political). West identifies Toni Morrison’s masterpiece Beloved as an example of this ethic of love that converts the self-destructive nihilist. Beloved teaches us how to “generate a sense of agency among a downtrodden people” (29). But West neglects the trauma that organizes this text and the nihilistic response to this trauma as the only form of “agency” in an absurd anti-black world. Racial terror compels Sethe to leave the plantation with her children, and the threat her children could be recaptured and subjected to the horrors of the plantation motivates her to make a very heavy decision: the choice between prolonged social death or physical death. These are really the only choices that she has, and her ethic of love is to choose the latter—it is an act of mercy. We could say that Sethe becomes a nihilist in that moment of decision, and infanticide is not an irrational, pathological, or loveless act, but the ultimate testament of agency and love. This is what Paul D could not understand because it contravened the narratives of political hope and futurity; her act was read as cruel by those who attempted to translate the absurd “false choice” that structured her existence into a bio-political grammar of meaning. It is certainly “inappropriate” to disregard this weighty decision as “loveless” or “hopeless,” for in doing so, we fail to understand the philosophical statement her action is articulating. This is a philosophical statement that understands the inadequacy of political hope in conditions of anti-black violence. It is easy to disparage behavior that runs contrary to the dictates of a bio-political order. Black nihilism invites us to consider this behavior as a form of philosophical discourse that must be addressed. In separating the behavior from its philosophical statement, we not only run the risk of pathologizing forms of blackness but also of foreclosing a particular critique of political hope that is absolutely necessary to understand black existential angst in the twenty-first century. In “Cornel West and Afro-Nihilism: A Reconsideration,” Floyd W. Hayes (2001) offers an alternative reading of black nihilism that considers it a “reaction to the dominant culture’s nihilism” and a critique of anti-blackness. In Hayes’s masterful critique of West, he interprets this behavior as a form of ressentiment. Following Nietzsche and Scheler, Hayes argues that horri is a critique of metaphysical thinking, anti-black absurdity, and inequitable distribution of resources. It is a “historical and contemporary phenomenon” (251) that emerges during the trans-Atlantic slave trade and calcifies over time. These sentiments of anger, revenge, and rage engender rebellion, and what is often misinterpreted as black pathology. Ressentiment, then, is the meeting ground for an array of responses to antiblackness, and it challenges the erroneous separation of behavior and philosophy. Black nihilism, in my analysis, acknowledges the persistence of ressentiment, but, unlike Hayes, posits no escape from it. The inability to ameliorate ressentiment is the essence of black suffering. Ressentiment constitutes torment without relief, and the desperation for relief results in forms of self-injury, in which the body must speak the existential crisis that gets muted within humanist grammars. In Hope on the Brink: Understanding the Emergence of Nihilism in Black America, theologian Lewis Brogdon (2013) would describe this theory of unresolvable torment as the “death of hope.” For Brogdon, this death is even more severe than West’s nihilism. This death is something that Brogdon mourns throughout the text with the assurance that it can be resurrected. The hope that he pines for is really political hope, for the hope that is lost is a hope in the efficacy of the Political to redress the injuries of anti-black violence. Brogdon believes that the withdrawal of political hope leads to despair. Reflecting on this lost hope, Brogdon suggests: And today, the black community is increasingly populated by people whose hope in a just and equitable society either died a long time ago or continues to die as they face stifling social inequities and disappointing economic disparities. I heard a similar comment while teaching a study on why the church struggles with the issue of racism. One older congregant from the Civil Rights generation said, “We already heard that and tried that. Nothing has changed.” Instead of working for change, some blacks, like this congregant, choose to respond to the permanence of racial inequality by retreating from the struggle altogether, accepting the inequitable nature of society as permanent, after having one’s hope die a slow, painful death. (42) The challenge that the “older congregant” put to Brogdon was a serious one. If Brogdon admonishes her to keep political hope alive, then he must answer the question “why?” For this congregant, we have exhausted the discourses of humanism and the strategies of equality—nothing has worked. Brogdon sidesteps this challenge by presenting “working for change” as a viable option, which is really a non-answer. What type of “work” will bring about the promises of the Political? Is there a type of work that will, once and for all, alleviate black suffering? Why would someone continue to do the same thing repeatedly without any substantial change (some would say this is the definition of insanity)? Brodgon leaves these nihilistic questions unanswered, precisely because they are unanswerable, and, instead, continues to exhort blacks to struggle for the fantasy object. This struggle is presented as a spiritual virtue, and the spiritual concept of hope is contaminated with the prerogatives of a political order. This problematic conflation is never adequately explained. Why is continued hope in an anti-black political order a sign of spiritual maturity? And if this order is redeemable, then it is the obligation of the advocate to explain how this redemption will occur. This merging of the spiritual and the political creates a flawed theology that either endangers people or necessitates living in what Lewis Gordon would call “bad faith” in Bad Faith and Anti-black Racism (1995). Perhaps it is the retreat from the Political that is the ultimate sign of spiritual maturity.