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China wants cyber diplomacy to maintain interdependence with the West

Nikolay Bozhkov March 2020 [China’s Cyber Diplomacy: A Primer, https://eucd.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/eucd/assets/-GXl50Cl/bozhkov-digital-dialogue-final.pdf] //DamienHS WAgustin

In absolute terms, the People's Republic of China is the European Union's largest trading partner. China is its most significant source of imports and second-largest export market. The EU is second only to the United States as China's top trade partner.207 In the framework of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation signed in 2013 - the strategy that guides comprehensive bilateral cooperation - the EU and China agreed to establish strategic partnership across a wide range of issues, including sustainable development, economic prosperity, global governance, foreign policy, security and peace.208 In 2017, China and Europol reached an agreement known as the "Europol-China Strategic Cooperation Framework" to increase law enforcement cooperation directed at combating transnational crime. The 2016 Joint Communication on "Elements for a new EU strategy on China", adopted by the High Representative, the European Commission209 and the EU Council's Strategy on China210 further clarified EU priorities vis-à-vis China. In line with the EU's overarching engagement strategy, it put special attention on human rights, the rule of law, social-economic issues, trade and investment and market access. The EU has repeatedly highlighted the need to curb industrial cyber espionage by intensifying cooperation with China on reforming the country's "protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights"211 through mechanisms such as the Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Protection212 and the EU-China Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation on IPR for 2018-2020.213 Underscoring the importance of intellectual property rights protection in Europe, and building on synergies with Japan and the USTR Section 301 Report, the EU has also launched a case at the WTO against China's "unfair [and forced] technology transfers" and discriminatory treatment of foreign companies.214 5.2 China's engagement with the EU and EU member states The landmark 2015 Xi-Obama industrial cyber espionage agreement has served as a template for EU member states' cyber-related bilateral partnerships with China. Both the United Kingdom (2016)215 and Germany (2015)216 have convinced China to formally adopt a norm against cyber espionage in bilateral accords, commit to hold a regular dialogue on pertinent cyber issues and cooperate in the fields of incident mitigation, CERTs assistance, cybercrime and CBMs. European member states' diplomatic approach to China has therefore been more functional and in pursuit of concrete practical outcomes of benefit for both sides. From EU countries' vantage point, this type of functional cooperation with China is necessary as it transcends unsurmountable differences between the two sides' normative preferences, threat perceptions and security interests. For decades, Sino-European Union relations have been characterised by consistently growing economic and cultural ties. Accommodating China's economic rise and appetite to shape international order has given rise to greater technological interdependence in tandem with tremendous new normative, security and political challenges. China's growing assertiveness - particularly its growing political reach in Europe, which is often perceived as a lever to undermine the cohesion of the Union - has eventually compelled the EU to fundamentally redefine its China strategy from an accommodation-based engagement policy towards one of balancing and "managed interdependence" in key strategic sectors and supply chains, with an emphasis on ensuring market reciprocity.217 2019 saw the European Union chart a new bolder course vis-à-vis China. In March 2019, weeks before the 21st EU-China Summit, and coming after recommendations made by the Federation of German Industries and other European actors (member states, other industry federations, etc.) earlier that year,218 the European Commission published an official document ("EU-China - A strategic outlook") describing a new "EU policy shift towards a more realistic, assertive, and multi-faceted approach" to dealing with China.219 The EU asserts that despite China being a cooperation and negotiating "partner" with which the EU needs to (re)align objectives and strike a "balance of interests", the PRC has increasingly become a "systemic rival" and an "economic competitor" that leverages economic investment to achieve geopolitical gains, energetically pursues global "technological leadership" and seeks to export norms and forms of governance at odds with neoliberalism. Furthermore, the profoundly intertwined role of the CCP in China's economy and the opaque and highly blended divisions between the public and private spheres and the military have made Chinese technology a security risk for the EU in the "short to mid-term". Overall, the EU's more critical stance before the 2019 summit has helped secure several concessions from the Chinese side. Concerning EU-China cooperation in cyberspace, the two sides will continue working towards implementing norms of responsible state behaviour under the EU-China Cyber Task Force framework and within parallel UN processes. While affirming that "there should be no forced technology transfers", the two sides also committed themselves to enhancing resilience against malicious cyber activities, including against cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. The two sides also committed to a concrete timeline to conclude the "EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement", for which "decisive progress" from the Chinese side - i.e. substantial market-opening reforms directed at ensuring a level playing field - will be required in 2019.225 Furthermore, China and the EU are to cooperate on reforming the WTO, though this will be conditional on China reforming the discriminatory effects of industrial state subsidies and other related issues.

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