They girlboss-ify the movement
---not sure if this has been put out or not yet
Cockburn 11 (Cynthia Cockburn, feminist researcher and writer and Visiting Professor in Sociology at City University London, 2011, “Snagged on the Contradiction: NATO, Resolution 1325, and Feminist Responses”, Accessed 7-19-2022, )//kpt
Contradictions in Resolution 1325
As feminist antimilitarists, as women of the Noto-NATO movement, how should we respond to the integration by NATO of Resolution 1325? After all, the instrument was universally welcomed by women. Its objectives were irrefutably sound which is, to draw attention to the impact of armed conflict specifically its impact on women. Such anticipated impact is for women to be recognised not as mere victims but as actors, capable of contributing to the ending of war and to achieving peace and redefining security. One can imagine that the United Nations Security Council might see NATO as an exemplary institution, implementing the resolution in pretty much the manner desired - and desired not only by the UN (we suppose), but by the women who drafted the Resolution and pressed the Security Council to pass it. Many of the measures NATO are introducing in Afghanistan, as described above, are in the circumstances, desirable. Given that ISAF is present in Afghanistan, we can only be glad if NATO personnel, prompted by Resolution 1325, behave respectfully towards women and try not to make their lives any worse than its current state. If Afghan women are to be searched at checkpoints, it is certainly more desirable that they should be handled by women than men. Yet, how can we who oppose NATO, who deplore its very existence and its war in Afghanistan – welcome its espousal of ‘our’ Resolution 1325? Especially when that war was legitimated by those who launched it, in part, by its potential for liberating women from fundamentalist oppression.
I would suggest that there are at least four elements in the contradiction that is now anguishing many feminist antimilitarists, not the least, ourselves in the No-to-NATO movement.
The most obvious and fundamental is the perennial ‘equality’ dilemma in feminism. At many moments in the history of the women’s movement, a divergence has surfaced between women who call for ‘equality’ and those who assert ‘difference’. Those who stress ‘equality’ believe that equal treatment of women is simple justice. Those who stress ‘difference’ believe equality is too easily interpreted as ‘equality’ with men in a men’s worsld. They call for a transformative change in gender power relations and a valorisation of women and the feminine. Yet in turn (and herein lies the contradiction), the positive assertion of difference can become an undesirable entrenchment of complementation in gender relations, trapping us in the gender dichotomy. The divergence between ‘equality’ and ‘difference’ strategies becomes seriously divisive when the equality demanded by women concerns access to roles that self-evidently enhance patriarchal, capitalist, nationalist or militarist power. Serving in the armed forces is an acutely troubling case in point.
It should be noted that Resolution 1325 does not in fact call for more women in armies. It urges, in rather careful terms, an expansion of “the role and contribution of women in United Nations fieldbased operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel.” In promoting a higher proportion of women in militaries, NATO is not actually ‘implementing 1325’. The feminisation of soldiering (at least in my interpretation), is part of NATO’s thrust to modernise and professionalise contributing national armies. It has picked up the ball of gender equality thrown into play by feminists and is running with it for its own objectives. What can we do as feminists in such a situation? We have surely to emphasise that equality is a matter of justice, and in a just and inclusive society, women should not be debarred on account of their gender from doing anything they want to do. Just as ethnic minorities should not be debarred from police force for instance. But we must simultaneously critique and seek to dismantle all the power relations that deform and subvert not only justice in employment, but also the quality of human life and relationships – including those of militarism. It’s unimaginable that the struggle for equality can be pursued, anywhere or ever, except hand in hand with an unrelenting struggle for transformative change in gender and other power relations.
The second contradiction I believe goes like this: NATO is a militarist organisation but the intention of Resolution 1325 is anti-militarist. 54 Yet its wording and provisions leave it co-optable by militarism. In fact, back in 2000 in New York, the ink was scarcely dry on the document before quite a lot of the feminist women involved were voicing self-criticism about their failure to frame the 1325 measures with a strong statement about ending militarism, militarisation and war itself. They were advised by those close to the UN system, and indeed informed by common sense, that the Security Council would not accept any insistence from the women on the resolution - a sharp critique of militarism, militarisation and the pursuit of war policies by member states. That is indeed why the women originators of the Resolution censored themselves. All the same, the UN was created to put an end to war. The Security Council’s primary responsibility, under the Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security.19 Some of the women now wondered, “should we not have called the Security Council’s bluff?”20 Four years later, Carol Cohn neatly summarised the effect of their failure to engage in struggle with the Security Council on this issue. She wrote, Protecting women in war, and insisting that they have an equal right to participate in the processes and negotiations that end particular wars, both leave war itself in place... [1325 is not] an intervention that tries either to prevent war, or to contest the legitimacy of the systems that produce war - that is, ‘to put an end to war’. In this sense, it fits comfortably into the already extant concepts and discursive practices of the Security Council, where the dominant paradigm holds a world made up of states that ‘defend’ state security through military means...Letting (some) women into decision-making positions seems a small price to pay for leaving the war system essentially undisturbed.21
The third contradiction is inherent in the several interpretations to which the word ‘security’ lends itself. Women have been at pains for a decade or more now to redefine ‘security’.22 We readily adopted the critique of military conceptions of security by those who began to speak and write of ‘human security’.23 Then, in the concept of ‘women’s security,’ we gave ‘human security’ gender specificity.24 This was, for feminists, the meaning of the word in the title of the Resolution: Women, Peace and Security. The ideal of ‘security’ can however too readily be manipulated by an organisation such as NATO, that however it 55 2012 Women in Action describes security in words, manifests it in action as meaning the militarisation of society and a readiness to fight wars.
Fourth, and finally, some of the women who were involved in the movement to achieve Resolution 1325 were self-critical afterwards on the grounds that they had failed at any point to express an explicit critique of men, masculinity and patriarchy in relation to militarism, militarisation and war. The Resolution said nothing about the male-dominant gender order in which we all live, the supremacy of men in political and military systems, the affinity of military values with hegemonic masculine values, and the overwhelming statistical preponderance of men in actual acts of violence against both men and women, whether in peace or war. As Carol Cohn puts it, to have the effect we desire as feminists, the women transnational activists in this story would have to address “the pernicious, pervasive complexities of the gender regimes that undergird not only individual wars but the entire war system.”25 (I argue that we should go further and recognise gender power relations as a predisposing, and thus causal, factor in militarisation and war.26) The fact is that, just as the UN cannot criticise the USA, capitalism and militarisation, so it is quite unable to make any critique of masculinity. Sandra Whitworth would later write in her post1325 study of UN peace keeping, “There is…no discussion within UN documents of militarism or militarised masculinities or, for that matter, of masculinities more generally” (Whitworth 2004:137). It may be beyond the bounds of reason to imagine the Security Council taking the step (albeit logical) from deploring the rape of women in war to pointing the finger at men’s perennial propensity for violence and specifically for sexual violence against women. Yet, this silence on men, masculinity and the male-dominant gender order has vitiated Resolution 1325. In the absence of a strong statement against the ‘co-production’ of hegemonic masculinity and militarism, it becomes little more than an aspiration on the one hand, to make war a bit safer for women, on the other, to alert the powers-that-be to the resource women can be in helping them do their job. The Resolution is left hostage to co-optation by militarist states and military institutions for military purposes.