The counterplan solves the aff, enforces international follow on, and restores BWC legitimacy, which is key to stop bioterrorism.
Braden Leach, 10-1-2021, [(Braden Leach is a J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law) "Necessary Measures: Synthetic Biology & the Biological Weapons Convention.: EBSCOhost," Stanford Technology Law Review, p. 149-153, https://web-s-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=e0a84552-8940-48f8-a876-84dc3c0e78c8%40redis]//MaizeDS
The obligations created under the BWC are broad, prophylactic, and forward-looking.
B. The Biological Weapons Act Of 1989
Congress gave the BWC domestic effect in 1989 when it passed the Biological Weapons Act.52 The statute had two principal purposes: (1) “to implement the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, an international agreement unanimously ratified by the United States Senate in 1974 and signed by more than 100 other nations, including the Soviet Union”; and (2) to “protect the United States against the threat of biological terrorism.”53 To further the latter purpose, the law imposed criminal sanctions for developing bioweapons,54 allowed the government to seize bioweapons,55 and provided a cause of action for the U.S. to seek injunctions against violators.56 C. Security Council Resolution 1540 In 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540 to strengthen international efforts to combat the development of biological weapons.57 As the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, this Resolution is binding international law. Resolution 1540 strengthened several points in the BWC by providing: (1) an explicit focus on nonstate actors; (2) applicability to states not parties to the BWC; (3) more specific measures states must take to prevent bioterrorism, including measures regarding security, physical protection, and border and export controls; and (4) very limited verification and enforcement.58 The Security Council decided, that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.59 In my estimate, the U.S. is currently in compliance with this Resolution with respect to biological weapons because it adopted the Biological Weapons Act.60 This statute “prohibited” biological weapon-related activities, imposed harsh criminal penalties for violations, and specifically focused on terrorism.61 However, the story is not the same for the BWC. In addition to mandating that states “prohibit” bioweapons and related activities like Resolution 1540 does, the BWC also mandates that states “take any necessary measures . . . to prevent” bioweapon development and use.62
III. THE UNITED STATES IS VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW
The United States is in violation of the BWC because of its failure to meaningfully regulate synthetic biology.63 First, I will demonstrate that the broad definition of biological weapons in the Convention encompasses the nefarious applications of synthetic biology. Next, I will argue that Article IV mandates that states regulate non-state actors. Finally, I will endeavor to show that the U.S. is violating the BWC because it is not taking “necessary measures” to “prevent” synthetic biology from being used to create biological weapons. According to the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, a treaty is to be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”64 In Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court provided that “[t]he interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”65 Synthetic Biology is Encompassed The broad language of the BWC encompasses synthetic biology used for nefarious purposes. Article I defines biological weapons as “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes . . .”66 DNA is surely a “biological agent[],” and the phrase, “whatever their origin or method of production” ensures that man-made DNA is no exception.67 Applications of synthetic biology justified by prosocial purposes are clearly not forbidden, while malevolent applications are.68 The BWC purposefully used spacious language to encompass all biological entities that could be weaponized.69 Article VI, which establishes five-year reviews to “take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention,” ensures that that the meaning of a biological weapon was not fixed at the time of the Convention.70 The definition was meant to evolve to encompass future threats. Professor Sutton notes that at the time of the Convention, the parties understood they were in the middle of a biotechnology revolution, and that “there was a clear need to meet every five years to assess any new technologies that were relevant to the treaty.”71 Indeed, the Final Report of the Experts at the BWC Seventh Review Conference in 2014 explicitly determined that synthetic biology was encompassed by the Article I definition.72 In doing so, the Seventh Review Conference reaffirmed that “Article I applies to all scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention.”7 Mandatory Duty and Non-State Actors Article IV extends to states a mandatory duty to regulate non-state actors to prevent bioweapon development. Article IV provides that: Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.74 First, the command “shall” clearly imposes a mandatory duty. Second, the “territory, jurisdiction, or control” language applies this duty to non-state actors. This language was not in the Geneva protocol, which explicitly only applied to states.75 In addition, Article I already prohibits states from developing bioweapons, so if this phrase is to have any meaning, it must refer to non-state actors.76 C. Necessary Measures to Prevent We now move to the phrase “take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent.”77 While this is undoubtedly forceful language, it is also quite general. However, a plain reading suggests that it compels energetic state action to prevent the development of bioweapons within its jurisdiction. Such a reading is bolstered by the BWC’s purpose. The BWC’s preamble expressly states that its purpose is “to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons” through “effective measures,” “[c]onvinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk.”78 Accordingly, states must take their obligation under the BWC quite seriously.79 To be clear, I am not suggesting that the BWC mandates state parties to take every conceivable measure to prevent bioweapon development; that would be wasteful and impossible. This provision is more straightforwardly read as requiring states to take reasonable, necessary measures. The crux of my argument is that the United States is in violation of the BWC because it is failing to take necessary measures to prevent synthetic biology from being weaponized. The United States currently employs two main measures toward compliance with the BWC. First, the Biological Weapons Act criminalizes bioweapon activities, which include the malicious manipulation of synthetic biology. 80 Second, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Department of Agriculture (USDA) screen biological product orders for “select agents” that pose severe threats. 81 However, this screening does not extend to synthetic DNA orders. These measures are deeply insufficient to meet the treaty’s obligations given the rapid democratization of synthetic biology and the threats it poses.