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That was because the definition of “the” did violence to common sense

Supreme Court of Kentucky 6. “Matheney v. Commonwealth”; 2002-SC-0920-MR; March 23, 2006; Lexis //BY

In , this Court held that the version of  then in effect required possession of all the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. Essentially, this Court found that the statute's use of the word [**5]  "the" meant that a person could be convicted under  of the statute only for possession of all the chemicals or equipment (as opposed to "any" or "some" of the chemicals or equipment) for the manufacture of methamphetamine. The Kotila majority based this conclusion on grammatical construction and subsequent statutory enactments by the General Assembly. While attempting to discern the General Assembly's intent by analyzing subsequent legislation, the majority opinion conceded that the precise intent of the General Assembly was ambiguous.

The majority also rejected the applicability of criminal attempt under  unless all the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine were present. Justice Keller concurred in the Court's opinion relating to . However, he believed  [*603]  that  applied to "defendants who intend to manufacture methamphetamine and who undertake 'substantial steps' towards manufacturing methamphetamine by knowingly accumulating materials necessary to do so, but who are apprehended before they can complete the  Manufacturing Methamphetamine offense by knowingly possessing all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine."  (Keller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Chief Justice Lambert authored a dissent, which was joined by Justice Wintersheimer. Chief Justice Lambert argued that if the General Assembly had intended the statute to be construed as the majority did, "it would surely have used the word 'all' rather than the more general 'the.'"  (Lambert, C.J., dissenting). One member of the Kotila majority has subsequently admitted that he "was seduced by a metaphysical infatuation which led to an absurdity" and concluded that Kotila "does violence to the concept of common sense."  (, dissenting).

In Fulcher, despite the fact that the defendant possessed a plethora of equipment and chemicals to make methamphetamine, the Court held that since there was no evidence of sodium metal or lithium, the defendant did not possess all the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. In addition, since there were no mixing bowls, stirring devices or pliers, the defendant also failed to possess all the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.

This Court has struggled with the effects of Kotila from day one. This is clear from the fact that the bright line rule of Kotila survived for only about six months. In , this Court upheld a conviction under  where all the chemicals except anhydrous ammonia and all the equipment except for a filter were present. The Court held that "the odor of anhydrous ammonia" and a "filter of unspecified nature and a dust filter mask" were sufficient evidence to satisfy Kotila. . Chief Justice Lambert remarked that the holding in Varble represented "a significant departure from the bright line rule announced in Kotila."  (Lambert, C.J., concurring).

Additionally, with Justice Graves's express disavowal of Kotila in his dissent in , four members of this Court have cast votes that necessarily demonstrate their disagreement with Kotila's holding regarding the application of  (Criminal Attempt) to methamphetamine manufacturing offenses. See  (Keller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);  (Lambert, C.J., dissenting in part, joined by  (, dissenting).

Since Kotila was rendered, over two years ago, it has become increasingly clear that Justice Graves was correct in that requiring possession of all the chemicals or equipment to uphold a conviction under  defies common sense. And though considerations of stare decisis would normally guide us to adhere to Kotila, we simply cannot overlook the fact that the Court's reasoning in subsequent decisions addressing  has already departed significantly from the bright-line rule. Therefore, we go one step further and hold that HN2 Kotila's construction of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) was incorrect.

[*604] We do not reverse Kotila lightly. As the dissent observes in its extensive [**9] discussion, HN3 stare decisis is an important guiding principle in American jurisprudence. On that point, we are in complete agreement. However, as this Court has noted recently, the doctrine of stare decisis does not commit us to the sanctification of ancient or relatively recent fallacy. While we recognize this Court should decide cases with a respect for precedent, this respect does not require blind imitation of the past or unquestioned acceptance ad infinitum. Rather, in many ways, respect for precedent demands proper reconsideration when we find sound legal reasons to question the correctness of our prior analysis.

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