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Heavier sanctions now deter Russia from further attack AND other deter China from initiating attack in the future

Hufbauer 22 [PIIE, 3-16-2022, "How effective are sanctions against Russia?," https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/how-effective-are-sanctions-against-russia, smarx, HHW]

Sanctions against Russia for invading Ukraine are the most comprehensive imposed against a major power since the Second World War. But are they effective? They plainly have not deterred Russia from making war. But answering that question in a comprehensive way requires the distinction among four stages of effectiveness, including whether they prevent something bad from happening. The classic objectives of economic sanctions can be grouped similarly to the objectives of criminal justice: do they deter bad behavior, but also can they be enforced, are their punishments effective, and do they lead to changed behavior by the targeted countries? Deterrence, enforcement, punishment, and rehabilitation are classic objectives of criminal justice, and they apply equally to economic sanctions.

Although deterrence clearly failed to stop Russia's aggression, the sanctions imposed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine could still deter other countries like China from undermining the sanctions. The sanctions may also deter China from carrying out its own aggressive acts against Taiwan. As for effectiveness, the sanctions have proven among the most powerful in modern history, largely because so many countries have gone along with them. The punishment to the Russian economy, and to rich and poor Russians individually, has also been extraordinarily severe. But nearly three weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine, there is not the slightest evidence that Moscow will change course and "rehabilitate" itself in the eyes of the West.

FIRST STAGE: DETERRENCE

As Sun Tzu declared 2,500 years ago, "The greatest victory is that which requires no battle." Deterrence through threatened sanctions is a modern application of the general's wisdom, and the first stage of effectiveness. On December 7, 2021, well before Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic (carved out of Ukrainian territory on February 21, 2022), President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. threatened "high impact" sanctions but did not make a public commitment by disclosing specifics. Unfortunately, Western threats failed to convey the extent and certainty of sanctions awaiting the Russian invasion.

Many experts argue that if President Biden and European leaders had declared in advance, in public, and in detail the path-breaking sanctions now imposed on Russia, Putin might have reconsidered. But advance threats from Washington and European capitals were ambiguous and deterrence failed, perhaps because Putin grossly underestimated not only Ukrainian opposition but also the worldwide condemnation and punishment evoked by the invasion. The size, speed, and sweep of existing sanctions—supported not only by the United States but also by the entire European Union and several Asian allies—are exceptional. It is entirely possible that Putin was unreceptive to Western threats leading up to the invasion because unified and damaging sanctions against Russia have little historical precedence.

Moreover, except for canceling the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia, Western economic sanctions, including the freezing of Russian central bank assets, have exempted sales of fossil fuels. Crude petroleum, refined petroleum, and petroleum gas constitute roughly 35 percent of Russian exports, while all fuels and minerals make up 59 percent of exports. Putin clearly believed that his economy could easily weather the fallout from his war and that Europe would not risk cutting off Russian gas and oil supplies. Perhaps threatening to hit Russia where it would really hurt—by sanctioning exports of fossil fuels—would have made an effective deterrent. But Europe's energy shortages at the height of winter made an embargo politically impossible.

Despite their failure in deterring the invasion, current sanctions may serve future deterrence: Putin might, for example, desist from threatening Moldova, Finland, and Sweden (not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) in his quest for a grander Russian empire. As well, Beijing might draw a sobering lesson from the worldwide condemnation of Russia and reconsider military plans for eventual unification with Taiwan. China is more integrated with the world economy than Russia: Two-way Chinese trade was 36 percent of GDP in 2019 while two-way Russian trade, excluding oil and gas exports, was 25 percent.[1] The prospect of Russia-style sanctions on China would entail a drastic fall in living standards.

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