Lack of consensus turns the case – conflicting standards produce unclear thresholds that undercut deterrence.
Tertrais ’16 [Bruno; Deputy Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, member of the committees of White Papers on Defence and National Security, former Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the Ministry of Defense; April 2016; “Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: Its Origins, Meaning and Future”; http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10238; NATO Defense College, No. 130] *Edited in brackets for reading clarity.
The Alliance has made progress in deterring and protecting against such threats. Protecting against a limited ballistic strike from the Middle East was the rationale for NATO’s ballistic missile defense program. It is today an operational capability. The cyber threat is now recognized as having the potential to be considered, under some circumstances, an “armed attack.”16 But faced with a limited attack, NATO should not expect that Article 5 will be automatically, swiftly and unanimously declared (and the history of the past 25 years highlights the relevance of these doubts). If coming from Russia, it should be expected that several member states will hesitate before taking steps that may commit them to war with Moscow. This includes not only a “Northern contingency” (in the Baltic region or in the High North), but also a scenario where Russia forcefully responds on Turkish territory to what it would, rightly or wrongly, see as provocation by Ankara.
Attribution will be a problem in many instances; even assuming that this issue is solved, some member countries might hesitate in acknowledging the adversary’s responsibility, especially if the latter – as should be expected – embarks on massive propaganda aimed at influencing their public opinions.
Finally, a 30 plus-country alliance (if two or more countries joined) would be less likely to reach consensus on the urgency to declare Article 5 faced with a limited attack than it would have been when NATO included only half that number (which was the case during most of the Cold War). As a result, “what might count locally as an intolerable assault on the Baltic States’ sovereignty may not be seen in Brussels as an ‘armed attack’ for Article 5 purposes. [...] All the strength of the world’s mightiest military alliance will not amount to much if its members cannot agree when an aggressor has actually stepped over the line.”17
NATO should expect that its potential aggressors are smart. Having learned from the history of warfare and terrorism, an adversary could organize fake civilian accidents, launch false flag operations, embark on sabotage, commit acts of terrorism, abduct foreign citizens, claim a “right of hot pursuit” on Alliance territory under a false pretext, etc.18
Incursions of security forces and militia (so-called “little green men”) – a subset of what Russia calls “hybrid warfare” – are the hardest to deter and defend against. Northern European security analysts are right to ask the following question: “to what extent is NATO’s legal framework ready to deal with modern warfare? [...] Supposing a Crimea-like situation occurs in Narva, Estonia, for example. Can Article 5 be called on if there is no armed attack, but instead, what Russia would call a ‘democratic right of self-determination of the same nature as Kosovo and Crimea’?”19 It would be impossible to declare that any form of externally-induced political destabilization is an “armed attack.” A positive answer to the question asked would be impossible to reach unanimously and would stretch the definition of an “armed attack” to the implausible.
Legal history provides a useful guide to what an armed attack is in international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its seminal Nicaragua decision (1986), stated that it includes “the sending of or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregular or mercenaries” provided that said State has “effective” control [over] them. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, for its part, judges that “overall” control is sufficient.