NATO won’t shape I-law.
Aurel 1AC Sari 19, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter; Director, Exeter Centre for International Law; Fellow, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; Fellow, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, “The Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties: The Challenge of Hybrid Threats,” Harvard National Security Journal, Volume 10, https://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2019/06/Mutual-Assistance-Clauses-of-the-North-Atlantic-and-EU-Treaties.pdf
The legal challenges that hybrid threats present for collective security guarantees have been recognized at the highest political level. At their Warsaw summit held in July 2016, NATO’s member states confirmed their readiness to assist each other at any stage of a hybrid campaign and to counter hybrid warfare as part of collective defense.294 They also underscored that the North Atlantic Council “could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”295 They repeated these points at their Brussels summit in July 2018.296 By drawing an express link between hybrid warfare and collective defense, NATO leaders signaled their resolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out.297 Still, their declarations of intent strike a rather conservative note. Whilst they accept that NATO may assist an Ally at any stage of a “hybrid campaign,” it is only in cases of “hybrid warfare” that they foresee a potential role for Article 5. This is not an unreasonable position to take. As we saw earlier, recourse to the use of force to counter hybrid threats falling below the threshold of an armed attack is neither permissible nor necessarily appropriate. A pledge to invoke the mutual defense commitment in response to every type of hybrid threat would be a promise to use the proverbial sledgehammer to crack a nut. It would be unrealistic and therefore lack credibility in the eyes of hybrid adversaries.298 By accepting that the role of Article 5 is confined to situations of hybrid warfare, the Warsaw and Brussels Summit Declarations avoid such empty gestures. However, in the same breath they also concede that the application of Article 5 is contingent on the legal threshold between warfare and peace, and thus vulnerable to subversion along the lines discussed in the preceding sections.
It may be tempting to deal with the problem of legal thresholds by attempting to escape them altogether, but this is not a feasible strategy. Even if the contracting parties were to revise Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU to avoid references to “armed attack” and “armed aggression,”299 they would remain bound by the rules governing the use of force under the UN Charter and customary international law. Although the member states of NATO and the EU make up an influential part of the international community, it is not within their ability to adjust these general rules of international law unilaterally. In any event, lowering the threshold for the use of force in order to facilitate the application of Article 5 and Article 42(7) would come with significant costs, since it would loosen the legal restrictions for all states, including hostile powers. The applicable thresholds therefore cannot be unilaterally modified at will and without the risk of unraveling key elements of the international legal order as it currently stands.
A more promising approach is to strengthen legal interoperability among NATO and EU nations. One line of effort is to reduce legal gray zones,300 for example by narrowing disagreements over the gap that lies between the definition of force and armed attack. This could prepare the ground for developing a shared understanding of what kind of hybrid threats may trigger the applicability of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU. Given that the assessment of any security threat depends heavily on its context, it may prove somewhat sterile to build such a consensus in the abstract. Drawing on war-gaming and exercises may offer a more fruitful way forward. Bearing in mind how attractive the use of proxies is to a hybrid state adversary,301 developing a common approach to attribute their activities to the sponsoring state also merits attention. Although many aspects of the rules governing the attribution of wrongful acts are settled, certain questions could benefit from a joint posture.302 NATO and EU nations should also strengthen their collective mechanisms for unmasking attempts at plausible deniability in order to deny its use as a hybrid instrument,303 as illustrated by their united response to the Skripal incident and to Russian cyber operations.304