Embrace pragmatism – fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism are the most effective instruments to navigate both abstract theory and the political world. They’re compatible with revolutionary visions but defense misconceives pragmatism as a defense of actual pragmatists.
Jack Knight & James Johnson 11. Jack Knight is professor of political science and law at Duke University and the author of Institutions and Social Conflict. James Johnson is associate professor of political science at the University of Rochester and former editor of Perspectives on Politics. “The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism”. Princeton University Press 2011. 8/22/11. Chapter 2. 25-28. GJII
Pragmatism “narrowly conceived” is a philosophical view that consists of “a set of arguments about knowledge, meaning and truth.”1 That said, pragmatists are an unruly lot. They disagree among themselves about various philosophical and political issues.2 We are uninterested here in adjudicating these disputes. Our concern is less with policing pragmatism and its boundaries than with advancing a conception of democracy that derives considerable motivation from its pragmatist bearings but that will prove compelling whether or not one embraces pragmatism. We consequently distinguish between the general, relatively ambiguous concept of pragmatism and the particular conception of pragmatism that we endorse. In so doing, we embrace what Dewey calls “the pragmatic rule” which holds that “in order to discover the meaning of [an] idea ask for its consequences.”3 As we formulate and defend our conception of pragmatism, we are especially concerned with highlighting its consequences for thinking about political institutions in general and democratic political arrangements in particular.
Our characterization of pragmatism explicitly is reconstructive. We do not claim that this or that classical or contemporary pragmatist actually adopts a position of the sort we outline. We do, however, draw upon the resources that those classical and contemporary pragmatists offer as we formulate our own defensible pragmatist position. Our enterprise is distinctive in large part because other pragmatists either have not made the sorts of argument we advance, have derived different implications from positions we might share, or would resist the more general position that we reconstruct from particular arguments. We are, in any case, interested here less in engaging in a full-scale debate with these writers than in relying upon them, as foil or as warrant, for the conception that we reconstruct.
At the most abstract level, one might depict pragmatism as one variety of instrumentalism in that it conceives of beliefs, conceptions, theories, and so forth as tools humans use to navigate the natural and social world.4 This portrait, while perhaps accurate, is too general to be useful. In order to discern the consequences of pragmatism, we need a more fine-grained conception. Here we understand three commitments as central to pragmatism.
First, pragmatists are committed to fallibilism. 5 This commitment has two implications. It means that pragmatists recognize that even those beliefs about which we are most convinced may turn out to be false. It also means that whatever certainty we may attain requires that we actively organize experience in such a way that our beliefs are challenged.6 This requirement is not nearly so onerous as it might at first seem. In a sense, we have no other option. For pragmatists insist that the social and natural world is marked by considerable indeterminacy.7 As a result, individuals and groups necessarily will confront unforeseen contingencies that will challenge their ostensibly settled beliefs and judgments.8 Fallibilism simply requires that when faced with such problematic circumstances, we prove ready and willing to revise our beliefs should they prove mistaken or erroneous.
Second, pragmatists are committed to anti-skepticism. 9 While any of our beliefs may prove false, it is not possible for us to suppose that they all are false. As Peirce insists, “complete doubt” is impossible, a mere philosophical pretension. Peirce did, however, countenance the sort of “real and living doubt” that is generated by problems we encounter in experience and that prompts us to try to settle our beliefs. This is “real doubt” precisely insofar as we have reason to question our beliefs. For pragmatists, then, both doubt and belief must be justified.10
Finally, pragmatists are committed to consequentialism. This comes through clearly in the “pragmatic rule” just mentioned. There, Dewey distills the advice of Peirce, who urges pragmatists to “consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”11 The classical pragmatists arguably considered this advice to be general and took its relevance to the philosophical problems surrounding the concept of “truth” only as one specific instance of its broader applicability.12
Pragmatists also commonly endorse holism in the sense that they see beliefs and conceptions as forming interconnected, more or less coherent webs. This view applies to pragmatism itself. Fallibilism, anti-skepticism, and consequentialism are themselves interrelated. Start with fallibilism. It is clear that if any of even our most confidently held beliefs might be false in the pragmatist sense of being useless or self-defeating, they also must be revisable. This raises the issue of what bounds, if any, constrain our ability to question and revise our beliefs. One temptation here is thoroughgoing skepticism or relativism.13 Pragmatists resist this temptation. Instead they embrace an anti-skeptical position that limits both the nature and scope of doubt. It is plausible to see this combination of theoretical commitments as among pragmatists’ unique intellectual contributions.14
Fallibilism and anti-skepticism each sustain the pragmatist commitment to consequentialism. Pragmatists see the social and natural world as fraught with contingency. As a result, even our most fundamental beliefs inevitably will be called into question and potentially proven false. What is important is how individuals and communities respond to the resulting tensions and strains, to the real doubt that unforeseen contingencies generate. Peirce famously identified several ways of settling beliefs—the methods of tenacity and of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science. And while he himself insisted that the majority of mankind would forever resolve doubt via the method of authority, he insisted that the experimentalism central to science afforded the surest way to fix or settle belief.15 For experimentation represents the most reliable way of generating solutions to problematic situations. And we assess the results of properly conducted experiments in terms of their actual or anticipated consequences. We take this commitment to be general in the sense that it applies, for example, not just to theoretical concepts, but to public policies and to social, economic, and political institutions as well.16
This claim may seem surprising, given the propensity of some prominent contemporary pragmatists to insist regularly and loudly that pragmatist philosophical commitments have no identifiable political consequences. Indeed, something of an odd, imperfect, and ultimately uncomfortable convergence has emerged on this point.17 Richard Posner, for instance, holds that “philosophical pragmatism . . . lacks any political valence and thus is equally compatible with reactionary and revolutionary social visions.”18 Similarly, Richard Rorty intones: “Philosophy and politics are not that tightly linked. There will always be room for a lot of philosophical disagreement between people who share the same politics, and for diametrically opposed political views among philosophers of the same school. In particular, there is no reason why a fascist could not be a pragmatist in the sense of agreeing with pretty much everything Dewey said about the nature of truth, knowledge, rationality and morality.”19 In what follows, we focus on the role that interpretations of the philosophy and politics of Martin Heidegger play in sustaining what we refer to as the Posner-Rorty consensus.