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In the face of anti-black violence, you must abandon political hope and ethically refuse to enter the political arena

Warren, Assistant Professor of American Studies, 2015 (Calvin, research fellow at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in Africology, "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope", CR: The New Centennial Review, 15.1, accessed on 9/26/15, BEN)

For West and Brogdon, nihilism is a spiritual-psychic disorder that requires a spiritual antidote. In this configuration of the spiritual, the nihilist is in need of deliverance—deliverance from the bondage of “hope-death.” We might, however, think of the nihilists not as the fleshly embodiment of “hope-death” but as spiritualists invested in the deliverance of the spiritual from the clutches of the Political. The black nihilist, in this regard, is profoundly spiritual and addresses the contamination of the spiritual by its political sequelae. Unlike the political-theologian, the nihilist does not promise redress within the structure of the political, for this is impossible, but offers, instead, rejection of the political as a spiritual practice itself.4 In a very thought-provoking discussion published in Religious Dispatches about the murder of Trayvon Martin and George Zimmerman’s acquittal, J. Kameron Carter, Anthea Butler, and Willie James Jennings conceptualize anti-blackness as a form of spiritual idolatry (Carter 2013). Evoking the seminal text Is God a White Racist? (1973), written by Dr. William R. Jones, these scholars suggest that anti-black political organization is often anchored in a racist theology—one that considers anti-blackness God’s will. Jones put the theodicy question to Black Liberation theologians and questioned this undying fealty to a liberation grounded in political reconfiguration and emancipatory rhetoric. Is God a White Racist? not only articulates the disjuncture between emancipatory “hope” and the devastating reality of black suffering but also questions the place of the Political within this liberation theology. This theology, indeed, presupposes certain metaphysical assumptions about the Political—progress, linear time, and agency—and Jones reveals a certain paradox within liberation theology: it is grounded in the Political but lacks a strong political philosophy to justify this grounding (i.e., a philosophy that connects the theological to the Political). This becomes even more problematic because these metaphysical presumptions are themselves instruments of anti-blackness. Anti-blackness, ironically, becomes the very foundation for the purported liberation from anti-blackness in this theology. This is precisely the contradiction that Jones intimates throughout the text, and it is this entanglement that renders political liberation somewhat of a ruse. In the article “Christian Atheism: The Only Response Worth Its Salt to the Zimmerman Verdict” (2013), J. Kameron Carter perspicuously foregrounds the problem of the Zimmerman verdict as a perverse deification of anti-blackness. If the shooting of Trayvon Martin was “god’s will,” as Zimmerman expressed to Sean Hannity in an interview, then this god considered black death a moral imperative, or an act of righteousness, and Zimmerman, in shooting Trayvon Martin, assumed the role of the obedient disciple. For Carter, this god is nothing more than an idol, a spiritual imposture created by modernity and its institutions: The white, western god-man is an idol that seeks to determine what is normal. It is a norm by which society governs the body politic or regulates, measures, evaluates, and indeed judges what is proper or improper, what is acceptable citizenship. It is this idol, the idol of “the American god,” that is the symbolic figure Zimmerman identified himself with and in relationship to which he judges Trayvon Martin as, in effect, religiously wanting—wanting in proper citizenship, and ultimately wanting in humanity. (3) The “white, western-god-man” (or the “American god”) that Carter describes bears resemblance to what Sylvia Wynter would call “Man” (2003, 322)—both are philosophical-theological apparatuses of anti-blackness, and they function to colonize essential spheres of existence (“Man” colonizes human and the “white, western-god-man” colonizes God). The “white, western-god-man” and “Man” index a process of extreme epistemological and metaphysical violence, and this violence serves as the foundation of Western society and its politics. The only response to this epistemological and metaphysical violence, according to Carter, is atheism. It is here that we hear an uncanny resonance with Ernest Bloch’s Atheism in Christianity (1971), in which “a good Christian must necessarily be a good atheist.” True Christianity necessitates a certain atheism—in fact it depends on it—to fortify the boundaries between the just/ unjust and the righteous/unrighteous. In other words, when a Christian encounters the idol of anti-blackness, she must assume an atheistic posture toward this idol to remain faithful (or as Carter would describe it to be “worth your salt”). The atheism that Carter proffers, however, is entangled in the metaphysical bind that sustains the very violence his atheism is designed to dismantle. For him, this atheism entails “social, political, and intellectual struggle... struggle in solidarity with others, the struggle to be for and with others, the struggle of the multitude, the struggle that is blackness [as] the new ecclesiology” (2013, 4). The term “struggle” here presents political metaphysics as a solution to the problem of anti-blackness—through labor, travail, and commitment one embraces progress and linearity as social