Cyberspace is the new site of reterritorialization. The AFFs attempt to exert sovereignty generates the conditions for cyberwar to take place.
Lambach, 19 [Daniel Lambach is a political scientist, currently working as a Heisenberg Fellow at the Research Centre Normative Orders at Goethe Universität Frankfurt, 5-11-2019, accessed on 7-22-2022, Oxford University Press, "The Territorialization of Cyberspace*", https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/22/3/482/5488469]/ISEE
States reterritorialize the “national territory” in cyberspace. These territories are cyber-analogies to physical state territory that solidify states’ regulatory reach and undergird jurisdictional claims. This reterritorialization strategy proceeds from the normative assumption that all online activity that occurs “in” a country (because users, servers, or data are “located” there) should be treated as a part of a corresponding cyberspace territory. This belief has been strengthened by the growing popularity of geolocation technology, which makes the virtual coincide with the physical. Discourses about “cybersovereignty,” “data sovereignty,” or “digital sovereignty,” which are mainly championed by Russia and China but also find some traction in countries like France and Germany, are evidence of this belief (Drake et al. 2016, 45–48; Fliegauf 2016, 79). There are a variety of instruments available to states seeking to recreate their national territory in cyberspace. National firewalls are one of the best-known ways for governments to both communicate their territorial claim and display power within the bounded space. These firewalls combine a range of filtering mechanisms like IP blocking and keyword searches to censor discussions about sensitive topics and deny access to websites deemed subversive. The “Great Firewall of China” is the best-known example, but other countries have developed, or are developing, similar systems of censorship. North Korea is probably the most extreme example, where, until recently, users could only access the countrywide Kwangmyong intranet. Today, access to select internet sites is possible under tight restrictions and government scrutiny. Internet “kill switches” are the ultimate display of power. Being able to shut off the entire national internet, or parts thereof, in a controlled fashion and for extended periods of time demonstrates the capability of the state (DeNardis 2014, 199–221). And while this is clearly a tactic of last resort, there have been shutdowns lasting days or weeks as well as partial shutdowns targeting parts of the country or certain times of the day. The difficulty of a shutdown is determined by the network structure; the smaller the number of “choke points”—for example, Internet Service Providers and autonomous systems—the easier it is for state actors to accomplish (Roberts et al. 2011; Belson 2017). Data localization laws have also become very popular in recent years in the wake of the Snowden revelations.12 Their stated aim is to safeguard data protection for citizens and corporations, mandating “that certain types of data collected in a particular country be stored and/or processed within that country” (Bowman 2015) and regulating which companies are allowed to manage these kinds of data based on whether the corporation falls under national jurisdiction. As Baur-Ahrens points out, the routing and storage requirements of such laws require “changes to the basic functioning of the underlying Internet infrastructure” (Baur-Ahrens 2017, 37). National firewalls, kill switches, and data localization laws reinforce container notions of territorial statehood. They clearly communicate territorial boundaries and openly display state control over territory. Another way of reifying the “national” territory is through country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs), such as .ru, .cn, or .de, which symbolically connect a virtual domain to a country (Mueller and Badiei 2017), although this mostly applies to larger countries. States like Tuvalu or Tonga are marketing their ccTLDs, .tv and .to, globally without reterritorializing a “national” territory in cyberspace. Nonetheless, ccTLDs have legal repercussions: domain name registries—that is, the agencies administering ccTLDs—typically mandate through their terms and conditions that registrants of a “national” domain follow national laws. Notions of cyberwar, cyberdefense, and cyber deterrence also reterritorialize cyberspace into separate state “containers.”13 First, such discourses and strategies reify certain network nodes—for example, CIR or national assets associated with military or intelligence branches of the state (Stevens 2012, 151)—as forming an integral part of a “national territory,” any attack on which is considered grounds for retaliation. Cyberwar strategists often point out the risks that hostile cyber operations can pose for infrastructure in physical space—for example, electrical grids, financial networks, or railways—thus connecting the “national cyber-territory” with the physical state territory (Warner 2012, 795–98). Second, “cyberwar” in the narrowest sense of the term is a practice conducted by states and state proxies (Lupovici 2016, 326–27). The literature is consistent in reserving this term for hostilities between states, whereas actions by/on private actors are commonly described as “cyber attacks” or “cyber operations.” Cyberwar and the state territorial container in cyberspace are mutually constitutive. This is why national security apparatuses have proclaimed cyberspace to be the “fifth domain of warfare” (after land, sea, air, and space) (Manjikian 2010, 384–88; Dunn Cavelty 2015). As a result, many countries have expanded or are expanding their cyberdefense and cyberwarfare capabilities (Fliegauf 2016, 79; Mueller 2017, 73–77). The division of “inside” and “outside” is also important in doctrinal debates about cyberdefense. In other words, should cyberdefense be solely about protecting the “territory,” or should it also include active measures (“active defense,” “hacking back”) that reach beyond the territory and deterritorialize the site of conflict? Beyond these various instruments, there are nascent, and as yet unrealized, possibilities to make cyberspace map even closer to offline geographies by revising fundamental protocols that govern the internet's functionality (Mueller 2017, 81–84). One such proposal would be to move the domain name system (DNS), which translates domain names into the numerical format that the internet protocol uses, from a global system into a system of interconnected national domain name