Ks of universal politics have it backwards—particularity is historically brutal.
McGowan, 20—professor of film studies at the University of Vermont (Todd, “Universal Villains,” Universality and Identity Politics, Chapter 3, ebook)
One could even go so far as to say that the interpretation of the political catastrophes of the twentieth century was itself another catastrophe. It produced fewer victims, to be sure, but the damage to political thought that it left behind was long-lasting. Rather than seeing Nazism and Stalinism as particular crimes stemming from an abandonment or distortion of universality, the common interpretations of these phenomena characterized them as instances of the universal’s inhuman barbarism. These were not crimes of the universal, but this is how most interpreters saw them. Interpreters thus missed that these were either crimes of particularity (in the case of Nazism) or crimes of a deviation from the universal (in the case of Stalinism). The deleterious effect of the predominant interpretation reverberates through the theorization of politics up to the present. We continue to exist in the wake of the fundamental misinterpretation of the horrors of the twentieth century.
Theodor Adorno is perhaps the exemplary figure of this widespread misinterpretation. Adorno contends that the eradication of difference is Nazism’s primary crime. (He doesn’t talk at length about Stalinism but focuses exponentially more of his theoretical energy on Nazism.) His analysis of Nazism links its eradication of difference in the figure of the Jew to the history of universalizing German philosophy. While Adorno locates his own thought in the dialectical tradition of Hegel and Marx, he also sees Hegel’s universalism as guilty for preparing the way for Nazism’s annihilation of the particular. 1 Excessive universality is not just the Nazi sin, but also that of the entire tradition of Western thought beginning with Homer.
Adorno’s critique of universalism—especially Hegel’s— reaches its high point toward the end of his life when he writes Negative Dialectics. Here, he attempts to defend the nonidentity of the particular against the onslaught of universality that reduces all particular difference to sameness. In an exemplary passage from this work, he writes, “Hegel’s transposition of the particular into particularity follows the practice of a society that tolerates the particular only as a category, a form of the supremacy of the universal.”2 Philosophies such as Hegel’s err when they reduce particular difference to nothing but a part of a universal system. Although Hegel is not to blame for the rise of Nazism, a philosophy that ceaselessly champions the “supremacy of the universal” and that has no concern for the particular not under the sway of the universal offers a paradigm for mass annihilation.3 According to this view, it is a small step from Hegel’s supremacy of the universal to Nazism’s Aryan supremacy. 4 Adorno insists on proclaiming the irreducibility of particular difference because it provides a way to respond to what he perceives as the universal violence of Auschwitz.5 He argues that ethics after Auschwitz must focus on particular difference rather than universality. If universality is to blame for Auschwitz, then we must call universality into question.
This type of theoretical judgment about Nazism as an exaggerated universalism makes strange bedfellows, which testifies to its ubiquity. It is not just one group of thinkers that makes this judgment but thinkers from vastly different camps—conservatives and leftists, anarchists and Marxists, parliamentary democrats and revolutionaries. This shared verdict on Nazism brings otherwise alien thinkers into proximity with each other through its production of near unanimity across the political spectrum. One cannot imagine Hannah Arendt, Gilles Deleuze, Leo Strauss, Michel Foucault, Karl Popper, and Theodor Adorno agreeing on anything at all. But they are united in their verdict on Nazism and Stalinism. They all see Nazism and Stalinism as the result of as excessive investment in the universal.
By imagining that Nazism and Stalinism represent universal crimes or crimes of the universal, theorists slander universality and transform it into a political sin to be avoided. This is where we still stand today. In the aftermath of this theoretical distortion, emancipatory politics becomes the assertion of particular identity rather than the striving for universality—which means that emancipatory politics ceases to be emancipatory politics, because emancipation depends on the universal. This misstep results in the Left paradoxically fighting on the turf of the Right, since conservatism is essentially the propagation of particular identity against what it sees as the danger of the universal. When we lament the ease with which right-wing populism wins adherents today, it is this slanted turf that we are lamenting.
Furthermore, the misinterpretation of Nazism and Stalinism as crimes of the universal has the effect of depoliticizing them. Once they become instances of universalist overreach, the sensible response turns out to be an ethical rather than a political one: one must respect particular difference. We must take refuge in the ethical treatment of the other in order to avoid political violence toward this other. 6 To a large extent, the prosecution of this ethical demand replaces politics.7 The ethics that replaces politics is not a Kantian ethic that foregrounds its universality but one that sees universality as the ethical problem that it demands we avoid by respecting particular difference.
But the ethical call to respect particular difference seems especially misguided when we take a closer look at the politics of Nazism and Stalinism. Of course, neither Nazism nor Stalinism was guilty of exhibiting too much respect for particular difference. But that said, Nazism perpetuated mass murder on the basis of an ontology of particular difference, and Stalinism did so by conceiving of a particularized version of universality that tried to liquidate the enemy that blocked its realization.
In this sense, the violence of Nazism and Stalinism is distinct. One cannot reasonably blend the two together under a single label, such as totalitarianism. But they do both partake in a betrayal of the universal.8 In contrast to how theorists of the twentieth century treated them, they were political rather than ethical horrors, horrors that arose directly from the turn away from universalist politics. The misinterpretation of these movements has undermined the possibility for universality. The theoretical legacy of the response to Nazism and Stalinism is an ethical turn that leaves us politically [ruined] crippled.9