goods. With this metaphysics, according to Carter, we can “struggle to get rid of these ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws that are in place in many states besides Florida, struggle against state legislatures (such as North Carolina’s) that are enacting draconian laws of various sorts, struggle in the name of the protection of women’s agency about their own bodies—in short, struggle to imagine a new politics of belonging” (4). This struggle contains the promise of overcoming anti-blackness to usher in a “not-yet-social-order.” Again, the trick of time is deployed to protect “struggle” from the rigorous historical analysis that would demand evidence of its efficacy. The “not-yet-social-order,” situated in an irreproachable future (a political prolepsis), can only promise this overcoming against a history and historicity of brutal anti-black social organization. Carter is looking for a political theology—although we’ve always had one under the guise of democratic liberalism—that will provide conditions of life by mobilizing the discourses of hope and future temporality. The problem that this theology encircles, and evades, is the failure of “social justice” and “liberation theology” to dismantle the structure of anti-black violence; this brings us full circle to the problem that Dr. William R. Jones brilliantly articulated. Are we hoping for a new strategy, something completely novel and unique, that will resolve all the problems of the Political once and for all? If the Political itself is the “temple” of the idolatrous god—the sphere within which it is worshipped and preserved—can we discard the idol and purify the temple? Does this theology offer a political philosophy of purification that will sustain the “progress” that struggle is purported to achieve? In short, how does one translate the spiritual principle of hope into a political program—apolitical theology? The problem of translation haunts this theology and the looking-forward stance of the political theologian cannot avoid the rupture between the spiritual and the Political. Can we reject this racist god and, at the same time, support the political structure that affirms this idol? Can we be “partial” atheists? This becomes a problem for Carter when he suggests that we abandon this idol but fails to critique the structure of political existence, which sustains the power of this idol. Atheism as imagined here would entail rejecting the racist-white-god, or a racist political theology, and replacing it with a just God, or an equitable political theology. Will replacing the idol with a more just God transform the Political into a life-affirming structure for blackness? Unless we advocate for a theocracy, which is not what I believe Carter would propose, we need an answer to this question of translation. The answer to this question is glaringly absent in the text, but I read this absence as an attempt to avoid the nihilistic conclusion that his argument would naturally reach. We might even suggest that one must assume a nihilistic disposition toward the Political if justice, redress, and righteousness are the aims. The problem with atheism, then, is that it relies on the Political as the sphere of redemption and hope, when the Political is part of the idolatrous structure that it seeks to dismantle. In this sense, Dr. William R. Jones becomes an aporia for Dr. Kameron Carter’s text, if we read Jones as suggesting that black theology offers no cogent political philosophy, or political program, that would successfully rid the Political of its anti-black foundation. The Political and anti-blackness are inseparable and mutually constitutive. The utopian vision of a “not-yet-social order” that purges anti-blackness from its core provides a promise without relief—its only answer to the immediacy of black suffering is to keep struggling. The logic of struggle, then, perpetuates black suffering by placing relief in an unattainable future, a future that offers nothing more than an exploitative reproduction of its own means of existence. Struggle, action, work, and labor are caught in a political metaphysics that depends on black-death. The black nihilist recognizes that relying on the Political and its grammar offers nothing more than a ruse of transformation and an exploited hope. Instead of atheism, the black nihilist would embrace political apostasy: it is the act of abandoning or renouncing a situation of unethicality and immorality— in this sense, the Political itself. The apostate is a figure that “self-excommunicates” him-/herself from a body that is contrary to its fundamental belief system. As political apostate, the black nihilist renounces the idol of anti-blackness but refuses to participate in the ruse of replacing one idol with another. The Political and God—the just and true God in Carter’s analysis— are incommensurate and inimical. This is not to suggest that we can exclude God, but that any recourse to the Political results in an immorality not in alignment with Godly principles (a performative contradiction). The project to align God with the Political (political theology) will inevitably fail. If anti-blackness is contrary to our beliefs, self-excommunication, in other words “black nihilism,” is the only position that seems consistent. We can think of political apostasy, then, as an active nihilism when an “alternative” political arrangement is impossible. When faced with the impossibility of realizing the “not-yet-social order,” political apostasy becomes an empowered hermeneutical practice; it interprets the anti-black Political symbolic as inherently wicked and rejects it both as critique and spiritual practice.

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