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Ambiguity deters attacks -- clarification encourages attackers and causes alliance disputes.

Davis '19 [Susan; 4/18/19; General Rapporteur to the NATO parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee; "NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defense, Stabilizing Deterrence," https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-04/087_STC_19_E%20-%20NATO.pdf]

60. NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages, but also poses distinct challenges.

61. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers treading lightly. A similarly vague deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War. However, ambiguity on where the threshold lies could indeed lead an opponent who is sufficiently comfortably with taking risks, to continuously exploit the ‘grey zones’, test the defender’s resolve, and conduct ever more daring cyber attacks.

62. If the Alliance were to set a clear threshold, the opponent would better understand how to stay below that threshold. This would strengthen deterrence of threats above the threshold but would encourage the opponent to increase attacks just below the threshold. Arguably, the solution for such attacks cannot be found in deterrence, but rather in clearly defined policy response for hybrid operations. Despite its best efforts, the Alliance continues to struggle to develop such options. Setting specific thresholds without strong options for hybrid operations would only encourage more of them. Moreover, the Allies could also find it hard to agree on and perhaps also credibly commit to a specific threshold. Thus, on balance, the policy of ambiguity on thresholds makes sense.

63. NATO’s ambiguity also extends to the type of punishment it threatens were it to suffer a cyber attack. The Alliance has made clear that it neither limits punishment to similar cyber attacks nor excludes them. Instead, it keeps the option open to use the full range of Allied capabilities to deter and counter cyber attacks. Once again, this introduces useful doubt in an opponent’s mind. While NATO would retaliate in a proportional manner, it could do so through similar cyber attacks, air strikes, or worse. A more technical reason for the difficulty of restricting retaliation to cyber attacks is that it is hard to credibly threaten the assets of the attacker in a similar fashion. If an attacker shuts down a power plant, would the Alliance have cyber options to attack an opponent’s power plants or similar infrastructure? Would NATO even want to if it could?

64. On balance, NATO’s ambiguity on the type of retaliation serves a convincing purpose. It produces doubts in the would-be attacker’s mind and presents more options to tailor and scale a response to re-establish deterrence. That being said, in practice, this so-called cross-domain deterrence can be complicated, problematic, and difficult to control (Nye, 2017). For example, proportional response in the mind of the defender might look escalatory to the attacker.

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