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Offensive cyber operations are the next reinvention of state violence.

---OCC = Offensive Cyber Capabilities

Elgoff and Shires, 21 [Florian J. Egloff works for Center for Security Studies and Centre for Technology and Global Affairs, Department of Politics; International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, James Shires works for the Institute for Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University,; Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council, 10-12-2021, accessed on 7-22-2022, Cambridge Core, "The better angels of our digital nature? Offensive cyber capabilities and state violence | European Journal of International Security | Cambridge Core", https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/better-angels-of-our-digital-nature-offensive-cyber-capabilities-and-state-violence/B225F961FD2212E34FDB0B267A1CB5E6]/ISEE

The transformation and reinvention of state violence has continued into the digital age. The clearest manifestation of state violence in cyberspace is in offensive cyber capabilities: the adversarial manipulation of digital devices and networks for interstate competition and globalised repression. However, the literature on OCCs is dominated by a narrow definition of violence as bodily harm, classifying OCCs as largely non-violent. This narrow definition has both analytical and policy consequences. Analytically, it implies undue homogeneity across the wide range of strategically relevant uses of OCCs. At a policy level, it means that many harms caused by OCCs are un- or under-appreciated by states and other actors. The account provided here provides greater analytical purchase on this expanding domain, as well as stronger normative foundation for action. An expanded concept of violence, including affective and community harms, reveals how OCCs relocate state violence through new means of repression and information manipulation, without simplifying or exaggerating their complex effects. Some readers may object that expanding the definition of violence is hazardous, diluting the devastating effects violent actions have on their victims and their communities. While we recognise this danger, we aim to show that the opposite is also true. Holding on to a narrow definition of violence leads one to misconstrue the harms resulting from the use of OCCs to the detriment of their victims. Further research is required to substantiate this relocation with empirical data, including large-scale surveys of cyber conflict and extended case studies that trace the decision-making processes behind individual deployments. Further work is also needed to transfer this account of violence from states to semi- and non-state actors, as well as to examine the justifications for violent uses of OCCs in more detail. This article has three main implications for theory and policy on cyber conflict. First, the affective and community harms caused by OCCs need to be identified, anticipated, and taken seriously in decisions about their use. Second, research and policy should focus on the most violent uses of OCCs, which may not be state-sponsored cyber-espionage or sabotage, but instead the adaption of authoritarian systems to rely on digital and globalised repression and rework existing practices of information manipulation against their adversaries. Third, and most importantly, adherence to a narrow conception of violence means that many states have undertaken significant harmful actions in their own and each other's societies without recognising them as such. Our current conceptual tools hamper institutional adaptation to counter and mitigate these broader harms, such as military doctrines and capabilities, intelligence capabilities, criminal laws, police support, victim counselling, and so on. Our redrawing of the concept of violence to include affective and community harms provides defensive actors with a stronger conceptual foundation to accurately measure harms exerted via digital means and then act to prevent them. Are OCCs the better angels of our digital nature? We have argued that they are not; on an expanded concept of violence, OCCs represent not Pinkerian optimism, but a more complex relocation of state violence. The main contribution of this article is thus the application of an expanded conception of violence to better understand the impact of OCCs on individuals and societies. But the account of violence put forward here also has broader implications. Many other emerging security technologies, such as lethal autonomous weapons systems, raise similar questions about the extent and type of violence they cause, in part due to their reliance on informational as well as material means to produce harmful effects. The expansion of the concept of violence we have undertaken in this article could also be applied to other information-enabled technologies, to identify and ultimately work to ameliorate currently unseen forms of harm in global politics. Consequently, in addition to its main contribution in rethinking the violence involved in cyber conflict, our study also provides new insights into how to best conceptualise violence in international affairs more widely.

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