Err neg on mutual exclusivity—there’s no defense of the particular tha doesn’t also apply to the universal.
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Our Particular Age,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 1, ebook)
One of the most politically debilitating errors of recent thought is the contention that one must construct the universal out of particulars. According to this position, particulars are given, while we derive universals from the act of bringing a series of particulars together. This epistemological turn is politically debilitating precisely because it occurs on the Left rather than on the Right—its natural home. In contemporary politics, the Left retreats to the terrain of the particular, which is the Right’s terrain.
This position is fully visible in the contributions from Ernesto Laclau and Judith Butler to the collection Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. In different ways, Laclau and Butler voice their discomfort with universality. 26 This discomfort reveals that they each see the particular as an ontological given and the universal as what we arrive at through engagement with multiple particulars. They are, to put it in the terms from above, disciples of Aristotle rather than Plato.
This position is not unique to Laclau and Butler among the Left. They are representative figures that give voice to what has become the leftist doxa. Laclau claims, for instance, “The ‘universal’ is never an independent entity, but only the set of ‘names’ corresponding to an always infinite and reversible relation between particularities.”27 Here, Laclau advances a nominalist philosophy that assumes that particulars exist and that universals do not. By reducing the universal to a name or set of names that indicates how particulars relate to each other, Laclau eliminates the universal’s epistemological priority, which is the foundation for any sustainable claim to collective responsibility. If the only bond between others and myself is our tenuous relationship, then I am justified in concerning myself with their interests only insofar as I can reconcile them with my own. Or at least my commitment to the collective is less clear than if one assumes that universals exist.
Butler does not go as far as Laclau down this path, but she nonetheless enacts an epistemological displacement of the universal. Butler contends that we construct the universal through the act of negotiating between competing particulars. If we don’t do this, she fears, we risk falling into what she calls a colonial logic. Butler states, “Without translation, the only way the assertion of universality can cross a border is through a colonial and expansionist logic.”28 Butler sees translation of the universal from particular culture to particular culture as the only way of avoiding falling into the trap of the universal’s dominance, which is, in her eyes, politically undesirable. From this perspective, the universal represents a constant danger that we must guard against. But it is such a danger only when one takes particularity as the starting point.
Although the idea of beginning with particulars and focusing on our concern for the particular sounds emancipatory to our contemporary ears, it does so only because our hearing has become so [damaged] impaired by the blaring critique of universalizing, which has been turned up to eleven. If we presuppose that we begin as particulars and that the universal only arrives through the accumulation of particulars, then any values that we might try to establish will inevitably seem like a violent imposition. The attempt to defend universal values from the perspective of the priority of the particular is an effort doomed before it commences. Viable values depend on the priority of the universal.
What results from the priority of the particular is a world in which one critiques instances of particular oppression without any ability to articulate what values this oppression violates. We know that particular instances of oppression are bad, but we have lost touch with why. This is because we have lost touch with the universal. It is only universality that gives us a reason to fight collectively against the wrongs of an oppressive situation.
One of the great achievements of the civil rights movement in the United States was its insistence on the universality of its struggle. Lack of equality for black individuals stood for lack of equality as such. Marches for voting rights made it clear that securing black voting rights meant securing everyone’s freedom. The particular struggle always had a universal backdrop to it, just like the Algerians’ fight against the French or the Viet Cong’s war against the United States. In each case, the emancipation of some holds within it universal emancipation.
Today, we are far removed from this political situation. Now, there is outcry about the treatment of immigrants, lack of acceptance of the transgendered, the ongoing environmental catastrophe, or institutional violence toward black individuals, but there is no universal ground for the outcry or tie that binds all together in a possible mobilization. Instead, the instances of oppression exist in a purely particular fashion. One enumerates the situation of immigrants, the transgendered, people of color, the working class, and so on, while always leaving room for the addition of another particular to the group. The problem with this serial approach to instances of oppression is not that one is always in danger of forgetting one item in the group but that the list of particulars never adds up to a universal.
The grouping approach to instances of oppression represents an indirect refusal of universality. It is the necessary expression of liberalism that derives from the ruling particularist epistemology. The ideological violence of this operation is the violence that derives from the abdication of universality. Whereas Butler identifies ideological violence with the imperial imposition of the universal, there is a much more brutal kind of violence in our inability to refer to it. Stuck in the existence of a group of particulars without recourse to the universal, the individual endures the violence of constantly recognizing itself in isolation. Without the emancipatory universal, the individual devolves into the perfect cog in the capitalist machine—taking itself as an isolated particular while performing the systematic role that capitalism demands. The bond of the group of particulars is only contingent and fleeting, never emancipatory.
For the conservative or the liberal, the collective is always on the verge of collapsing. This is because the universal that holds it together—a collective link always requires a universal—is constructed rather than constitutive. As a result, conservatives constantly try to secure it through appeals to national or ethnic identity that would create collectivity through exclusion. Conservative politics has its basis in the opposition between friend and enemy because this is the only way for the conservative to secure a collective bond. Liberals suffer from the same tenuousness but avoid the divisiveness that conservatives use. Instead, liberals advocate forging the connection through difference. For them, the negotiation of differences can be the source of our bond.
For the leftist or the proponent of emancipation, the situation is altogether different. Universality is the condition of possibility for particulars. It plays a constitutive role relative to its particulars. As a result, the collective link established through the universal forms an indissoluble connection. The universal is not a foreign outsider but an intimate point at which each particular finds itself lacking. Through this lack, the universal holds the series of particulars together even when they themselves do not register the connection.