systems, substantially increasing the scope for control by national regulators. In the words of three leading internet experts, this would create “the mother of all fragmentations” (Drake et al. 2016, 28). Beyond this reterritorialization of cyberspace into state containers, some states, given the requisite resources and power, can also create regulatory territories, which expand the reach of a state's laws and regulations in extraterritorial ways.14 The structure of cyberspace and of internet governance makes such a differentiated approach possible, even necessary. States have great control over infrastructure localized in their country but little control over global aspects of cyberspace. However, very powerful countries like the United States or coalitions like the EU can hope to make extraterritorial claims stick. Creating regulatory territories typically rests on an expansive claim to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was and is typically assigned according to the location of a particular act or one of its constituent elements. Cyberspace has substantially complicated this line of legal reasoning because it is very easy to claim “territorial contacts and thus jurisdiction, for example, on the basis of where the server is located, where the content is viewed, where the content is uploaded, where the content is deliberately directed to, where effects are felt, etc.” (Ryngaert 2015, 63; see also Berman 2002). Absent a rule for adjudicating between jurisdiction claims, there are few legal limits on states’ claims for quasi-global regulatory territories. For instance, there is an ongoing dispute between the French Data Protection Agency (CNIL) and Google relating to the EU “Right to be Forgotten,” where the CNIL demands that Google enforce its orders to delist personal information relating to a claimant from Google's search results globally, not just for users geolocated in the EU (Daskal 2018, 214–88). This multiplicity of regulatory territories and the lack of clear rules for dispute resolution has recently sparked debates about the necessity of norms to regulate cyberspace (Svantesson 2016), especially in the fields of cyberdefense and cybersecurity (Finnemore and Hollis 2016; Schmitt 2017; Taddeo 2018). While the practical impact of these discussions has been arguably shallow, at least thus far, a norms approach is instructive for an appreciation of some deeper dynamics. Put very simply, there is an ongoing and unresolved process of norm contestation between a multistakeholder approach and a multilateral model of internet governance, much of which turns on whether extraterritorial regulatory territories are permissible. The multistakeholder approach has been the prevalent model of internet governance since the 1990s and emphasizes the inclusion of private actors in policymaking, limited influence of governments, and a decentralized architecture of the internet (Carr 2015). It is most clearly expressed by the United States and, with some variation, their Western allies. The second position is informed by ideas of cybersovereignty and argues for a more state-centric form of governance, mediated by intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (UN) or the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This position is championed by Russia and China, who believe that “multi-stakeholderism is a front for maintaining Western-centric dominance of this new ‘global commons’” (Lantis and Bloomberg 2018, 156) and does not respect national sovereignty (Aronczyk and Budnitsky 2017; Wei 2017; see also Warner 2012, 792–93; Maurer 2017, 50–67). This debate has been going on for more than two decades and has shaped institutional developments in internet governance. Notable sites of contestation include the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee since 1998 (Tikk-Ringas 2012), the 2003 and 2005 World Summits on the Information Society, and the annual, UN-endorsed Internet Governance Forum, inaugurated in 2006. In 2011, Russia, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan proposed an international code of conduct for information security to the UN General Assembly, later elaborated into a proposal to the ITU World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in 2012, that the ITU International Telecommunications Regulations treaty be amended to include the internet under its ambit. This would have given the ITU substantial authority over many aspects of internet governance. The WCIT fell apart when the two camps failed to find an agreement, prompting the United States delegates to walk out of the meeting, although some contentious issues were later resolved at the 2014 ITU Plenipotentiary Meeting. These disputes can be read as competition among “territorial projects,” with repercussions down to the level of infrastructure. The multilateralists envision a more vertically integrated internet of state territories and interstate cooperation. The multistakeholderists prefer a more open, decentralized internet, where states and private stakeholders work together. The latter position is much more comfortable with regulatory territories, whereas the former views these as encroaching on national territories (Aronczyk and Budnitsky 2017). But the opposition between these positions should not be overstated—as much as China wishes to maintain control over “its” portion of cyberspace, it is aware of the economic and commercial significance of the internet (Lantis and Bloomberg 2018, 158). This was also visible in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE). Since 2004, expert groups have discussed various security-related issues regarding information and telecommunications. And even though the 2017 meeting failed acrimoniously, it should not be forgotten that the 2013 and 2015 meetings had agreed that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to cyberspace as well (Sukumar 2017) and that the use of proxies in offensive cyberoperations should be discouraged (Maurer 2017, 5). A territorialization perspective on states in cyberspace challenges the “internet fragmentation” view of states erecting hard boundaries that will inevitably destroy the internet as we know it, although these arguments are not without merit. We do see efforts to recreate “container” notions of state territories in cyberspace, but these are in tension with “extraterritorial” regulatory spaces. In contrast to narratives of states “colonizing” the cyber-frontier (Saco 1999), the reterritorialization of state territories in cyberspace is a more complex and conflictual process and does not necessarily create “hard” boundaries.