Centering particular identity categories strengthens capitalism and creates barriers to collective emancipation by occluding universality as a shared point of solidarity.
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Introduction: Finding Universality,” Universality and Identity Politics, Introduction, ebook, dml)
The clear argument of Capital and Marx’s other major works is that particularity or the celebration of particular identity actually strengthens capitalism and its control over one’s existence. Freedom, if it is seen and pursued as a purely particular struggle, nourishes capitalism. The more we imagine ourselves as identical to our particular identity, the more we see ourselves as isolated subjects, which is what capitalism requires. Capitalist subjects see themselves as isolated monads, and identification with one’s particularity produces this sense of isolation. It is only when freedom becomes a struggle for universal freedom that it challenges the capitalist behemoth.
Far from seeing a danger in universality, Marx believes that the real threat comes from accepting the value of one’s particular identity within the capitalist socioeconomic system. Capitalism thrives on a variety of particular identities because this variety provides for more types of commodities to be sold. In our contemporary capitalist society, the goth can buy trench coats and dark eyeliner while the jock can purchase sweatpants and jerseys. More identities lead to more commodities. Even if one’s identity isn’t tied to a particular look, variety of identity still plays into the capitalist system by providing more opportunity for the production of needs. But more important, seeing oneself as particular puts one in the capitalist mindset, where there is no universality that might change the entire structure. By believing oneself to be an isolated particular identity, one takes up the role of the perfect capitalist subject. Capitalism depends on all individuals believing themselves isolated from everyone else.
Although capitalist society talks a great deal about freedom, this freedom is actually a form of servitude for everyone, even those at the top. From top to bottom, everyone in capitalist society does what the economy demands as long as they remain trapped within the bounds of particular identity. Of course, no one can simply give up particular identity and exist as a pure universal, but it is possible to become alienated from this identity. Doing so enables one to abandon one’s libidinal investment in particular identity, an abandonment that makes participation in universal struggle a viable option. But if particular individuals fail to grasp their participation in the universal, they will continue unknowingly to play out their parts in the capitalist economy.
According to Marx, emancipatory change comes through the recognition of the universality of the proletariat, whose revolution frees not just the working class but all classes.14 As long as I fail to see my universal connection with others in capitalist society, I remain the dupe of that society. Attempts to challenge capitalism through insisting on identity can do nothing to dent capitalism’s dominance. Particular identity is what keeps one a capitalist subject.
Just as Marx conceives particular identity as a lure for oppressed subjects, so do Simone de Beauvoir and Frantz Fanon. With Beauvoir and Fanon, unlike with Marx, although we remain within the Western philosophical tradition, we leave the arena of European white guys. Their insistence on universality as the key to emancipation—a position they share with the Western philosophical tradition—reveals that this is not just the claim of those tied to their social advantages.
Beauvoir insists on demolishing the image of female otherness that is, for her, nothing but the badge of oppression. There is no question, for Beauvoir, of celebrating feminine identity as a radical alternative to patriarchy. Femininity holds no essential secret that might provide the basis for emancipation. To the contrary, it is the idea of a feminine identity that she finds oppressive. In The Second Sex, she claims, “If man fails to discover that secret essence of femininity, it is simply because it does not exist. Kept on the fringe of the world, woman cannot be objectively defined through this world, and her mystery conceals nothing but emptiness.”15 Rather than asserting an essence of femininity that society must value and protect, Beauvoir’s move here is the opposite: she wants to demolish feminine identity in order to assert women’s participation in universality. Identity is an obstacle to overcome rather than a foundation from which to base one’s politics. Clinging to particular identity cannot possibly be the source of emancipation since it clearly functions as the driving force for female subjugation.
It is so difficult to abandon feminine identity, Beauvoir recognizes, because its blandishments are almost the only symbolic support that women receive in patriarchal society. As a woman, I receive recognition for my embrace of a feminine identity and ostracism when I reject it. In this way, it becomes clear why identity has an appeal. If identity is oppressive, it nonetheless provides recognition from a social authority. But it is for this reason that identity cannot be emancipatory. Identity remains within the domain of the social authority that recognizes it and is thus dependent through and through. For Beauvoir, valuing the particular identity of the feminine is not a way of fighting sexism but the ultimate acquiescence to it. Beauvoir understands that identity is an ideological trap that the feminist must avoid.16
By giving up the feminine as an identity, the feminist simultaneously undermines the masculine as well. Masculine identity depends on its feminine counterpart that affirms it as its complementary other. Without this support, masculine identity collapses. This is why the feminist struggle against feminine identity that Beauvoir advocates is a battle against patriarchy.
Though Fanon advocates a more violent form of revolt than Beauvoir, their investment in the universality of the struggle is the same. When the colonized strike down their colonizing oppressors, according to Fanon, they do so not on behalf of their particular local identity that Europe has destroyed but in the name of a universality that Europe has abandoned through its turn to colonialism.17 The violence of European colonialism does not consist in imposing a foreign universality on the colonized people. This is the fabrication that the colonialists themselves repeatedly broadcast with their claims of bringing culture to the unenlightened. The violence lies instead in the subjugation of the colonized beneath the foot of the European particular. Colonialism does not involve European universality because universality cannot be parochial in the way that the European colonial project was.
