Russia says yes
Geoff Van Epps 13 Geoff Van Epps is a lieutenant colonel in the US Army. This article is based on research he conducted while serving as a Senior Fellow at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, from 2012-2013. [Common Ground: U.S. and NATO Engagement with Russia in the Cyber Domain, https://www.proquest.com/docview/1501475931/fulltext/E74DB63D289B45DFPQ/1?accountid=14667] //DamienHS WAgustin
An Agenda for NATO-Russian Cooperation Absent any ongoing cooperation between NATO and Russia, a virtually blank slate exists for developing NATO's agenda to finally begin to engage Russia in the cyber domain - and NATO must acknowledge that such engagement is imperative going forward. While the NATO Policy on Cyber Defense acknowledges that NATO will "tailor its international engagement based on shared values and common approaches,"147 and a recent NATO study called international partners "essential actors of NATO's cyber defense" with whom NATO should "develop bilateral arrangements ... focusing on infor- mation-sharing, exchange of best practices, and judicial agreements," Alliance gridlock has prevented NATO from even initiating a relationship with Russia on issues of mutual concern.148 As a consequence, NATO members with favorable bilateral relations with the Russian Federation are bypassing NATO to work directly with Russia on cybersecurity and other topics, which neutralizes the collective influence of NATO and plays toward the Russian strategic goal of marginalizing NATO wherever possible.149 Rather than sitting on the sidelines as the cyber domain is evolving around it, NATO has the opportunity and the need now to match its actions to its rhetoric by accepting Russian overtures to cooperate on cybersecurity. It should build internal consensus on engaging Russia with relatively low-cost, low-risk measures where both sides can easily find agreement as first steps toward an eventually more substantial partnership that tackles the thornier problems where the two sides have fundamental differences. Specifically, NATO should seek to cooperate with Russia to accomplish the following goals. Add a Cybersecurity Working Group to the NATO-Russia Council. Ideally, this arrangement would establish a stand-alone working group on par with working groups covering topics like missile defense, logistics, or terrorism. If that were to provide too broad of a mandate for the Alliance partners to agree to, it could be formed as a subgroup underneath the Science for Peace and Security Committee with a much narrower and more technical purview. In any case, forming a working group at the NRC would signal the intention to work seriously with Russia on cybersecurity and would provide an organizational venue for doing so.150 Partner Computer Emergency Response Teams. Regardless of the level of trust between NATO and the Russian Federation, having contacts established between the technical experts who have the ability to respond in the event of a crisis is invaluable.151 NATO should collectively adopt the pragmatic stance of some of its member states and begin a series of limited, technically-oriented exchanges between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability Technical Center and the Russian CERT in order to exchange technical information and determine how best to communicate during a crisis. Share Cyber Intel. Because cyberspace is constantly evolving and the nefarious actors who operate within it are continually adapting, maintaining up-to-date information on cyber threats is an endless challenge. Likewise, sharing intelligence across NATO can be a sensitive and difficult process, so any proposal for trading secrets with Russia might on the surface seem dubious - except that during an April 2013 visit to Moscow, NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow proposed the creation of two centers to allow Russia and NATO to share intelligence, conduct joint planning, and coordinate operations on missile defense.152 While a final agreement on establishing these centers is nowhere near, missile defense has been as much of a source of friction between the U.S., NATO, and Russia as cybersecurity, so the proposed facilities provide a template for a cyber threat information clearinghouse as another space for NATO and Russia to cooperate. Such a clearinghouse could start small and work initially on shared analysis of excellent but unclassified data from commercial cybersecurity firms and, as trust is built, graduate to more sensitive and classified intelligence products.153 Develop Confidence-Building Measures. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is nearing completion of a set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) intended to prevent misunderstandings and avert international conflicts among its fifty-seven member countries.154 Although the publicly available draft of the measures reveals them to be voluntary and not particularly robust,155 the agreement, once finalized, will be important for having started a conversation on cybersecurity among over a quarter of the world's nation-states and in facilitating the exchange of cybersecurity terminology, doctrine, and contacts among the members. NATO should build on the OSCE agenda to pursue a more detailed and more ambitious set of CBMs with Russia, including joint early-warning mechanisms, exchanges of technical cybersecurity recommendations, and improvement of cyber crisis communication channels.156 Given that all twenty-eight NATO countries and Russia are part of the OSCE, achieving consensus on confidence-building measures at the NRC should be attainable, and it would go a long way to addressing Russia's almost paralyzing fears of being blamed for a cyber incident in which it legitimately played no role.157 And since NATO and Russia have a long track record of devising CBMs related to nuclear weapons, adapting those existing procedures and processes to cybersecurity would appear eminently achievable.