As Fanon sees it, to abandon universality is to fall into the same trap that ensnares Europe itself. The colonized must not follow Europe down the path of retreating from universality into the promulgation of a particular identity. To abandon universality for particular identity is to commit the sin of Europe, though ironically today many criticize universality as a vestige of Eurocentrism. The fight against colonialism is a fight to recognize the universal equality and freedom that colonialism renders invisible. It is not a fight to preserve the particularity of local culture that European colonialism wiped out.
Localism, despite its obvious appeal, is always a reactionary phenomenon. Even if it drives out colonizers, it will replace them with an oppressive regime that will not offer opportunity for the distance from particularity that the universal provides. It is only the move to universality, Fanon recognizes, that opens up a genuine alternative to colonialist oppression. Localism is another form of what it struggles against.
Through Beauvoir and Fanon, the emancipatory project that begins with modernity continues its universalist form. For them as for Kant and Marx, if emancipation isn’t universal in scope, it isn’t really emancipation. Emancipation has its basis in universality and forges singularity through this universality. There can be no equality or freedom for certain identities while others exist outside of equality and freedom. Without an appeal to universals, we lose touch with the emancipatory project altogether.
Universality, in contrast to identity, cannot but be emancipatory. Though there are innumerable cases when an oppressive external force imposes itself on subjects in a holistic fashion, this imposition does not involve universality. No external force can impose universality because no one has the universal to impose. It is not possessable. The universal is what the ruling order doesn’t have, not what it does have. In this way, it is always on the side of those fighting on behalf of freedom and equality because they are what is missing, not what is manifested.
Due to its status as an absence that can never become fully present, the embrace of universality represents a challenge because it entails an acceptance of our necessary alienation. The proponents of the universal cannot identify themselves directly with the universal but can only recognize the distance that separates them from it. No subject can be a universal subject, though the universal is the source of the subject’s singularity. We retreat from universality because it deprives us of the consolations of identity. But it is only by giving up the consolations of identity that we can discover our freedom.
PARTICULAR ENTITIES
Since the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists of emancipation have taken refuge in local particular identity as they seek an alternative to the totalizing dangers of fascism, Stalinism, and global capitalism. Universality, which was for earlier thinkers integral to the emancipatory project, becomes the primary feature of oppression.18 Rather than freeing subjects from their ideological particularity, universality comes itself to be seen as an ideology that allows no quarter for difference or otherness. Fascism, Stalinism, and global capitalism all appear to operate through the imposition of their universality on oppressed particulars. The insistence on particular identity appears as the only viable response.
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction provides one prominent instance (among many) of this turn to the particular and allergy to the supposed violence of the universal. Through the practice of deconstruction, Derrida undermines the pretensions to universality lurking in Western metaphysics. The deconstruction of the metaphysical tradition is an attempt to reveal the particular origins of its purported universality. As Derrida sees it, deconstruction liberates us from the tyranny of the universal by highlighting its failure to be really universal—its reliance on the denial of its particularity.
Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in the essay “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” which figures the deconstruction of universality as a fight against its inherent racism. Here, Derrida uncovers the mythological origin of the supposed universality of reason. He notes, “Metaphysics—the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West; the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason.”19 Derrida is very clear here: the universal is nothing but the substitution of one’s own particular mythology for a structure that applies to all. Universality is the disguised violence of an inflated particularity. Combatting this violence, for Derrida, is not just a matter of directly asserting particulars. It involves instead revealing how the universal deconstructs itself, how its universality points toward a spectral particularity that it never directly articulates.
It is difficult to overstate the extent of the reversal that takes place when universality comes to seem oppressive and particularity comes to seem liberatory. Neither Kant, Beauvoir, nor Fanon would have believed that such a reversal could even be possible. They would be collectively rubbing their eyes today, sure that their vision had been magically inverted. To claim that our particular identity is the site of liberation is to give up on the possibility that emancipation might occur for everyone—and that it must occur for everyone if it is to truly be emancipation. Affirming particular identity as the site for emancipation not only reverses the historical alignment of emancipation with universality but places an unnecessary barrier in the way of collective political action. In a world that insists on particular identity as emancipatory, it is always difficult to get people to see the commonality of their struggles.
But the great setback is that universality, which is necessarily emancipatory, begins to appear oppressive. If freedom and equality cannot be universal, they fall apart as values. When confined to a select group, they necessarily imply unfreedom and inequality for those outside the group. There can be no freedom and equality for some while others remain unfree and unequal. In this sense, the turn from universality to identity betrays freedom and equality. Universality is an integral part of these values. For this reason, the political reversal that they have undergone is a catastrophe. The theoretical attempt to avoid colluding with totalitarianism has created a situation in which we have lost the thread of universal emancipation.